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Even without the pressures of a financial crisis, the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) in 
UK banks occupied a potentially conflicted role during 2007 – 9.  The Boards of 
banks had created the CRO role with responsibility for managing commercial 
risk but also for producing public risk reports within a system of enforced self-
regulation.  Under this system, the regulator seeks to overcome control 
asymmetries by harnessing the governance resources of regulated organizations.  
Theoretical perspectives of regulation in action, informal groups in 
organizations, and individual risk perception, indicated that CROs‟ dilemmas 
merited further study.  Banks‟ selective risk reporting practices were under-
represented, with scholarly knowledge seemingly limited by difficulties of 
access and trust.  This research overcomes these limitations, gaining access to a 
closed group to conduct qualitative depth interviews with bank senior managers 
including 35 CROs (one-third of known incumbents in 2007). 
Ideas of enforced self-regulation were found not to account fully for banks‟ risk 
reporting practices.  The regulator was little-respected, mistrusted, and had 
limited influence over bankers‟ behaviour.  Within a bank the CRO, though 
formally identified with risk governance, was informally pressed by powerful 
sales-side groups to report optimistically.  Seeking senior management support to 
resist this pressure, many CROs instead found their Board prioritising sales 
activity over risk governance.  Though employed as compliance managers, many 
CROs reinterpreted their role as a commercial support function, becoming 
coping agents for banks‟ creative risk reporting. 
Enforced self-regulation does not restrain organizations whose reward systems 
reinforce asymmetries of control, whose economic power exceeds that of 
governments attempting to regulate them, and whose sales culture aggressively 
dictates organizational norms.  New approaches are suggested to recognise and 
prevent conduct which increases financial market fragility.   
This thesis provides wider lessons for the relationships between organizational 
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The research which follows began in 2006 as an investigation into the way banks 
behave when responding to regulatory demands. This was to include an 
investigation into the way that banks‟ Chief Risk Officers (CROs) appeared to be 
compromising the findings of their risk tests by presenting unrepresentative 
information to the regulator.  It appeared at that time that the degree and nature 
of banks‟ compliance with regulators‟ demands was significantly under-
researched. What soon emerged from CROs‟ narrated accounts of their 
experiences was the existence of a more complex range of coping behaviour, 
producing an unforeseen range of consequences, including a global market crash 
in 2008.  
 
The research was not intended to predict, let alone find the root cause of, the 
financial crisis of 2008, whose effects are still being felt today. However, when 
banking market shocks began to occur during the main field research period 
(2007 – 9), the research gained topical significance and benefited from vivid new 
empirical material.  Any prescience of topic choice was unintentional – although 





CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION       
 
“An act, a habit, an institution, a law produces not only one effect, 
but a series of effects. Of these effects, the first alone is 
immediate; it appears simultaneously with its cause; it is seen. 
The other effects emerge only subsequently; they are not seen; we 
are fortunate if we foresee them.  …The good economist takes 
into account both the effect that can be seen and those effects that 
must be foreseen; [he] pursues a great good to come, at the risk of 
a small present evil.” 
      Bastiat (1848, p.1)   
 
1.1  Research overview 
This research investigates how Chief Risk Officers (CROs) of banks in the UK 
cope with their regulatory compliance obligations.  It also asks whether CROs 
adopt coping strategies to balance regulators‟ demands for compliance reporting 
against employer banks‟ demands for profitable trading.  To discover this, 
original research collects and examines CROs‟ narrated accounts of their 
experiences as they attempt to make sense of these conflicting demands, and 
identifies coping strategies used as a result.  CROs were invited to talk about 
their relationships with regulatory agency staff, their bank‟s sales staff and senior 
management colleagues.  The research reflects on the extent to which all those 
involved might be described as having engaged in a nuanced version of 
compliance, and suggests that compliance should be characterised as a scale, 
rather than a binary choice. 
 
The research enquires into, and locates within existing social studies, the nature 
of the risk officers‟ creative responses to regulators‟ demands for information.  
This topic was already significant before the international banking crash of 2008 
and has since become a matter of pressing concern for public policymakers. 
 
Studies conducted in other sectors indicate, as will be seen, that many managers 
are complicit in enacting coping responses to regulators‟ demands, such as 
interpreting newly-imposed rules in ways which favour continuation of existing 
behaviour.  Until the present study there was no primary research into this 




This gap in research knowledge among banks has persisted for several reasons.  
There are significant obstacles to access to the relevant respondent group:  
Gaining initial access to, and holding the confidence of, a closed and elite 
professional subgroup is a particular challenge.  In addition to overcoming the 
sector‟s cultural exclusivity, it is clearly challenging for an external researcher to 
ask any senior officer in a high-value business to volunteer information which 
might be seen as self-incriminating.  With a  history of confidential contact with 
senior bankers, this researcher has had access to an otherwise closed group, and 
has been able to maintain their trust once admitted.  This access, and the 
subsequent support of respondents who entrusted the researcher with sensitive 
revelations, are distinctive assets of this project.   
  
The working hypothesis has been that we may expect to find among banks in the 
UK, as already found in other British business sectors, that coping
1
 compliance 
is a common response to a regulator‟s demands for information.  It suggests that, 
in the banking sector, coping takes a distinctive form:  the role creation and 
deployment of a CRO.  It is further suggested that this officer, though charged 
with responsibility for public reporting of risk, when asked by the regulator for 
information will in practice act consistently with banks‟ established coping 
behaviour – that is, by supporting commercial imperatives.  
 
For similar reasons to the difficulties in obtaining initial access to CROs, one 
might also predict that there would be resistance to any research attempt to 
acknowledge or discuss the phenomenon of coping.  As well as plainly rational 
concerns to avoid self-incrimination, this outcome would reflect an established 
(if tacit) corporate culture of “holding the line”.  Given an established 
professional means of access to the respondent group, the greater research 
challenge has been to obtain responses with robust validity. 
 
                                                 
1
 “Coping” is here initally used in the sense of “incomplete” compliance.  Concepts of “coping 
behaviour” are considered in further detail in Chapter 3.  
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1.2  Research motivation 
The research aims to produce an objective review of coping behaviour and 
strategies among a group which has not previously been studied in this regard.  
Original findings from a previously little-observed group can be a sound premise 
for further research with the wider aim of informing a continuing public policy 
debate around effective regulatory design. 
 
The researcher‟s previous work in senior Corporate Affairs roles in the financial 
sector involved, among other tasks, presenting banks‟ public policy rationales to 
the government of the day and provided informal access to senior bankers over a 
more than a decade.  In the course of this many anecdotes were heard implying 
that there were frequent informal trade-offs between a regulator‟s compliance 
demand and what response a bank deemed practical.  Intriguingly, rules appeared 
not to be absolute but somehow negotiable;  this phenomenon appeared to merit 
further, structured study. 
 
Having explored academic research in the field, it appeared that the phenomenon 
of coping
2
 had not previously been studied among banks‟ senior risk staff.  It 
had, though, been studied among senior managers in other regulated fields, 
giving rise to a hope that new empirical research might expect to find analogous 
behaviour among bankers.  The present research addresses this shortfall in the 
literature. 
 
A first step in establishing understanding is to consider fields of research 
informing the topic.  Literatures of relevant fields will be explored in Chapter 3.  
An initial view of relevant research concerns now follows, starting with an 
overview of the scholarship of risk, regulation and organizations. 
 
                                                 
2
  This term will be further defined and considered in the course of the thesis 
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1.3 Scholarly interest in Risk regulation and 
organizational responses  
Theories of organizational risk management connect to many different fields of 
scholarly work:  Epistemologies range from mathematics (such as Black and 
Scholes‟s [1973] pricing formula) to criminology (Sykes and Matza, 1957). Its 
academic pioneers include mathematicians (Bernouilli [1738], Bayes [1763]), 
social anthropologists (Cohen [1970], Marsh and Fox [1992]), social scientists 
(Perrow, 1984), social psychologists (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1974) and 
lawyers (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).  Its consumers include corporate boards 
(Walker, 2009), emergency planners (Cabinet Office, 2002), systems engineers 
(Kletz, 1993) and product designers (HSE, 2009).  From amongst many 
conceptual strands it was necessary to identify those which could best inform the 
purpose of this  research.  The salient fields of scholarship are theories of risk 
regulatory compliance; of the behaviour of organizations in response to 
regulators‟ demands; and of risk perception by the individual (in this case, bank 
risk officer) trying to overcome uncertainty and conflicts of purpose in a 
corporate risk management role. 
 
The importance of the interaction between government risk regulation and 
organizational response cannot be ignored. It is evident in the popular media that 
risk regulation and organizations‟ response to it are now prevalent concerns for 
the British public.  A preliminary subject scan of the phrase “risk regulation” 
sourced across BBC Online‟s weekly news confirmed this, showing popular 
news media concern with such topics as: Biotechnology - the urge to rethink GM 
food bans; estate agents “need regulating” and related Office of Fair Trading 
crackdown; the call to regulate “unorthodox” (acupuncture and herbal) therapies; 
Law Commission to consider introducing private claims for consumer 
compensation; eBay‟s  plan to force Paypal use barred by Australian trade 
regulator; speculation as to whether the sale of extended warranties will be 
controlled; police firearms training death as an “extremely rare event” in a 
heavily regulated setting; rail engineering disruptions for passengers criticised by 
regulator; water regulator fine depresses utility company profits; voluntary code 




These stories are characteristic of a distinct topic of public interest, a news 
subgenre which might be termed “risk control stories” (Brighton and Foy, 2007).  
For the news organizations producing them, such stories have the merit of 
making money by simply adding public outrage or moral panic to pre-existing 
news analysis (Cohen, 1972; Sandman, 1987; Pidgeon, Kasperson and Slovic, 
2003).  Regardless of the supply-and-demand mechanisms of news production, 
the persistence of news headlines about risk control supports a research starting-
point that the control of risk is now a routine concern for the British citizen. A 
large body of academic work substantiates the point that civil society regards 
risk as a significant topic – especially its perception, dynamics, and regulation – 
with far-reaching impacts on multiple areas of society and public policy design 
(e.g. Douglas, 1986; Beck, 1999; Slovic, 1993).  As news headlines suggest, the 
topic of linkage between regulation and human behaviour continues to interest 
the popular media. 
 
The following research considers impacts on UK bankers of a trend in British 
public perception of risk.  Public anger at bankers following the 2007 - 8 credit 
crisis adds a topical edge to the more longstanding concerns addressed  by this 
research.  As first conceived in 2005, this research proposed to explore the 
phenomenon that bankers appear to adopt a compromising attitude towards 
regulators.  The events of 2007 - 8 sharply raised public and political concern 
around this point. 
 
Whilst there is much discussion of the notion that business interests tend to 
deflect attempted regulation (Kagan and Scholz, 1984; Braithwaite, 1982; Black 
and Rouch, 2008), before 2008 there appears to have been little direct 
questioning of UK-based deposit taking bankers themselves on the subject.  A 
hint of bankers‟ collective attitude may occasionally be glimpsed, for example in 
this passage from a banking sector newsletter at the height of the credit crisis: 
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“Complying with [FSA] rules is a science and occasionally an art.  
…A good relationship with supervisory contacts can have a 
positive impact [and] can often tilt the balance away from 
enforcement action.  Given its limited resources, the FSA usually 
prefers to conclude swiftly. …The FSA brings enforcement action 
based on high-level principles… so there may be room for debate 
about what conduct warrants a penalty and what is simply failure 
to achieve perfection or „best practice‟.  Remember also that the 
Tribunal [regulatory decision review body] has made applicant-
friendly decisions in the recent past.   Take comfort that UK fines 
are rare and usually small.”     (Morris and Shanahan, 2008) 
 
The seemingly general acceptance of the regulator‟s “light-touch” approach 
(interpreted in practice by many regulatees as “laissez-faire” or even “hands 
off”) suggested the merit of research along the lines of:  Does such behaviour 
reflect a belief within the industry that the regulator has been suppressed? – 
perhaps by “regulatory capture” (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992), or other means?  
Are practitioners careless of the penalties?  Or is the relationship between 
regulator and regulatee more complicated?    
 
The remainder of this chapter will begin to expand on these initial questions.  
Bankers‟ behaviour may be better understood in the context of the sector‟s 
history of risk governance; Chapter 2 will consider this history, including the 
emergence of the CRO, before the thesis continues in a conventional structure 
(see 1.6 below). 
 
1.4  Why research compliance? 
Academic research suggests that managers in various regulated sectors may be 
tempted to decide for themselves whether or not to comply with any given rule, 
depending on whether they think the rule suits their own purposes.  Studies of 
managers around the world and in a number of sectors have identified a common 
range of coping responses that may arise when a regulator intervenes in their 
work. Previously researched sectors include food retail (Fairman and Yapp, 
2005), medical care (Bevan and Hood, 2005), pharmaceutical research (McGoey, 
2007), maritime safety (Gunningham, 2009), and consumer financial services 
(Broadbent, Jacobs and Laughlin, 2001).  Observed responses typically range 
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from patient or impatient acceptance, through tacit disregard, to subversion, or 
other forms of defiance, even (rarely) including expressions of open hostility.   
 
The study field of organizational behaviour in response to regulation – 
“compliance culture” – is still emergent and suggests fertile ground for research 
initiatives.  Recent research (Hood [2002]; Fairman and Yapp [2005]; Hutter 
[2001]; Kodate and Dodds [2009]) has suggested the notion of cognitive framing 
by which regulated individuals conceive compliance.  These research findings 
are thematically linked in that they observe that compliance and non-compliance 
should not be regarded as binary opposites:  Rather, as can be observed, a 
regulated person‟s behaviour lies somewhere along a continuum “scale of intent 
to comply”, with exact position along the scale varying over time in response to 
new experiences, revised risk information, and changing perceptions.  Factors 
which influence a given actor‟s position on this scale may include how fair or 
relevant a new rule appears to be; how the regulator‟s staff behave; how (or if) 
an employer signals that compliance is expected; and how much informal group 
pressure there is to obey or ignore controls. 
 
If compliance should be reconceived as a model “scale of intent”, as distinct 
from a binary indicator (either compliant or non-compliant), this calls into 
question certain conventional assumptions about how regulation operates in the 
real world.  A view of the regulatory domain as a negotiating space also raises 
questions about the extent to which apparent compliance is the same as real 
compliance, and whether either of these states has any meaning in a sector where 
regulation has been seen to fail. 
 
Even without the topical backdrop of a crisis of public confidence – as with 
banking regulation following the credit crunch – we might expect recent research 
insights into behaviour to present a good opportunity to challenge certain 
assumptions made by policymakers about regulatory efficacy.  There are two 
prime focuses for this challenge.  The first is one described here as the 
“Newtonian assumption”:  This is the rationalist premise that regulated actors 
“know what‟s good for them” and so may be expected to self-correct deviant 
behaviour after new regulations are imposed.  Those who draft new regulation 
18 
 
expecting a rational response, and good conduct, rely upon this assumption.  The 
second assumption regards over-reliance on indicator systems and implicitly the 
devaluing of personal and empirical experience of risk-taking.  This may be 
described as the “models assumption”.  In the UK banking sector, it refers to 
regulators‟ belief – or hope – that control systems are effective as long as they 
are well-populated by market-derived risk models. By March 2009 the regulator 
admitted to a “misplaced reliance on sophisticated maths to manage risks” 
(Turner, 2009). 
 
Recent bank failures beg research questions which challenge these assumptions.  
Before considering how research might address this, it is useful to reflect on the 
obstacles which face any attempt to regulate modern banking. 
 
   
1.5  Why is banking hard to  regulate? 
As this subsection will consider, the business of banking presents unique and 
complex challenges to designers of regulation. As a result  the sector is 
inherently attractive to students of regulatory design.  Nor is this just a matter of 
academic interest. A reliable commercial banking system is of critical 
importance: enabling world trade, supporting nations‟ economic stability, and 
handling cash as a utility service to citizens.  Yet as modern banking services 
have evolved, various factors have begun to make banks increasingly hard to 
regulate.  These are now examined. 
 
Firstly, there is asymmetry of knowledge between providers – in this case, banks 
– and purchasers (and indeed the wider community).  Banking products are 
complex and largely virtual; that is, intangible.  Complex contracts may be 
unintelligible even to the bank staff who market them, let alone any agency 
tasked with supervising them.  Allied to this is the use of complex mathematical 
and monetised models of risk to calibrate regulatory standards, even though 
these models are unilaterally assembled by banks‟ risk specialists. No matter 
how complex the maths, such econometric models do not represent, or support, 




Secondly, there is fragmentation between various banking activities and the 
regulatory frameworks that seek to control them.  Banking business tends to 
consist of many, typically diffuse, elements whose control regimes follow 
disconnected regulatory standards.  These standards tend to have originated in 
distinct fields of professional practice such as audit, actuarial, fund management, 
treasury accounting, securities trading, share ownership, and consumer debt 
protection.  The drivers of these various regulatory standards reflect their variety 
of origins, in professions with diverse aims such as:  Fair statement of value; 
objective assessment of risk in markets, credit or contracts; transparency; or 
good governance.  Moreover, many banking activities are simply not regulated:  
The US Federal Reserve‟s admission in 2010 that the hedge fund or “shadow 
banking” (unregulated products) market may be twice the size of the regulated 
market is a chilling reminder of the scale of the regulator‟s ignorance of trading 
activities  (Pozsar, Tobias, Ashcraft and Boesky, 2010). 
 
Thirdly, although they often trade separately from one another, banking markets 
are to a great extent interdependent, deciding commodity values on the basis of 
other markets‟ perceptions of value.  Although commercial operating units may 
be fragmented, many elements of trading are close-coupled; that is, each 
element‟s performance may depend strongly on what other elements are doing.  
Interdependencies exist between products, institutions, and national and 
international markets.  Two notable risks produced by this linkage are contagion 
(the tendency of one market or nation to respond adversely to neighbouring 
events, whether this response is rational or not); and offshoring  (the perverse 
incentive to contract for risks across or beyond national boundaries).  These risks 
in banking occur beyond the jurisdictional reach of nation-state regulators. 
 
Fourthly, the banking sector has a dominant presence in some nations‟ 
economies, notably the US and UK.  Other business sectors, and the public 
sector, are affected by this asymmetry of economic power.  In a bank which has 
greater economic power than the nation-state which hosts its offices, sales staff 
may be willing to exploit this dominance to resist local regulators‟ attempts at 
control.  Economic asymmetry may therefore produce asymmetry of public 
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control, or regulatory capture (Bernstein, 1955; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992); 
the observed tendency of a dominant sector to exert control over public policy 
and regulatory agendas.  As a business largely selling virtualised products, a 
bank facing regulatory changes can threaten to move its business base away to a 
new jurisdiction, out of a host country, so removing tax revenues and earnings 
streams from that country.  Similarly, banks are aware of their own corporate 
longevity; they may exploit this to engage robustly with the government of the 
day and to dismiss short-term policy initiatives, knowing that the bank will far 
outlast the tenure of any minister or government. 
 
Fifthly, the regulator‟s lack of resources is also an issue: the volumes and 
complexity of banking transactions are simply too great to be capable of 
thorough supervision; hence the appeal of a system of enforced self-regulation as 
a way to overcome the regulator‟s resource shortfall.  
 
Sixthly, in the absence of concerted  public advocacy to challenge the sector, a 
regulator may not expect to receive popular support; this may further encourage 
regulated practitioners to defy attempts at control (Ayres and Braithwaite‟s 
[1992] “counter-capture”).  Again despite the clear social consequences of a 
credit crunch, it has remained difficult for the lay public to connect the damage 
caused by “big finance” to intelligible sources of blame.  Although the UK‟s 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) was tasked with protecting the public 
interest, and although banks were held in low public esteem even before the 
2008 crisis, to date there has been no successful attempt to harness hostile public 
opinion against the industry over the long term (compared with, for  example, the 
founding of the Consumers Association to combat the sale of unsafe goods in the 
1960s).  As nascent protest groups may have found, it is hard to define, locate, or 
draw attention to “toxic financial waste sites” in the virtual-product landscape of 
banking.  Compared with, for example, the empirically detectable trails of 
environmental damage left behind by conventional heavy industries, banking 
catastrophes merely leave protestors chasing intangible abstractions. Less than 
two years after a collapse of global banking markets, an environmental 
catastrophe associated with BP in the Gulf of Mexico raised a wave of public 
outrage more visceral than any protest directed at the banks, even though the 
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economic damage to BP, at 50 billion US dollars, was a fraction of the sums 
required for taxpayer-funded bailouts of individual US or UK banks. 
  
For all the reasons stated above,  it can be seen that banking is a difficult sector 
to regulate.  For many academic analysts, a rational response to such challenges 
is to invoke enforced self-regulation, which holds out the promise of control by 
pressing the industry‟s own reporting systems into the service of the regulator.  
Even after the onset of the latest banking crisis, policymakers continued for some 
months to advocate the banks‟ own argument that reporting responsibility is best 
left to expert practitioners. More than three years later, the extent of failure of a 
regime of enforced self-regulation – which banks had enthusiastically supported 
– is becoming clearer, yet the improvement made by proposed new regulation is 
also hard to qualify.  The UK regulator has only recently started to refer to a 
“conduct risk” approach (FSA [2011, 2012]), which seeks to control behaviour 
by direct observation, as opposed to regulating by econometrics or product 
design;  a focus which public interests would appear to welcome. 
 
A banking regulator faces a particularly acute problem of practical engagement 
with  regulated businesses.  Although a policy of enforced self-regulation carries 
good intentions, the operational realities of banking impose unique burdens on 
any regulator seeking to apply them in practice.  Banks deploy complex 
instruments and processes; the volumes of transactions they generate, and the 
associated data, are far too large to be fully overseen; whether monetary or 
event-triggered, the value-component of some contracts tests the limits of human 
comprehension; and the commodity being traded is, for all practical purposes, 
virtual.  A limited number of supervisors, often lacking expert knowledge, face 
the prospect of engaging with all of this in a high-speed trading environment 
where access to time with business principals is limited and where interruptions 
by outsiders (especially “cost centre types”) are unwelcome.   
 
Commercial practitioners do recognise that enforced self-regulation is a plausible 
approach for a regulator to adopt to try to manage such difficulties.  A new 
regulator such as the FSA (in 1997), faced with massive asymmetries of 
information, quantity and quality of staff, may feel more or less compelled to 
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enlist the resources of the industry it supervises.  To deflect the criticism that this 
strategy is really no more than co-optation, and to attempt to create a deterrent 
effect, the regulator may also punctuate routine monitoring with a few acts of 
symbolic enforcement, such as heavy fines or highly-publicised arrests of 
practitioners suspected  of  misconduct. 
 
1.6  Overview of structure 
Regulation of banking is a topic deserving close study, this thesis suggests, not 
so much because of one recent market shock but because of the continuing 
difficulty facing regulatory policymakers who wish to overcome the above-
mentioned problems of control design.  Add to these problems a trading context 
which – at least until the 2008 shock – allowed banks considerable leeway in the 
reporting of risk; a lack of concerted public challenge to this, with widespread 
ignorance of data manipulation and risks taken, and the subject becomes a 
compelling focus for original research.  The remainder of this thesis will address 
the topic with the following structure:  
 
In Chapter 2, banks‟ development of risk management, relationships with the 
regulator, and the Chief Risk Officer function are considered.  Attention is drawn 
to the origins of a situation in which the banking sector came to present strong 
and unique challenges for regulators.   
 
Chapter 3 then explores relevant previous research informing the development of 
present research questions, identifying the value of conducting original research 
to make good an apparent shortfall in the knowledge base.  In Chapter 4, 
methodology is advanced for a detailed study to test the contention that, at least 
until the events of 2008, banks‟ risk officers regarded coping as a normal and 
acceptable response to regulatory demands imposed on their sector.   
 
Chapters 5 to 7 present the resulting original field research, considering whether 
the new evidence supports a contention that bankers‟ notions of compliance may 
include factors not previously noted in studies of coping.  A research contention 
unique to the present project and sector is that the creation of the new 
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management role of CRO literally embodies, in human form, an extension of 
banks‟ long term strategy of deploying coping responses to the regulator‟s 
compliance demands. 
  
Chapter 8 concludes by bringing the findings together.  Besides improved 
understanding of coping phenomena in a new sector context, findings suggest 
new forms of action which regulators and market participants might wish to take 
to counter any tendencies to coping behaviour.  After presenting conclusions, the 
chapter also suggests directions for possible future research. Along the way, the 
research findings will be seen to indicate where there are analogies to be drawn  
between banking and other sectors where complex conceptions of compliance, 




CHAPTER 2: THE RESEARCH CONTEXT                       
2.1 Introduction:  UK banking industry context for the 
emergence of the Chief Risk Officer 
Chapter 1 introduced the topic of this research and argued that it merits new 
study: UK bank Chief Risk Officers‟ (CROs) experiences of noncompliant 
responses to regulators‟ requests for information.  The research will focus on 
gathering by interview, and reviewing, primary accounts of coping responses.  
Its aim is to improve scholarly understanding of banks‟ noncompliant response 
to a regulator‟s demands for risk reporting; a form of behaviour now regarded as 
a potentially significant factor in the banking market shocks of 2008 (Walker, 
2009; Wolf, 2009; Tett, 2010; Turner, 2009b, Lewis, 2010). 
 
Before considering relevant research studies in Chapter 3, and developing a 
detailed methodology for original research in Chapter 4, this chapter will reflect 
on the regulatory circumstances of the UK banking sector in 2008, to place 
interviewees‟ perceptions in their topical context.  Because UK banks have been 
criticised for enjoying special privileges (Black and Rouch, 2008), some 
knowledge of banks‟ antecedent relationship with regulators assists 
understanding of why public controls did not prevent bankers‟ excessive risk-
taking, and compromised reporting of risk, to be investigated later in this thesis. 
The CRO role, created in part in response to the regulator‟s concerns in the early 
2000s, is central to this understanding and to the research which can develop 
understanding further.  As will be seen, the role may be conceived as 
representing – even embodying – certain organizational coping strategies, which 
are also to be considered in the research which follows. 
 
Between the deregulation of 1986 and the advent of the Financial Services 
Authority from 1997, regulation in UK financial markets co-evolved alongside 
the markets themselves.  Markets had a cultural history of vigorous, resilient and 
fast-innovating commercial practice (Knafo, 2008; Roberts, 2004; Christophers, 
2012).  This research is concerned with exploring whether that tradition may 
have continued, however tacitly, to inform modern banking practice and how 
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regulators now interact with bankers who may invoke it.  The current chapter 
summarising regulatory development is intended only to point to significant 
differences in the way that financial markets and governments characterise risk.  
Having set public risk management concerns within this context in Chapter 2, the 
thesis progresses conventionally from Chapter 3, moving to consider relevant 
theory and unanswered questions. 
 
Chapter 2 therefore now considers factors shaping the culture of risk 
management in UK banks, including developments in regulation.  This culture 
may be expected to inform bankers‟ routine activities, commercial decisions, and 
interactions with regulators.  Chapter 2 also outlines the role and powers of a 
CRO as conceived by the regulator; banks‟ conceptions of the role may be 
revealed subsequently in new research.   
 
2.2 Changing dynamics of risk management and 
regulation in UK banks 
Any study of banks‟ interactions with a regulator might benefit from first noting 
the context of how the current regulatory regime came to exist, shaping bankers‟ 
interactions with regulators.  This section will identify the regulatory system 
prevailing in 2008, and its antecedents, as these informed banks‟ culture of 
commercial practice and regulatory compliance. 
 
2.2.1  Early developments, to 1986 
London banks have a history of self-confidence which is partly due to their 
historical good fortune of being located in a major hub for international 




 centuries, Britain enjoyed 
effective control of many overseas trading opportunities, with London as a centre 
for easy maritime access to the Baltic, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and 
exporting from a booming domestic manufacturing base (Black, 1989).  In the 
same period, wars in continental Europe encouraged commercially active 
migrants to move their trading operations to London as a safe haven, devising 
“new techniques of financing” to integrate with England‟s self-interested 
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banking community (Knafo, 2008).  By the time London had become the world‟s 
busiest port, in 1700 (Roberts, 2004), dedicated merchant banks had evolved to 
finance overseas trade.  Through the 19
th
 century the City massively developed 
its capacity for market-making, to capitalize the ever-larger projects emerging 
from the industrial revolution: new manufacturing technologies; new national 
infrastructures, such as rail transport and supply utilities, in the UK and around 
the world; and even the national (“sovereign”) debts of other countries. 
 
Initially protected only by early commercial law,  and reliance on a strong 
tradition of oral contract-making (“my word is my bond”) (Knafo, 2008), market 
participants regarded the possibility of a bank failing as a normal hazard of 
commerce (Mackay 1841/1996;  Kindleberger, 1978/2000).  As a new science of 
risk management began to develop, commercial operators began to question the 
inevitability of certain types of loss, devising financial and practical loss-
prevention measures such as insurance (Bernstein, 1996).  Nevertheless, collapse 
of a bank continued to be seen as unpreventable (Kindleberger, 1978/2000), until 
in 1890 a major shock passed the Bank of England
3
 de facto responsibility for 
supervising risk:  The Barings crisis. 
 
Barings Bank found itself credit-squeezed in 1890 and its Directors begged the 
Governor of the Bank of England to “do something, or say something, to relieve 
people‟s minds [because] they have made up their minds that something awful is 
up” (Kindleberger, 1978, p.152).  The Bank of England stepped in as “lender of 
last resort”, carrying Barings‟ commercial risk and helping to assemble a 
syndicate of other banks to fund a rescue and avert systemic collapse.   
 
Other shocks, such as the recession following the collapse of confidence in stock 
markets in the 1930s, were also popularly blamed on speculative financial 
markets, and central banks‟ failures of supervision (Roberts, 2004).  Yet until as 
late as 1979, each practitioner group within the UK financial market – including 
                                                 
3
 Originally a government agency for marketing war bonds, the Bank of England 
evolved to become an official handler of government debt, and so regarded as the City‟s 
senior banking institution 
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bankers, accountants, insurers, and share traders – continued to self-govern, 
designing rules to protect their own commercial interests and continuity.   
 
2.2.2  Two major changes of regulatory approach in the UK 
financial sector, 1986 - 2008 
It is significant for banks‟ relationships with their regulator that since 1986 they 
have been subject to two fundamental changes in regulatory policy.  Both of 
these new policy initiatives have given bankers regulatory controls based on self-
reporting.  Both regulatory systems thus offered opportunities for bankers to 
engage in creative compliance – that is, the manipulation and exploiting of the 
“spaces between” formally presented rules to circumvent any controls which 
might disturb commercial market-making (McBarnet and Whelan, 2011).  Before 
the market shocks of 2008 many financial market practitioners had regarded the 
previous twenty years of credit-driven growth as the natural and benign outcome 
of these two public policy stimuli.  
 
The first of these policy initiatives was the Conservative government‟s wholesale 
market deregulation of 1986, which permitted banks to trade in commercial debt, 
diversify trading activities and reduce their capital constraints.  This “big bang” 
(as the Financial Services Act 1986 was popularly known) also relaxed the rules 
on cross-ownership between different types of financial institution.  The 1986 
initiative encouraged rapid agglomeration of financial trading entities into multi-
service financial groups, blurring public perception of the distinctions between 
various activities such as retail and commercial banking, insurance and securities 
trading, such that a failure of any one type of business might raise questions 
about quality of controls in the sector as a whole (Walker, 2010).   
 
Secondly, in 1997 an incoming Labour government created a new independent 
regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), in part in response to popular 
perceptions that since 1986 the financial sector‟s system of a voluntary Self 
Regulating Organization (SRO) for each financial market had failed to prevent 
abuses (Walker, 2010).  In place of SROs, the FSA introduced a system of 
enforced self-regulation, a control mechanism advocated by Braithwaite (1982), 
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which required businesses to bring to their own resources to bear on informing 
rule-making, risk reporting and compliance, under threat of formal prosecution 
for non-compliance.  HM Government gave the FSA a broad remit, including 
statutory objectives to oversee wholesale and retail financial market standards; to 
support orderly markets and public confidence; and to prosecute rule-breakers 
(FSA, 1997).  In spite of these powers, practical achieving of fully compliant 
behaviour might be expected to prove elusive, as the present study will explore. 
 
The FSA had been founded on an earnest intention, following loss of public trust 
in the 1986 self-regulatory system, as will now be considered.   
 
The FSA replaced former subsector self-regulators in securities, banking, mutual 
savings, fund management, consumer saving and paper trading (shares and 
derivatives).  The FSA was also subsequently tasked with preventing market 
abuse, and with supervising mortgages, general insurance, and dispute mediation 
(ombudsman schemes).  Its creation followed on from two notable control 
failures.  The first of these was the biggest bank fraud in history, at the Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International in London in 1991, which had raised 
questions about the adequacy of the City‟s supervision in general and the role of 
the Bank of England in particular:  The Bank of England, and by extension the 
City‟s whole regulatory apparatus, appeared to have wished to maintain market-
making whatever the ethical cost, and hence seemed more interested in self-
preservation than in effective intervention (Roberts, 2004).  Had a culture of 
“holding the line” (or its dark side, “co-optation” or “regulatory capture”) 
become normalised?:  
 
“These episodes fostered a perception among some sections of the 
public and politicians that fraud and wrongdoing were 
commonplace in the City and that the Bank of England was not 
up to the job.”   
(Roberts, 2004, p55) 
  
The Banking Act 1987 had provided a new framework for prudential control, in 
the form of Value-at-Risk
4
 (VaR) risk measurements.  Yet practical 
                                                 
4
 This factor is defined and expanded upon in section 2.2.5 below. 
29 
 
implementation of the 1987 Act was found to be not robust enough to prevent 
the onset of the second major control failure, and most expensive bank collapse 




Although the FSA was given statutory powers from the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000, its governance structure is a company limited by guarantee 
and financed by the financial services industry.  It is an independent non-
governmental body funded entirely by the firms it regulates and provides open 
information for firms, consumers and others about its objectives, plans, policies 
and rules; and about consumer financial products, regulation and rights. 
 
Whilst the FSA was conceived as an overarching regulator for the conduct of 
business by financial services practitioners, it does not oversee certain core 
aspects of commercial banking activity, which are subject to continuing debate 
after the 2008 credit crisis drew attention to overlapping control regimes. 
 
A complicating element post-1997 was the presence of two other institutions in 
the banking regulatory framework: The Bank of England and HM Treasury.  The 
resulting tripartite structure was regarded by some bankers as multiplying their 
opportunity to exploit loopholes in the control system (see section 2.2.3 below).  
Although the FSA was the primary regulator, responsible for general day-to-day 
conduct of business and the licensing of practitioners, HM Treasury retained a 
theoretical right to intervene in the national economic interest, whilst the Bank of 
England was charged with overseeing systemic risk and maintaining markets‟ 
stability.   
 
Banks were subject to other regulatory oversight (detailed in 2.2.3), including 
limits on commercial risk-taking.  These were formulated under the Basel capital 
adequacy rules set by a global committee of central bankers and supervised in 
each country by the lead regulator (the FSA and the Bank of England, together, 
in the UK).  As is now clear, the Basel rules did not anticipate or prevent the 
2008 liquidity crisis.  The FSA was also the local (UK) regulatory agency 
                                                 
5
 See Annex 4 for case notes describing this and other significant events of control failure 
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supervising EU-wide rules on financial product marketing and transparency,  
with four statutory obligations relating to this:  To maintain market confidence; 
to publish information transparently; to protect consumers; and to reduce 
financial crime. 
 
The creation of the FSA is one example of a long-term readjustment in 
understanding between regulated commercial sectors and government, a 
“broader political and cultural change” around the public and commercial 
governance of risk (Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin, 2001).  In parallel with 
changes in regulatory regime, the commercial understanding and definition of 
risk evolved significantly during the 1990s, and this development is separately 
considered in section 2.2.4. 
 
2.2.3  The FSA‟s role and its connections to other regulators 
As the current research will consider the role of the Chief Risk Officer in 
responding to regulators, to support this purpose at this point it may be helpful to 
highlight key elements of the banking regulatory regime in force at the time of 
the present field research (2006 – 9), and thus the object of the CROs‟ 
perceptions as reported in Chapters 5 to 7. 
 
Although the FSA is the principal regulator for intra-UK banking activity, three 
bodies share responsibility for oversight (“Tripartite” supervision), each with its 
own focus of concern:  HM Treasury (for the national economic interest); the 
Bank of England (overseeing systemic stability); and the FSA (granting 
commercial licenses to operate, dependent on good conduct).  The FSA‟s 
supervisory stance is reviewed from time to time but at the time of the present 
fieldwork was held to be “comply or explain”, supporting a “light-touch” or 
“principles-based” approach to intervention, as opposed to a technocratic, tick-
box or “zero-tolerance” approach (all phrases FSA, 2006).  The development of 
regulatory practice towards this point is considered in greater detail under the 




The FSA also applies EC-defined standards regulating acceptable conduct of 
business.  These govern the marketing and transparency of banking products and 
include requirements for clear product explanations and reporting of transactions.  
Following the allowance for a period of adjustment under the EC‟s Financial 
Services Action Plan (1995 – 2005), in 2007 banks became subject to the EC 
rules, known as the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID”). 
 
Banks‟ solvency – and hence ability to conduct lending business – was also 
specified by a supranational treaty between commercial- and central- bank 
actors: the Basel Accord (“Basel II” 2005 to 2010, “Basel III” from 2011).  This 
treaty specifies controls on operational risk and on capital adequacy.  Sponsored 
by central banks of the G10 nations and with more than 100 signatory nations 
globally, the Basel framework requires each bank to apply and report consistent 
standards in assessing risk and managing decision-making.  Basel provides 
standards for regulatory capital and guidelines on economic capital, binding 
signatory countries‟ banks to oversight of “prudential capital adequacy” by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, convening at the Bank for 
International Settlements, in Switzerland.  
 
Various regulatory agencies specify certain other standards of acceptable 
performance in other aspects of business.  London-originated deals connecting 
into other national markets have to comply with the requirements of local 
regulators in those markets (such as the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission [SEC]).  The publication of financial accounts, and audit scrutiny 
standards for these, has UK standards and has been the subject of an extensive 
international debate towards a transnational Reporting Standard, though this too 
remains elusive at time of writing.  For crime prevention, in addition to 
respecting criminal and commercial laws in national jurisdictions, banks 
subscribe to global standards agreed through the Financial Action Task Force on 
Money Laundering, which seek to avert the risk of banks handling (whether 




2.2.4  Loss of public confidence in risk controls: Financial 
market shocks and perceived failures of regulation 
Financial market shocks occurring during the course of this research have raised 
public awareness of banking risk.  Public debate has focused on appropriate risk 
management in general and, in particular, raised questions about the perceived 
shortcomings of operational risk controls.  Bankers participating in the present 
research might therefore be expected to show a reflexive appreciation of public 
concerns about regulation.   
 
Then again, it is possible that bankers may be unconcerned about any of this.  
One professional journal has identified a lack of empathy with the public as a 
common characteristic among bankers and financial regulators alike: 
 
“As far as the Bank of England was concerned, there was no 
logical reason why Northern Rock depositors should ask for their 
money back.  …Yet withdraw they did, forming queues outside 
branches across the country.   …[The Bank of England] decided 
to stay tight-lipped… [then the] Chancellor of the Exchequer 
appeared on television and told everyone to calm down and be 
sensible.  Much to everyone‟s surprise, his intervention had the 
opposite effect, and only heightened the sense of panic.  …Telling 
worried people to stop worrying tends not to work, especially 
when the person issuing the instructions is an authority figure in a 
suit.”  
       (Baker, 2007) 
 
On the evidence of Northern Rock savers‟ experience alone, the threatened 
collapse of a bank has a profound effect on public confidence.  Even before the 
Northern Rock collapse, a number of other factors were adversely affecting 
public trust in regulation in general, and financial regulation in particular.  These 
factors are now considered, before returning to the impact of Northern Rock‟s 
problems. 
 
As reported widely in the news media, and subsequently confirmed through 
academic research and official public enquiries, performance targets in certain 
regulated sectors have been seen to be abused by regulatees‟ “gaming” 
responses.  This phenomenon has since produced a significant subset within the 
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literature of regulatory studies.  Recent reports have noted the phenomenon of 
“gaming” responses in fields including healthcare (Hood, 2002; Kodate, 2009), 
shipping (Bloor and Samson, 2007), policing (Williams, 2008), public transport 
(Hutter, 2005) and high street banking (Parker and Nielsen, 2011).  A common 
conclusion is that regulators tend to overclaim their own efficacy.  These and 
other academic contributions to the public debate are considered further in 
Chapter 3. 
 
Shortly before the market shocks of 2007 - 8, there had also already been a 
marked loss of public confidence in financial fraud prosecutions, as evidenced 
by a report presented to HM Government by the Fraud Advisory Panel (2006).  
The report was compiled by a group of senior UK public- and private- sector 
lawyers and auditors, aggregating their collective experience and formally 
raising concern that regulatory structures were insufficient to prosecute serious 
fraud with any success: 
 
“The public no longer believes that the legal system… is capable 
of bringing the perpetrators of serious frauds… effectively to 
book.  The overwhelming weight of evidence laid before us 
suggests that the public is right.”  
(Fraud Advisory Panel, 2006) 
 
Citing the collapse of the Jubilee Line corruption trial in March 2005 (a case in 
which the actions of banking advisors were held to be a significant factor) at a 
cost to the public purse of £60m, the Fraud Advisory Panel pointed out an urgent 
need to restore public trust in the efficacy of regulatory process. 
 
The Fraud Advisory Panel‟s concerns were also supported by academic analysis 
of the systemic inability of policymakers and of the executive arms of the Law 
(police and public prosecutors) to achieve any cultural engagement with financial 
practitioners (as predicted by Kagan and Scholtz [1984]).  Reviewing cases 
studied in North America, the UK and Australia, Williams (2008) aggregated 




“appear to have nothing to fear… The perception [of enforcers] is 
one of „invisibility‟.  This is the result of interrelated factors:  
complexity of the cases; procedural delays; mandated 
[prosecution] disclosure obligations; evidentiary challenges
6” 
 (Williams, 2008, p310) 
 
Williams‟s concerns were added to a wider debate about the perceived inability 
of regulators to counteract corporate crime in the face of globalization and the 
resulting blurring of jurisdictions.  This research theme had been pioneered by 
Tombs, who together with Pearce [1990] and Whyte [2003], had warned early of 
the socially corrosive effects of “regime shopping” by multinationals.  This 
theme is of interest to the current research, where bank risk officers may be 
expected to recognise some of Tombs‟s objects of concern, albeit in sector-
specific forms such as (in the traders‟ own jargon) “jurisdiction-hopping”, 
“offshoring” and “grey banking” as strategies to avoid regulatory control.  These 
phenomena merit further questioning (see Chapter 5). 
 
Public concern also focused on the inherent weakness of the divided, tripartite 
regulatory control agency operating from 1997, involving the FSA, the Bank of 
England and HM Treasury.  The remainder of this subsection considers market 
abuses and certain specific inabilities which public concern identified in the 
regulator, failing to prevent abuses.  Bankers‟ responses to the FSA, as lead 
regulator, are to be the present focus; it is relevant however to note that control 
lapses have historically occurred, and seemingly continue to occur
7
, whichever 
regulatory agency is in office.  Banks‟ risk officers might be expected to have 
interesting views on the issue of the generic failures of regulation, from inside 
the organizations which run the regulated risks.   
 
The UK banking market is vigorous, accounting for nearly 10% of the United 
Kingdom‟s GDP (Haldane/Bank of England, 2010). This economic strength has 
allowed banks, at least until recent events, to demand and expect to receive 
                                                 
6
 Williams (2008) cites as examples: “the inability to compel witnesses to respond to enquiries, 
and the need to derive criminal intent from activities (e.g. trading shares) that are patently legal” 
7
 Such as, at time of writing: JPMorgan‟s inadvertent loss of £1.2bn in UK derivatives trading:  
JP Morgan boss admits failures  BBC News online, 13th May 2012; Barclays traders 
manipulated market risk reports: Barclays fined for attempts to manipulate LIBOR rates, BBC 
News online, 27
th
 June 2012  
35 
 
minimal interference from regulators.  Over time, in some bankers‟ minds, this 
may have developed into a sense of entitlement to non-intervention, or even of 
immunity.  One might therefore wish to ask UK bankers whether they regard 
themselves as natural survivors, or deserving special protection.  Is banks‟ 
continued survival perhaps due to their own development of coping strategies, 
which have enabled them to endure major shocks to market operations and 
confidence?  It is useful to consider initially here how banks have come to 
survive, before addressing through original research any sense of entitlement 
which bankers may have come to develop, perhaps partly as result of their state-
protected survival through the market shocks of recent years. 
 
These shocks include failures of providers in every category of regulated 
business.  In the past quarter-century alone, every UK financial service subsector 
has produced its own costly control failures and it is a natural topic for research 
to invite bank risk officers to discuss their perceptions of any lessons from these 
events.  Detailed in Annex 4, these include collapses in the following 
commercial activities:  commercial banking (Crocker, BCCI); investment 
banking (Barlow Clowes, Morgan Grenfell); securities trading (Merrill Lynch, 
County NatWest); money broking (British & Commonwealth Holdings); 
traditional deposit-holding (Barings‟ self-destructive venture into derivatives in 
the early 1990s); mortgage banking (Northern Rock, Bradford and Bingley, 
Halifax, TSB);  commodities trading (Johnson Matthey); pension fund 
management (Mirror Group Trustees); insurance (Equitable Life); hedge fund 
management (also known as “shadow banking”) (Long Term Capital 
Management); securities broking (NatWest Markets); and corporate value 
reporting (Arthur Andersen).  These are, generally, failures of business-to-
business operation; meanwhile the mis-selling of financial products to consumers 
on the high street has continued, with sales frauds perpetrated through products 
including endowments, mortgages, pensions, life assurance, credit insurance and 
annuities. 
 
One event in particular, however, the collapse of UK regional mortgage bank 
Northern Rock in 2007, came to be popularly regarded as marking the onset of a 




“a catastrophe… obliteration of the Prime Minister‟s credibility 
…derogation of power… if this kind of [public] money is 
available for a minor bank in Newcastle, what else could the 
Treasury have done with £55 billion?”  
(The Times, leader column, 22
nd
 January 2008) 
 
Following the Northern Rock collapse, commercial bankers also thought to 
question why regulators had previously insisted that their preferred method of 
control, a capital adequacy standard, might be sufficient to keep the banking 
system stable.  Bankers noted similarities between the Northern Rock crisis and 
the collapse, two years earlier, of the Long Term Capital Management hedge 
fund (LTCM), whose “unprecedented” levels of arbitrage had combined with a 
“blind faith” in risk models to create a “disastrous downside” (Mackenzie, 2006). 
Regulators were seen to have substituted warnings for effective intervention, to 
have been communicating instrumentally  
 
“to give regulators the evidence to say „We told you so‟ in the 
event that the horse bolts, rather than to chivvy recalcitrant 
bankers into locking the stable door in the first place.”   
(Pearce and Tombs, 1990) 
 
Failures of more major banks during 2007 – 8 pointed to a specific regulatory 
blind-spot:  Uncontrolled liquidity.  In the public mind, bank failures revived 
earlier latent concerns about certain unresolved problems inherent in banking 
regulation.  Prime concerns included moral hazard, diffusion of control 
responsibility, and inappropriate focus of control.  Each is briefly noted here, 
together with a contemporary public expression of the concern.  
 
Firstly, public concern focused on moral hazard – that is, that publicly funded 
bailouts of failing banks may be expected to increase, rather than decrease, 
bankers‟ risk-taking.  It is tempting for governments to seek to support public 
confidence by propping up failing banks with public funding.  However, the 
state‟s issue of a guarantee for one bank may encourage other banks to be more 
reckless, as commentary in The Economist noted at the time of the second wave 




“banks feel free to lend recklessly [if they know] the state will 
limit their downside risk. …nationalisation of the downside of 
extreme financial risk may potentially prove far more of a disaster 
than [the] decision to nationalise Northern Rock.”   
(The Economist, 19
th
 February 2008) 
 
Secondly, the recent wave of bank failures, from Northern Rock (2007) onwards, 
led to public questioning of how clear the regulator‟s control brief was.  Even 
under normal trading conditions, it could be hard to discern which of three 
interested bodies (FSA, HM Treasury, Bank of England) should be taking lead 
responsibility for maintaining public confidence.  Public concern was that, with 
the onset of the credit crisis  
 
“…no one [of the three] takes charge, no one takes the tough 
decisions and everyone is too interested in shifting responsibility 
and blame… a very disappointing game of bureaucratic pass-the-
parcel, [it] urgently needs reform.”   
(The Times, 7
th
 November 2007) 
 
Thirdly, there was concern that the regulator‟s focus of control – that is, the tools 
used and their point of application – was inappropriate.  In 2008, regulatory 
controls had focused on capital adequacy but neglected to provide for liquidity 
risk, the factor which destroyed Northern Rock, LTCM, and the Scottish retail 
banks.  Worse, among a new generation of virtualised or derivative financial 
products (“vehicles”), some had been designed to avoid regulatory control, so 
that 
 
“banks have been able to lend more without increasing the 
amount of capital required.  These vehicles ran a clear funding 
risk:  If ever the money markets became illiquid they would be 
unable to repay.” 
(Prospect, February 2008) 
 
Contemporary news reports, as above, implied that the Northern Rock collapse 
may have signaled an end to an unspoken public tolerance for financial service 
providers:  formerly, it may have been acceptable sometimes to ignore rules, as 
long as there was some benefit and nobody was hurt by this.  Some have 
suggested that Northern Rock might in theory have survived if the BBC had not 
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broadcast the bank‟s liquidity problems to the public (see discussion in Annex 4) 
– yet in reality, public risk perception of a “failing” institution tends to confirm 
the failure as a fact, as evidenced by the queues of depositors waiting to 
withdraw their cash.  Northern Rock savers were not concerned whether an 
institution had been in technical breach of borrowing covenants; they just wanted 
to lay hands on their own money.  In this case it is the actions of the general 
public that pass judgement on corporate conduct as unacceptable:     
 
“The point is that the response of other people has to be regarded 
as problematic.  Just because one has committed an infraction of a 
rule does not mean that others will respond as though this has 
happened.  …Formal rules …may differ from those actually 
thought appropriate by most people.”  
(Becker, 1963,  pp 12, 16) 
 
Control failures arouse public concern, and with this, often calls for regulatory 
action.  The 2008 liquidity crisis and public-funded bank bail-outs drew criticism 
of the FSA‟s discretionary “light touch” approach; of banks‟ self-reporting of 
risk; and, as in the Halifax fraud case, of the impact of ephemeral contacts with 
individual case officers.  These factors will be explored here (see Chapters 5 and 
6).  The event of collapses and frauds was seen to indicate that the regulatory 
apparatus itself had introduced risk into the system – an unwelcome secondary 
risk.  The FSA‟s intention, under risk-based regulation, had been to compel 
banks to make their commercial risk assumptions explicit. Instead, but condoned 
by the FSA, banks handed off responsibility for risk governance by giving the 
task to a newly-created senior management role, the Chief Risk Officer (CRO).  
The evolution and scope of this role, and experiences of those who hold it, 
appear to be a natural focus for scholarly research within the fields of risk 
regulation, organizational studies and risk perception, discussed further in 
section 2.3 and Chapter 3. 
 
2.2.5  Developments in commercial risk management during 
the period 
Whilst the structure of public regulation of banking was changing, with the 
public policy shifts of 1986 and 1997, significant changes were also occurring in 
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banks‟ internal approach to managing commercial risk.  The advance of 
information technology, and developments in the governance of risk and 
corporate capital, introduced more precise methods of categorising risk and more 
complex means of manipulating it.  Four developments in commercial risk 
governance are here highlighted as significant to steps in the shaping of a 
dedicated Risk Management function in banking, culminating in the creation of 
Chief Risk Officers, whose relevance as a research focus is the concern of this 
chapter. 
 
The first of these developments is the definition of operational risk.  Highly 
publicised failures of corporate control in the 1980s and 1990s
8
 supported a 
sense among the public, and in government and corporate Boardrooms, that 
common-standard controls for operational risk were desirable (Blunden and 
Thirlwell, 2010).  Following a survey by British Bankers‟ Association in 1999, 
bankers in the UK agreed to specify operational risk as a new category of risk to 
be managed.  Before this date, banking risk had been conceived in essentially 
financial terms such as credit, market, liquidity and contract risk.  Operational 
risk recognised that broader commercial considerations are relevant to the 
business of banking.  The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (a committee 
of the heads of central banks) subsequently defined operational risk as   
 
The risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people and systems or from external events. 
   (BIS, 2006) 
 
The move to recognise operational risk was significant for its acceptance by 
banks that, just because they take specific risks relating to money management in 
markets, this does not mean that they should ignore the general “risks of running 
a business” (Blunden and Thirlwell, 2010).  The formal acknowledgement of 
operational risk required banks to look beyond money management in their risk 
reporting and consider such factors as fraud, employment and sales practices, 
protection of physical assets and systems, and business processes (BIS, 2006).  
                                                 
8
 From among many discussed in the news media, Blunden and Thirlwell (2010) highlight for 
their impact on governance the cases of NASA‟s Challenger shuttle (1986); the Piper Alpha oil 
platform explosion (1988); the Exxon Valdez oil tanker spill (1989) and the collapse of Barings 




Whilst operational risk considered the detail of managing systems and people, at 
the same time a second, more strategic new approach was developing to 
recognise the strategic value of risk across a business: enterprise risk.  This 
sought to bring a unified risk-awareness across various functions in a large 
organization.  All managers – not just conventional financial risk managers – 
were to understand that they had risks to control, with senior management 
seeking to co-ordinate these functions.  A UK definition of enterprise risk 
management (ERM) suggests that the activity should include 
 
“Culture, processes and tools to identify strategic opportunities 
and reduce uncertainty… [taking] a view of risk both from 
operational and strategic perspectives”  
 (RIMS, 2010) 
 
ERM programmes of management would typically pursue common definitions 
of risk, the setting of corporate “risk appetite”, and risk reporting to stakeholders 
(RIMS, 2010). 
 
Banks also reconsidered the appropriateness of valuing risk according to the 
price of a contract at the time of a sale, since the present value of a contract is – 
indeed, should often be – different as markets move subsequent to the sale.  The 
vulnerability of financial asset values to market sentiments was recognised in the 
creation of the Value-at-Risk (VaR) modelling.  VaR for the first time forced 
banks to contemplate and formally recognise a “probability of loss” component 
in financial contract values.  Specific results were seen as less important than the 
VaR calculation process itself, which was a new 
 
“structured methodology for critically thinking about risk. 
Institutions that go through the process of computing their VaR 
are forced to confront their exposure to financial risks and to set 
up a proper risk management function.”   
(Jorion,  1997)  
 
For all the benefits of this “forced” contemplation of risk, the introduction of 
VaR also created a perverse incentive, which is of considerable interest for the 
present research; that is, that the 
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“freedom to use value-at-risk models in calculating capital requirements 
was attractive to banks because it generally reduced those requirements” 
       (Mackenzie, 2006) 
 
The practical effect of this, in the longer term, was thus a pressure on banks‟ risk 
offices to reduce the reported figure for regulatory capital by any available 
means.  With the advent, in the early 2000s, of Chief Risk Officers, this activity 
came to be seen as a natural function of the role (see Section 2.3 below). 
 
Finally in this group of commercial risk developments, a public debate on 
corporate governance sought to ensure that company Directors would 
acknowledge their responsibilities.  The debate focused on Directors‟ perceived 
responsibility to reconcile conflicting stakeholder priorities and other “collective 
action problems” for investors (Becht, Bolton and Roell, 2005).  A series of 
government-sponsored reports, endorsed by UK industry groups, recognised the 
intrinsic merit of Directors showing public accountability (Cadbury, 1992; 
Greenbury, 1995; Hampel, 1998; Turnbull, 1999; Higgs, 2003).  UK public 
company Directors recognised that the above-noted corporate control failures 
merited a concerted response and that shareholders might reward Boards who 
subscribed to a common standard of corporate governance.  Corporate Boards 
became formally committed – at least through a voluntary code – to balance 
short-term commercial striving for profit against other, for example social, 
concerns to promote longer-term goods such as employment and sustainable 
patterns of growth.   
 
Corporate governance may also be regarded as a function of operational risk 
management (Blunden and Thirlwell, 2010).  Governance standards may bear on 
policies on the reporting of decision-making processes to stakeholders such as 
customers, staff, owners and regulators. UK governments responded to 
successive waves of public concern after each control-failure scandal by 
sponsoring a succession of public reports
9.  In 2003 the EC adopted Turnbull‟s 
                                                 
9
 Reports and recommendations were produced by public committees backed by Government and 
City interests, entitled Cadbury [Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992], Greenbury 
[Greenbury Report, 1995],  Hampel [Corporate Governance, 1998], Turnbull [Internal Control: 
Combined Code, 1999] and Higgs [Non-executive Directors, 2003]. 
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(1999) corporate governance recommendations into a European action plan with 
a new standard for corporate governance (Directive 2006/43/EC). 
 
2.3  Creation of the Chief Risk Officer role 
2.3.1  Why was the CRO role seen as necessary? 
Banks created the role of Chief Risk Officer from the late 1990s onwards 
(Power, 2005), charging the holder with responsibility for pulling together three 
divergent risk reporting strands:  The oversight requirements of the external 
regulator; the commercial risk models used by the traders; and the audit practices 
of internal control staff. The potential for contradiction between these roles may 
be readily seen, and is of interest for the current research.  
 
Before the credit crisis of 2008, banks had customarily objected to any proposed 
new regulatory powers on the grounds that any such intervention restricts 
commercial risk-taking and so suppresses economic growth (BBA, 2007).  Many 
bankers were – and, as this research will explore, perhaps still are – ready to 
suggest that inspectors‟ competence may be open to question.  Meanwhile, 
coping strategies are little considered (that banks may have been finding ways to 
deflect the regulator‟s wish for them to alter preferred ways of working).  It is 
possible, as suggested by Power (2005) and of present research interest, that a 
factor motivating banks to create the CRO function was a wish to reduce the 
need for other staff to change behaviour to accommodate compliance demands, 
or to enable more flexible interpretation of risk data from the start.   
 
In the context of long-term debates around control uncertainties and unsound 
assumptions (Porter, 2010), financial risk managers had, with regulators‟ 
support, increasingly adopted econometric controls – that is, money-derived 
numerical measures of performance (Mackenzie, 2006).  This activity appeared 
to suit the interests of all concerned, by offering the appearance of objective 
truths and hence fully accounted-for risk (Cox, 2008).  Traders were able to 
define risk using plausible descriptors (value-at-risk, stress testing) and to 
convince the regulator that these could serve both regulatory and market-making 
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functions.  This use, or abuse, of risk models and their language is a natural 
focus for research when considering the CRO experience. 
 
Although econometrics became a normal form of encoded risk control, it is also 
apparent that two different interpretations of the task of “risk management” have 
been in use: public-interest hazard prevention, and commercial enterprise 
(Porter, 2010). Even though these two approaches shared some of the same 
words, practical interpretations differ, and these differences are also of interest 
where participant experiences are to be revealed through new research. 
 
As seen in section 2.2 above, there have been pressures to demonstrate greater 
control of business risk, and specific recognition of stakeholder interests, in 
parallel with banks‟ continuing development of management tools for 
conventionally recognised financial (that is, credit and market) risks.  Taken 
together, these developments evidence a move in the 1990s towards more formal 
systems for risk management, corporate governance, and a culture of risk-
awareness.  Increasingly looking for reassurance by formal auditing of risk, 
government and industry were investing in “formal, generalizeable systems of 
control”, with formally defined risk understandings replacing earlier “informal 
sources of [risk] intelligence” (Power, 2007).   
 
More auditable risk systems might be expected to be more transparent, enabling 
better public scrutiny and wiser questioning of governance decisions and risk 
criteria.  However, advances in risk governance occurred in parallel with the 
development by banks of a new tier of complex, risky and virtualised products 
collectively known as derivatives.  Whilst the appointment of a CRO was 
intended to create a stronger internal check against excessive risk taking, 
increasing product complexity was in practice making such checking more 
difficult.  CROs‟ awareness of this problem, and their response to it, merits 
scholarly research. 
 
Research may also help to establish that the CRO in a bank may be responsible 
for a far higher level of risk than their counterpart CROs in other sectors.  
Although, within a general definition of operational risk and corporate 
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governance, a risk officer in any corporate organisation will have a generic 
interest in public risk protection (Blunden and Thirlwell, 2010), banks present 
egregious levels of risk.  Whilst, for example, the CRO of a public utility 
company may be subject to public hostility in the event of a catastrophic failure 
of service, this would not be expected to have the same economic and social 
impact as the failure of a bank.  As illustrated by the failures of Northern Rock 
and the Scottish retail banks in the UK during 2007 – 8, the price of risk 
protection, in the form of a publicly-funded bank rescue, may be beyond many 
people‟s capacity to conceive (Christophers, 2012).  Banks themselves also bear 
large costs of self-protection in the form of setting regulatory capital (cash which 
cannot be traded but, as specified by Capital Adequacy rules, must be held on 
account to cover any sudden liabilities).  To bankers‟ satisfaction, of course, the 
potential for massive profit makes this regulatory cost easier to tolerate. 
 
Within banks, since deregulation in the 1980s, a culture of separation between 
traders and internal controllers appears to have hardened and may even represent, 
in some bankers‟ view, profit and cost respectively.  Divergence in 
understandings of the concept of “risk”, the difference between internal and 
external modes of risk reporting, between public and private sector risk 
managers, is not the only tension for the CRO.  A potentially wider difference in 
understanding of the purpose of risk management exists between banks‟ traders 
and internal risk control staff.  The CRO‟s responsibility for closing the cultural 
gap between traders and risk officers was perhaps their greatest challenge, and 
one which itself merits scholarly study. 
 
The FSA has issued guidance, though not a prescriptive job specification, as to 
the areas of responsibility that a CRO should address.  The FSA wishes, but does 
not compel, the CRO role to include being: 
 
“accountable to the firm‟s governing body for the oversight of 
firm-wide risk management; fully independent of a firm‟s 
individual business units; [of] sufficient authority, stature and 
resources for the effective execution of responsibilities; [to] 
ensure that data used to assess risks is fit for purpose; [to] provide 
oversight and challenge of the firm‟s systems and controls in 





Meanwhile the bank-prescribed job functions of CROs, and their use of risk-
metrics, have already been the subject of research (Power, 2004, 2005).  
However, the creation of CROs has raised other, untested research issues.  
Regulatory policy seems rationally derived, and appears to ignore coping 
strategies. The CRO could be regarded as embodying the bank‟s informal 
strategy of coping response to compliance demands.  Significant issues arising 
from this are now considered.  
 
2.3.2  CROs: Concerns and institutional pressures 
A core question in relation to the CRO function is how far the officer might be 
able to stand outside the organization in order to avoid bias in appraising 
commercial risks.  Reported experiences indicate a common and unwelcome 
discovery that the role is found in practice to have limited power and so lacks 
traction over the behaviour of traders.  Within even the most commercially 
consistent organizations, widely varying cultures of control and incentivisation 
may prevent practical agreement on how to act on the overarching risk 
objectives.   
 
One way to address this issue is to characterise it in terms of two opposite 
extreme views of the CRO, optimistic and pessimistic.  An optimistic view of the 
CRO function might regard the role as a necessary and desirable development 
towards making sense of the many proprietary econometric tools for risk 
management initiated by banks‟ trading operations (even though it is common to 
see these models pressed into service as instruments of regulatory control).  In 
this optimistic view the CRO is a force for good governance, testing risk controls 
for efficacy, acting as a conduit for good-quality risk information, shaping 
knowledge and influencing behaviour towards the fair achievement of corporate 
goals. 
 
A pessimistic alternative view might suggest that the CRO has been given a 
token role, as a powerless figurehead or “flak-catcher”, by being tasked with 
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making sense (or the appearance of sense) of diffuse streams of regulation.  A 
CRO motivated by self-preservation might, in this view, be justified in devising 
procedures which gave the appearance of compliance (performative “box-
ticking”) whilst working to avoid disturbing the marketing activities of the 
bank‟s traders.  Any questioning of this token function, or game of regulation, 
might incur summary dismissal (see Chapter 7). 
 
CROs were nevertheless mandated – both by their Boards and the FSA – to 
deploy risk tools based on highly formalised, commercially-derived econometric 
analyses (such as Value-At-Risk modeling, Monte Carlo testing, and stress 
testing).  Whether powerful or compromised, CROs may be expected to 
acknowledge how fragile a balancing act is needed to reconcile the often 
conflicting uses of risk analysis by traders, internal controllers, and the 
regulator‟s case officers.   
 
That a new senior management role should be widely created with specific 
responsibility for general (that is, operational and other, as opposed to financial-
risk models) risk may indicate a widening acceptance of risk as discipline of 
general management, with the CRO literally embodying good governance.  
Research interviews may be expected to establish the extent to which CROs 
admit to recognising tensions in their daily working lives and how they might set 
about resolving it and to find out what, if any, range of coping responses CROs 
encountered or recognised in others, and the extent to which they were able to 
challenge inappropriate coping. 
 
2.4  The CRO as a suitable focus for new research  
For the reasons reviewed above, the creation of CROs was an appealing 
development for banks and for the regulator.  As with many regulatory and 
control initiatives, difficulties may have been expected to arise between 
conceiving the initiative and successfully executing it.  To make the role work in 
practice, the CRO may have to balance tensions between internal and external 
reporting responsibilities and loyalties.  As a single point of dependency for 
corporate risk reporting, the CRO might carry an impossibly large responsibility. 
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For a CRO in a bank this responsibility is acute:  in terms of value of assets at 
risk, and systemic stability in financial markets, it is arguably greater than for a 
CRO in any other business sector.  Misjudged risk decisions in a bank may, as 
events have shown, affect entire national economies or business sectors. 
 
As Power (2005) has suggested, it must be considered that the creation of CROs 
represents not a positive paradigm shift towards engaging with risk, but more a 
simple reprise of a blame-shifting manoeuvre.  This manoeuvre continues from a 
long corporate tradition of such strategies in response to regulatory change.  In 
Power‟s analysis the bank CRO role may be merely 
 
“the latest in a long line of corporate „officers‟ created in response 
to specific problems.  …Creating a dedicated officership category 
is part of problem definition.  As a well-tried form of 
administrative innovation, officerships signal organizational 
seriousness about issues.  However, the history of such 
innovations also suggests that CROs are a potential fad, which 
may be short-lived. …effectiveness and legitimacy is constantly 
in question, and the role may be a dumping-ground for high-
blame problems.”    
(Power, 2005) 
 
Early surveys of role definition among CROs themselves bear this out.  Two 
studies (Deloitte, 2007; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2007) offered functional 
definitions of the CRO role, with varying levels of instrumentality and executive 
authority, and with operational efficacy seemingly dependent on the culture of 
the hiring organization.  PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) (2007) concludes that 
CROs did not yet enjoy strategic influence, perhaps because they were perceived 
as not yet having “won the right” to this in the Boardroom by demonstrating 
economic value.  Even as they confirm their appointment to champion a nascent 
“culture of risk-awareness” in their organizations, PWC‟s respondents expressed 
consistent concerns about “delivering value” – possibly a coded expression of 
concern about long-term tenability (echoing Power, 2005) of a special risk 
designation. 
 
Despite Power‟s misgivings about the precedents for new officers acting as 
blame-recipients, the widespread institution of a new senior management officer 
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remains a striking corporate phenomenon.  This fact alone would justify studying 
it; all the more so since the officer in question is dedicated, at least in part, to 
making sense of regulatory risk demands. 
 
For present research purposes, it may be hypothesised, for subsequent research 
verification, that the FSA‟s adoption of the control model of enforced self-
regulation was seen as sending two opposing messages to the markets.  The first, 
intended point was that regulation might more effectively be rolled out following 
dialogue with practitioners; by implication, the FSA expected market-makers‟ 
engagement in dialogue as a condition of licensing them to trade.  The other 
signal, unintended but commonly inferred by practitioners – and presently to be 
explored – was that local informal interpretation of rules was now acceptable.  
This latter perception was reinforced when apparent conflicts of interest, such as 
serving bankers sitting on the Board of the FSA, appeared for some time to pass 
unchallenged (BBC, 2009).  As the present research will investigate, bankers 
appeared to be little concerned that the possibility of enforcement visits 
presented any significant hazard to business or reputation.  This dismissive view 
of the regulator persisted in spite of earlier signs of regulatory failure (such as 
the fraud-driven collapses of BCCI, Barings, and NatWest Markets) (Gapper and 
Denton, 1996).  Even as British banks continued to be major long-term 
contributors to the national exchequer (Wallis/Bank of England, 2001), they 
were selective in self-reporting their risk-taking, both to regulators and 
shareholders. 
 
CROs may be expected to have had experience of attempting to reconcile 
corporate risk appetite and regulatory policy.  Their conclusions from this 
experience might be expected to include insights into coping, as one possible 
strategy, and the extent to which any forms of coping can be formalised;  
whether CROs in general fulfil their function as instruments of good governance 
(including the extent to which they have „real‟ authority and power, and their 
level of engagement with colleagues and regulatory case officers);  and to what 
extent coping, if found, may be seen as normative, irrespective of whether it is 




Research might therefore seek to develop a question to establish whether CROs 
regard their role as effective in supporting best practice in corporate governance; 
and to examine factors that shape the exercising of executive power more 
generally. Some other concerns are also of interest when scoping an initial 
investigation.  These are:  The extent to which CROs see their own (and also 
trader and Board) behaviours as constrained, whether by external forces, by 
workplace cultures of acceptable or expected behaviour and by incentives; the 
extent to which defiance against regulators came to persist in the system, as 
supported by “coping games”; and the success or otherwise of regulators‟ 
attempts to capitalise on existing internal control systems.  Greater scholarly 
understanding of these points may, in turn, shed light on how to prevent the 
tendency
10
 of markets and regulators to over-rely on self-generated risk reports; 
what formal Risk Management achieves in reality, if it fails to engage with 
crisis; whether or not it may be possible to “design out” the risks which are 
perceived to follow on from newly-imposed controls; and how better to resolve 
the differences between “public good” risk and commercial risk, so preventing 
regulated groups from re-shaping regulation for their own ends. 
A sequence of themes is emerging, suggesting the need further investigation 
which this research will pursue.  Apart from relevance to developments in 
theoretical fields, the research topic is enlivened by its connection with current 
concerns evident in national and international news.  Whilst the present research 
does not lay claim to a full causal analysis of the 2008 banking crisis, it is 
reasonable to note that the failures of control here described have had some 
bearing on that event. 
 
A first theme is to examine whether banks exhibit coping responses to their 
regulator‟s demands. If they do, research should then consider the range of such 
coping responses, and whether these may be seen as analogous with responses 
noted in other sectors.  Research should also focus on the role of banks‟ CROs in 
relation to these responses.  Considering relevant theory as a starting-point for 
developing the research question, in Chapter 3, the project should aim to identify 
behaviour associated with coping, applying to the financial sector a theoretical 
                                                 
10
 Noted in Mackenzie (2006) 
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approach which has already successfully been employed to investigate other 
sectors. The research should also aim to apply rationales arising from existing 
research to see if these can help an understanding of how one clearly definable 
practitioner group perceives the efficacy of regulatory interventions.   
 
The research topic emerging from initial observations, historical context, and 
theory, is to determine whether bankers‟ response to FSA demands for 
information might collectively be characterised as “coping” noncompliance.  As 
Chapter 3 will now explore further, apparently similar behaviour has been 
observed among other regulated business and professional communities.  A 
preliminary form of the research question is therefore: 
 
Do UK banks respond to the FSA‟s demands for information by 
“coping”? 
 
A prediction, based on the sector‟s social history and theory (see chapter 3), is 
that coping may be found as a normative response among this community.  
 
Subsidiary questions may later locate the main question more precisely within 
relevant fields of scholarship, such as theory of regulation and of organization.  
Such questions include:    
If coping responses are evident, what forms do these take? 
 
Are banks‟ coping responses analogous with those already found in other 
sectors? 
 
Finally, addressing personal experiences of organizations‟ risk governance, this 
research elects to focus on a senior manager, whose approach to the role 
expresses how risk governance will be enacted: the CRO. As a limited and 
identifiable group of newly-appointed senior individuals, CROs may be seen as 
the personifying organizational risk response.  A question linking all of these 




What is the role of UK banks‟ Chief Risk Officers (CROs) in relation to 
coping responses? 
 
Locating these questions in relation to theory, in the following chapter, does not 
make them abstractions; they support a public policy debate about risk 
governance, following financial market turbulence which continues to affect 
many UK citizens. This debate concerns risk and protection of the public as 
consumers and taxpayers; and so, the levels of supervision, market failure and 
moral hazard that society may be willing to accept. 
 





CHAPTER 3:  REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH            
 
3.1  Introduction 
Chapter 2 considered the origins of the CRO role, as a recent development in UK 
banks.  It suggested why the problems facing CROs in banks may be on a larger 
scale than those facing risk officers in other business sectors.  It further 
suggested that there are factors in the commercial history of banking which 
might be encourage bankers to adopt a coping approach towards demands made 
by regulators.  One implication is that the presence of regulators did not act to 
curb excessive risk-taking among banks‟ trading staff.  Chapter 3 will now 
consider previous research informing this topic.    
 
As a notably inter-disciplinary concept, risk has generated several grouped 
theories, overlapping (with variations) between different academic fields.  There 
are various taxonomies for hazard, perception, decision-making, control and 
compliance.  These have emerged from the work of, among others, social 
theorists (Douglas, [e.g. 1992], economists (Power [2005], Goodhart [2006]), 
psychologists (Kahneman and Tversky [1979], Slovic [2004]), mathematicians 
(Bernoulli [1738/1954], Nash [1994]), criminologists (Sykes and Matza [1957], 
Becker H [1963]) and political scientists (Hood [2002], Rothstein [2002]). 
 
A large and distinct body of literature also exists on the management and control 
of financial risk-taking.  Among this, one might expect to find studies examining 
the nature of systemic failures by senior risk managers in banking, and the 
problems faced by these individuals as they try to make sense of sometimes 
conflicting demands.  
 
Before turning to the literatures of regulation and risk perception, this chapter 
will first note other theoretic approaches to understanding the problematics of 
evaluating the social (and economic) contribution made by financial services: 
studies of financialization, and geographies of money and finance.  It will also 
acknowledge a significant body of social research into employees‟ experiences in 
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corporate settings (including financial services), studying individuals who face 
pressure to comply or conform to norms which they find discomforting or even 
stressful.   
 
Social studies of financial markets also encompass geographies of finance.  
Within this theory field Christophers (2012) reflects on “financialization” – that 
is, the increasing prominence of financial services within in national economies, 
and of finance activities within companies.  Within this conceptual setting he 
examines the extent to which banks make be judged as making a real or “added 
value” contribution to the countries where they have a business presence.  The 
Geographies of Finance approach also raises the issue of banks‟ loyalty to any 
one host country, if banks do not routinely regard themselves as having the 
purpose of contributing to the public finances of their host country; although the 
sector claims, in its own defence, strong “invisible export” earnings (Haldane, 
2010).  In the UK, or indeed any other country where they operate, and as the 
present empirical study may be expected to confirm, many banks regard 
themselves as stateless – that is, not belonging to or owing allegiance to any 
particular national enterprise economy.  Christophers identifies as the core 
geographical “banking problem” that much commercial banking practice has an 
essentially international nature, which presents a problematic for national 
economic accounting seeking to measure it.  A related aspect of the problem is 
that financial-centre cities having become “increasingly detached from other 
cities within their nation state” McDowell (1997).  The modern challenge, for 
social sciences as for regulators, is to comprehend banking as “framed at an 
international scale”, since seeing it only at a national level is akin to “extracting 
one piece from a larger jigsaw puzzle” (Christophers, 2012).   
 
A further concern raised within this analysis is that the international nature of 
many banks‟ activities may encourage their employees to regard themselves as 
being somehow “above” any one national, or even regional, control standard.  
This concern arise especially in the banking sector, as the freely portable, 
virtualised nature of many banking products means that corporate choices on the 
allocation of geographical presence, and reporting of profits, can be “relatively 




The present research may expect to encounter this point in relation to the activity 
of banking risk management, in the form of bankers‟ known attraction to 
“jurisdiction-hopping” or “regulatory arbitrage” – that is, banks seeking 
commercial benefit from relocating their business activities (whether sales or 
accounting) into places where the local regulatory regime is seen to be more 
favourable.  Banks‟ practice of this form of arbitrage may also have a cumulative 
detrimental effect on the quality of regulation, encouraging national regulators to 
compete to attract financial businesses by marketing their “relaxed attitudes” 
towards controls (Neu, cited in Christophers, 2012). This effect has potential 
significance for banks‟ internal notions of conformity to national controls, such 
as risk regulation and (prominent in UK news bulletins at the end of 2012) how 
much tax should be paid to the local exchequer.  If national regulators have been 
assuming that banks‟ compliance is driven by a supportive attitude towards the 
national economic “project”, we may anticipate that their expectation will be 
found to be misplaced.   
 
Studies of the geographies of finance thus raise usefully, for analysts of 
regulation, the question of why a regulator ought to expect compliance from an 
entity which does not regard itself as having any local (nation-host) 
responsibility or ties.  Within the limited resources and deterministic focus of the 
present study, geographies of finance are not a thematic priority but one may 
expect to find some linked concerns mentioned by present research respondents 
as informing their own circumstances.  
 
Turning specifically to the literature concerning regulation of risk, it is apparent 
that numerous approaches to the task are possible and that context is a significant 
determinant.  In the context of banking, for example, risk regulation concerns 
ways in which government may seek to prevent bank staff from engaging in 
excessive risk-taking behaviour.  From among a broad range of scholarly 
approaches to regulation and compliance, three ways of examining these issues 
emerge as of direct relevance to the present study.  The three approaches are: 
regulatory control and compliance; informal organizations; and the social 
psychology of risk-taking in individuals.  The relevance of these three scholarly 
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focuses to the present research topic will be considered in the course of this 
chapter.   
 
As noted in Chapter 2, the bank CRO is an inherently attractive focus for 
research.  One might therefore expect existing literature to offer some 
explanations as to why regulation, mediated by a CRO, may not succeed in 
curbing banks traders‟ risk-taking behaviour.  Explanations might be expected to 
account for how, within banking organizations, informal groups act to promote 
non-compliant responses to demands for information from the financial 
regulator‟s case officers.  Previous research might also be expected to explain 
whether, and if so how, bank risk officers adopt coping strategies to manage 
conflicting demands for risk reporting. 
 
This chapter will explore theoretical fields identified as relevant to the present 
research.  Relevant themes in other research fields will also be noted in passing, 
although practical constraints prevent further detailed exploration of these.  After 
addressing the focus of the sector and research, this chapter therefore reviews 
literature concerning regulation in action, social theories of organization and of 
risk cognition.  It identifies where earlier research findings and theories might be 
expected to elucidate the problems faced by CROs, and perhaps to explain or 
predict their likely responses to the problems.  Where previous research appears 
insufficient to explain CROs‟ concerns, this chapter aims to highlight where 
original research may improve understanding. 
 
3.2  Literature concerning regulation 
3.2.1  Why regulate banking risk? 
There are many ways to identify, categorise, and attempt to regulate risk in a 
commercial sector.  Approaches to risk management range from assertive pursuit 
of those who misbehave, with vigorous enforcement and criminalisation of 
offenders, to the gentler approach of advising, persuading or warning 
practitioners to take remedial action.  As will be seen, financial regulators have 




As noted in Chapter 2, the banking sector has experienced many shocks in the 
past, and a recent major crisis following the collapses of Northern Rock and the 
Scottish retail banks in the UK, and Lehman Brothers in the US.  This would 
lead a researcher to expect to find studies accounting for the origins of support 
for the risk control regime in place in 2008, which was premised on the scholarly 
theory of enforced self-regulation.  This chapter will consider such regulatory 
scholarship,  and whether it adequately accounts for the scope of the banks‟ 
failures of control, for example by giving due warning of the extent to which 
incentive structures, conflicts of purpose, and the high stakes involved in bank 
trading may be insufficiently recognised risk factors.  Historically, enforced self-
regulation had been supported by regulators and the banking industry as a way of 
helping regulators to deal with complex products and massive volumes of trading 
data.  However, as this research will consider, the attractions of this approach to 
regulation may, over time, have encouraged participants to overlook its 
underlying weaknesses. 
 
Such literature informs the present study‟s intent to add to the understanding of 
factors frustrating regulatory design by presenting a new account of the origins 
of noncompliant and coping responses to regulators‟ demands for risk 
information.  Although the focus of the present study will be the UK banking 
sector, with primary research among banking practitioners, this does not mean 
that the study is interested only in such problems specifically in relation to 
banks.  Rather, the present study approach is that banks may be found to be a 
rich source of instances for studying non-compliant behaviour, as indicated by 
recent market shocks.  This research is interested in origins of non-compliance 
with regulation; banks provide a topical setting in which to address the broader 
issue. 
 
As a first step towards understanding banks‟ responses to regulatory demands, 
the following subsection will review enforced self-regulation as the dominant 
structure in the UK in 2008, identifying its theoretical strengths and weaknesses, 
leading exponents and critics. 
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3.2.2  Enforced self-regulation, its problems and critics 
 
Enforced self-regulation holds a number of attractions for policymakers.  
Proposing the system as a solution for resource-stretched governments, Ayres 
and Braithwaite (1992) set out its strengths, summarised in this paragraph 
(quoted words are from this source).  The system gains the co-operation of 
regulatees, by engaging individual firms in producing standards and negotiating 
these with the state.   The state is then well-placed to require firms formally to 
accept and abide by these “privately written rules” – not  merely through 
collective bodies such as trade associations, but with an individual commitment 
by each firm directly to the state.  The state also retains the right to rewrite rules.  
The regulator‟s resources are greatly eased by its transferring to the industry 
certain critical but labour-intensive functions, such as collating transaction data 
and explaining product design; it is argued (after Coase [1937]) that this transfer 
will prove “cheaper and more effective” – although not without secondary risks, 
as will be seen.  In banking, this transfer of activity is especially significant, due 
to the volume and complexity of trading data, risk analysis and product design.  
Ayers and Braithwaite further argue that internal (business-side) compliance 
inspectors are “better placed to trap wrong-doers” because they have greater 
expertise in “subject-matter” and are better placed to observe the business in 
action.  This nearness to the source of the activity to be controlled also makes the 
system, at least in theory, efficient and responsive to change.   
 
The principle of leveraging the internal control capacity of business 
organizations may be expected to hold a natural appeal to regulators and their 
sponsor governments who wish to conserve public resources.  However, as 
critics of the system argue, the leverage works only if supported by strong 
external incentives to manage risk.  Although the employees of organizations 
with complex businesses – such as banks – are indeed best placed to be familiar 
with the risks, and to develop systems to manage them, a number of significant 




Banks‟ history of adapting measurement systems to regulatory demands is a 
specific focus for Mackenzie (2006), who questions the “self-referring 
knowledge” of risk models.  Extending a notion from Friedman that models act 
as “an engine not a camera”, and with a similar argument to Goodhart (2006), 
Mackenzie notes that the introduction of risk measurement systems had the 
effect of changing the behaviour of the people being measured – and also often 
of those who do the measuring.  Setting out a history of methodological concern 
about the generation and application of econometric models, which also 
resonates with Porter‟s (2011) work on policymakers‟ misuse of statistical 
assumptions, Mackenzie considers whether banks might ever be expected (let 
alone trusted) to self-regulate.  Bankers‟ risk models may have an attractive 
“cognitive simplicity” which can be dangerous; that is, the models can give the 
impression that complex phenomena may be simply presented, concealing their 
underlying assumptions which may create a “performative loop between „theory‟ 
and „reality‟” (Mackenzie, 2006). 
 
The willingness of banks to “show” compliance through deployment of self-
generated risk models is found to be less reassuring in the light of this debate: 
tracing the historic relationship between risk-models and markets, Mackenzie 
indicates that they have continued to shape one another, so that models should 
not be relied upon as truly objective measures.  Taking as one starting point 
markets‟ widespread adoption of the Black-Scholes formula, which drove 
explosive growth of banks‟ derivatives trading, Mackenzie is concerned that its 
general use by bank traders “helped to create a reality in which the model was 
indeed substantively confirmed”. 
 
This analysis also highlights the problematic that risk modelling is compromised 
by being, to an extent, socially constructed; for example when underlying 
assumptions are ignored as a model becomes popularly adopted for general 
trading purposes.  Porter‟s (2011) analysis of historic social studies similarly 
questions the eagerness of public administrators (and, one may reasonably infer, 
of public regulators) to rely on statistics as the unchallengeable “truth”.  This 
strand of social studies of finance thus urges continuing research consideration of 
questions of sense-making and the role of subjective human judgement in the 
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face of uncertainty; topics explored notably by Weick (e.g. 1996) and Kahneman 
and Tversky (1974, 1979, 1982) and here considered further in section 3.4 
below. 
 
Reviewing antecedent theories, Mackenzie (2006) also suggests that, in any 
event, it may never be possible definitively to claim that an econometric model 
has been abused, since models themselves are derived by means of an abusive 
process – that is, deploying, then coming to rely upon, assumptions which tend 
to be expedient to trading but may be inapplicable to the market situation in 
which they are used.  Mackenzie also makes a useful distinction, reflected in 
bankers‟ comments in Chapter 6, between two forms of “models abuse”:  Abuse 
by dogmatic use of models (creating the problematic of relying on inappropriate 
or unnoticed assumptions), and abuse of models (where a rationally-derived 
trading model is compromised by “street-level” corrupt practices, such as large-
multiple running of tests followed by “cherry-picking” of the most commercially 
attractive results). 
 
Despite this potential for abuse, from the regulator‟s point of view enforced self-
regulation offers the prospect of balancing the considerations of commerce and 
public protection.  From the commercial point of view, however, practitioners 
wish to see regulators‟ interventions kept within acceptable parameters:  Too 
much intervention may suppress natural market growth, whilst too little may 
enable deviant enterprise to flourish.  Prior to self-regulation, command-and-
control systems of regulation adopted a utilitarian view that practitioners would 
regard strict compliance as a practical necessity (Hawkins, 1983; Braithwaite, 
2000; Knafo, 2008).  Yet it was also recognized that command-and-control 
might perversely encourage “rational” non-compliance (Viscusi and Zeckhauser 
[1979]);  an effect which Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) suggest enforced self-
regulation helps to moderate:  “tightening of a standard may lower overall 
performance”. 
 
A primary problem of self-regulation is any assumption that regulatees may 
automatically comply, perhaps out of some sense of ownership of the system.  A 
more realistic aim for the regulator in this system is to secure “egoistic co-
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operation”, argue Ayers and Braithwaite (1992).  Enforced self-regulation, 
however, may have the effect of distributing decision-making, which introduces 
the differing viewpoints of various participants, each with their own perception 
of risk and compliance.  As Beck (1992) suggests, regulated actors produce 
subjective cognitions and may even dismiss absolute truths when judging their 
own appropriate response to a risk (or to a regulatory demand).  Because 
subjective risk cognition plays an important part in decision-making about 
compliance, this topic will be examined more closely in a separate subsection of 
this chapter (see 3.4 below).  Since many business decisions must be taken in 
uncertain circumstances, individuals will make their own sense of the apparent 
risks and appropriate response; as the present research will explore, there are 
times when individuals see a regulatory prescribed response as irrelevant to the 
situation. 
 
The present research will use primary investigation to explore how enforced self-
regulation presents systemic problems which, in the presence of noncompliant 
regulatees, may severely compromise its efficacy.  Observations of actors in 
many forms of regulated organizations
11
 reveal some of these weaknesses of 
self-regulation in action. These problems are summarised in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
For self-regulation to work, even with a component of enforcement, there must 
be symmetry of incentives to comply.  Internal incentives (that is, to comply) 
must be aligned with external incentives (that is, to do business).  Regulatees 
may also be attracted by alternative activities such as “systems thinking” 
(Seddon, 2008) or a “ritual” of apparent compliance (Power, 2005), which may 
involve less effort than actually changing their behaviour to achieve real 
compliance.  At the extreme, a systems-thinking response may lead to the 
production of a “fantasy document” (Clarke, 1999), or of narrowly-defined 
                                                 
11
 Recent accounts of noncompliant responses to self-regulation include, in the public sector:  rail 
network operators (Hutter, 2005), central government (Torriti, 2007), pharmaceutical product 
testing (McGoey, 2007), and hospital management (Kodate and Dodds, 2009).  Commercial 
sector studies include: food production (Yapp and Fairman, 2005), shipping (Bloor and Samson, 
2009), and chemical refining (Etienne, 2010).  
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compliance targets (Goodhart, 2006), invoking procedures which have no impact 
on regulatees‟ risk-taking behaviour. 
 
The “fantasy document” is one extreme outcome arising from the problem of 
asymmetry of information.  A regulatory agency, with limited resources, relies 
upon the industry to make good any knowledge deficits.  Regulated actors 
control the input data in the form of their own reported figures and their choice 
of risk models deployed to analyse inputs.  The regulator‟s control initiatives 
may be seen as lacking legitimacy if they are uninformed, as can happen when 
the industry does not co-operate to transfer knowledge.  If frustrated in this way, 
a regulator may as an alternative come to over-rely on systems being in place and 
performing as specified; if important elements of the systems turn out to be a 
“fantasy” specified by the industry, the control begins to fail, potentially creating 
a crisis of regulatory legitimacy.  
 
Asymmetry of information is one aspect of the wider problem of asymmetry of 
resources.  The regulatory agency is more resource-constrained than the 
commercial firms, lacking the manpower necessary to maintain a consistent 
deterrent in the form of a sustained physical presence on banks‟ trading floors. 
Risk reports (summary trading activity stress tests) must therefore accepted as a 
proxy for the observation of trading behaviour. 
 
Finally, self-regulation may incite a culture of minimal or “satisficing” 
compliance (Simon, 1956) – that is, making the smallest amount of reporting or 
change in behaviour which the regulatees perceive is needed to satisfy the 
regulator‟s case officers.  Over time, an organization may legitimize various 
types of “routine nonconformity” (Vaughan, 1999).  As a social construct of 
noncompliance this effect is further considered in section 3.4.3 below.  
 
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) further warn of the dangers of regulatory capture 
(“co-optation”) by vested interests, noting the dangers of “cozy local 
agreements”.  Empirical study of financial regulators‟ failures of enforcement 
(Williams, 2008) suggests that regulatory capture may in fact be a normal state 




“intractable constraints whereby… powerful economic actors 
[can] undermine and circumvent regulatory process.  
…Enforcement initiatives that appear brazen on their surface 
[become] blunted over time through accommodation and a 
disjuncture between intention and practice, buttressed by essential 
power differences between regulator and regulated”. 
     (Williams, 2008, p311) 
 
In plain terms, the conclusion is that “money talks”.  Whilst financial sector 
lobbyists may remind each new government that banks are central to the UK‟s 
national wealth creation, Black and Rouch (2008) offer a more nuanced view of 
“legitimacy criteria” for financial regulation.  They suggest that tacit pacts exist 
between banks and the state, allowing any proposed regulation to be pre-assessed 
by the industry and supported or rejected depending on whether the industry 
regards it as congruent with current notions of appropriate democratic 
governance, constitutionality, functionality and declared goals. 
 
Having considered significant problems, expected findings are now indicated in 
each of the three highlighted fields, starting with regulatory theory. 
 
3.2.3  What a sector study might be expected to find: 
Regulation 
Critical studies of enforced self-regulation in action, such as Fairman and Yapp 
(2005), suggest that regulatees may over time come to expect compliance to be a 
“negotiated outcome” after a meeting with the regulator‟s case officer.  Although 
Fairman and Yapp welcome enforced self-regulation as an improvement on 
command-and-control schemes of regulation, they warn that it promotes a softer 
conception of compliance.  In the context of a food industry study, they find that 
enforced self-regulation encourages reactive decision-making and casts the 
enforcer in the role of “driver” of compliance. 
 
Other critics note that compliance may be meaningless if defined by user-
produced econometrics (such as Toft [1996]; Hood [2002]; and Cox [2008] 
attacking statistical “illusions of certainty”) and note real adverse responses to 
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new regulations  (such as Braithwaite J and V [2000, 2003]; Rothstein [2002]).  
There are also warnings that enforced self-regulation encourages a “systems 
tendency” (Seddon, 2008), “fantasy” control documents (Clarke, 1999), the 
unqualified pursuit of audit (Power, 2005) and risk quantification (Toft, 1996) as 
a substitute for human judgement.  Indeed, Ayres and Braithwaite acknowledged 
flaws in their own proposition: for example, in a study of pharmaceutical 
industry, they note that although internal compliance officers have great 
expertise and “know where the bodies are buried” (1992, p 104), the officers 
cannot be expected to be willing to self-incriminate.  If self-regulation were 
purely voluntary, they concede, internal compliance officers could be “more 
capable [but] not necessarily more willing to regulate effectively” than the 
regulator‟s own agents (Ayers and Braithwaite [1992], p106).  They predict that 
difficulties may arise if a business sector‟s collective resources are directed into a 
trade association which then manoeuvres to “co-opt” or even “capture” the 
regulatory agenda.  Pearce and Tombs (1990) warn that commercial firms must 
be challenged to prevent them pursuing profit without regard for public good.  
The present study will challenge, in particular, Ayres and Braithwaite‟s assertion 
that empirical inspection will normally find firms engaging constructively with a 
regulator, and will instead propose that “coping” may be as common. 
 
Another conception to be challenged empirically is Ayres and Braithwaite‟s 
view that one may rely upon commercial staff members as “family”, whose 
compliance questions to colleagues will be answered, as distinct from regulatory 
staff, who as “outsiders” who may be ignored.  This distinction cannot be applied 
in the banking sector where the dividing line between insiders and outsiders is 
more likely to be drawn between the trading teams and the bank‟s own 
compliance team (Fenton-O‟Creevy, Nicholson, Soane and Willman, 2005).  In 
the context of banking, to be examined, the compliance function as a whole is 
widely regarded with suspicion and the benefits of the CRO being “family”-side 
are less than the regulatory theory anticipates. 
 
Attempts to improve compliance, whether by tighter standards or tougher 
enforcement, may also be expected to run into difficulties.  Some regulated 
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actors may weigh up the cost of compliance against the cost of noncompliance
12
 
and conclude that noncompliance is commercially preferable (Viscusi and 
Zeckhauser [1979]).   If so, attempts by the regulator to raise the threshold 
standard for compliance may make well-behaved firms safer still, but will also 
perversely encourage marginally compliant firms to consider save on the higher 
compliance costs by ceasing to comply.  Reviewing regulatory agencies‟ historic 
failures, Carpenter (2001) also cautions against their seeking to accrue power by 
promoting “the appearance of control” (as opposed to a better grasp of empirical 
detail).  Overall, as Viscusi and Zeckhauser argue, in an industry where the 
regulator‟s authority is already unsound, the raising of standards may produce 
lower performance.  The present study will look at whether this expected effect 
may be found in the banking sector.          
 
A final area of doubt concerns the deterrent impact of enforcement.  In this 
regard there are weaknesses both as to the understanding of what is to be 
enforced – under a “light touch” regulatory regime – and the extent to which 
regulatees expect or fear enforcement action.  Shortly before the 2008 crisis, a 
permissive atmosphere had been encouraged both by government, the regulator 
and the industry.  Following claims of a crisis of over-regulation in the UK 
(reviewed in Hutter, 2005), HM Treasury commissioned a review of regulatory 
policy (Hampton, 2004) which favoured a “business-friendly” approach, to be 
called “enterprise regulation”.  Hampton (2004, 2005) recommended that risk 
assessment should determine the focus of enforcement interventions and that 
regulators‟ first resort should be to offer positive guidance on compliance.  This 
approach would rely upon business interests giving a “dominant consensus” 
(Vickers, 2008) support for controls based on enforced self-regulation. 
 
The system was expected to work as long as it was supported by comprehensive 
and transparent risk assessment, to focus inspections and enforcement action on 
the highest-risk businesses.  Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) offered an 
“enforcement pyramid”: regulatory interventions should range from persuasion 
and warnings (for mild non-compliance) through civil penalties, and finally to 
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criminal penalties and the revoking of licences in extreme cases.  This staged 
approach was suggested to help a regulator to focus limited resources on areas of 
greatest concern and to reduce the need for visits to firms who are seen to be 
compliant.  One expected consequence of this approach, also to be examined 
empirically in the present research, is that this may encourage sophisticated 
regulatees to practice making convincing representations of compliance in order 
to conceal a non-compliant reality.   
 
Following the advice of Sparrow (2000), Hampton (2005) also proposed a 
“random component of audit”.  As Carpenter (2001) also argues, it is desirable to 
limit practitioners‟ “earned autonomy” by regular audit questioning.  Hampton‟s 
new control initiatives were also to be passed through a Regulatory Impact 
Assessment (RIA), designed to weigh commercial interests against public 
protection.  Subsequently RIAs were criticized when empirical evidence 
emerged that they were themselves being manipulated by local political interests 
(Baldwin 2005, Torriti 2007).   
 
Even before the 2008 crash, enforced self-regulation was also being criticized for 
its broad “susceptibility of policy processes to elite interests” (Vickers, 2008).  
This contrasted with the FSA‟s contemporary view of desirable characteristics of 
self-regulation (see Chapter 2 section 2).  One of Ayers and Braithwaite‟s (1992) 
cautions had been a warning to regulators to avoid resorting to “unenforceable 
blandness” as a way of winning industry support.  But as Black, Hopper and 
Band (2007) report, the FSA‟s principles were welcomed by practitioners as easy 
to interpret in favour of commerce, as they were 
“…drafted at a high level of generality, [using]  qualitative, 
evaluative terms: „fair‟, „reasonable‟, „suitable‟ [rather than] 
„bright line‟ specifics...  Largely behavioural standards concerned 
with, for example, „integrity‟, „skill care and diligence‟ and 
„reasonable care‟…”   
   (Black, Hopper and Band, 2007, p 192) 
 
Less than a year later, Black and Rouch (2008) concluded that the FSA‟s 
“voluntary rules” approach was failing under the weight of commercial 
“interpretative interference”.  Black and Rouch predicted that the 2008 market 
shocks would, for the foreseeable future, dismiss “soft” principles in favour of a 
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return to tough standard-setting.  The introduction of hard rules is, they suggest, 
an instrumental activity which tends to be “most intense” after a systemic shock:  
 
“Current financial conditions have resulted in a further surge.”   
(Black and Rouch, 2008, p.218) 
 
The coincidence of the 2008 market shocks with the present study may be 
expected to reveal research respondents experiencing a similar change in 
attitudes within their own employer banks.  Alternatively, one might expect to 
find the banks clinging to the commercial advantages of interpretable soft 
principles, encouraging a culture of noncompliant behaviour.  The following 
section will consider theories of organization which refer to this; these may 
explain or predict factors responsible for CROs‟ experiences in attempting to 
secure compliance.   
 
3.3  Literature concerning Organizations 
3.3.1  Introduction 
The problems of enforced self-regulation discussed above indicate that an 
organization being regulated may, in practice, make less effort to comply than 
the regulator expects it to.  Where a regulator requires, or expects, the 
organization to offer assistance this is not always forthcoming.  However, it 
would be unsafe to conclude from this that organizations somehow naturally 
prefer to be obstructive.  To understand better the factors involved, it is 
necessary to consider how a bank regards its organizational purpose as differing 
from that of the regulator.  A commercial organization‟s aims, problems, 
interests and incentives will be distinct to itself, and to some extent to its 
business sector.  Literature of organizations is now considered, with an emphasis 
on scholarship which addresses differences between their formally constituted 
structures and the informal practices typically experienced by employees.  This 
literature also provides some valuable broader insights into the differences 




3.3.2  The differing aims of organizations; the tension of 
formal versus informal 
Enforced self-regulation, as noted above, relies upon a co-operative response 
from regulatees; that is, on their good behaviour.  In practice, organizations 
produce a variety of group behaviours, some of which impede enforced self-
regulation.  Scholarly studies of organizations in relation to this concern are now 
considered.  In making sense of the literature for current purposes, it is helpful to 
consider the broader picture of organizational function, against which behaviour 
is played out.  This subsection will address this topic. 
 
Scholars note that formal structures (academically expressed as the organization) 
exist in a continual state of tension with subcultures (academically expressed as 
groups).  Hutter (2005) sums this up, in a discussion of risk response plans:  
 
“Once… organizational scripts and re-organizations are in place it 
is not necessarily the case that they are complied with or co-
operated with.”  
(Hutter, 2005, p80).   
 
Ulrich (2000) suggests that the tension has its origins in the structure of 
organizations differing from their capability.  Formal structure, he says, matters 
less in reality to staff than “what the organization is able to do and how it does 
it”.  Thus “who reports to whom” and “which rules [apply]” are secondary 
concerns for many staff.  (A regulator who assumed that hierarchies will support 
the enforcing of controls would find this unhelpful.)  Heller (1996) similarly 
argues that a business organization‟s purpose is made evident not in its structure 
but in how it sets about its essential task of “increasing long-term capability”.  
Behaviour is distinct from structure: A complex organizational structure may 
conceal numerous and widely distributed informal groups of staff who do not 
comply with rules (Mullins, 1985).  There is a “gap”, says Heller (1996), 
between an organization‟s formal public representations – its published aims, 
structure and rules – and “what actually happens”.  This gap is also informed by 
actors‟ perceptions of their organization‟s sense of purpose (Katz and Khan, 
1978).  Regulatory and banking organizations, for example, have differing 
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perceptions of the purpose of risk management, which may be summarised 
respectively as public protection and finding profit opportunity.    
 
Attempts to control an organization, including by regulators, must constantly 
confront the “what actually happens” gap.  That the organization‟s own senior 
managers may not be able to do so is a concern of the present research, which 
reflects on the contrast between the formal organization and the informal groups 
within it (after Mullins, 1985).  Where the organization has formal and published 
structures, such as every company produces, the individual‟s acculturated 
experience of working in an organization is the product of many interactions: 
that is, the outcome of repeated perceptions and and interpretations of 
colleagues‟ behaviour.  An organization‟s interactions with other parties, 
including regulators and individual members of staff, contribute to a view of 
itself which may differ from officially marketed versions: the informal 
organization is a form of “abstract structure caused by human intervention” 
(Mullins, 1985). 
 
Differences of organizational purpose, and conception of risk, may deliver 
consequences which regulation did not intend, possibly including secondary 
risks.  These “unintended consequences” were noted by Weber and are here 
summarised (after Cherkaoui‟s [2007] taxonomy of Weber).  Regulatees may 
respond with “instrumental rationality” if they perceive a regulation to be based 
on incomplete or faulty information; this form of sense-making will be further 
discussed in section 3.4.  “Interdependencies” may mean that the desired 
outcome of a regulation is displaced by other actors‟ interventions.  The 
inappropriate transfer of a control rationale from one sector to another – such as 
financial risk analysis into public healthcare – creates problems of 
“ramification”.  Finally, and a key concern of the present research, regulation 
may be subject to varying interpretation through different value-systems: 
Weber‟s “polytheism”.      
 
The informal group, or informal organization, has its own distinct subset of 
organizational scholarship.  Variance between informal groups and formal 
structures is first addressed in Mayo‟s (1949) digests of the “Hawthorne studies” 
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of a US manufacturing workforce:  Mayo warns of the need to conceive formally 
designated “teams” separately from informal “groups”, as he finds that informal 
groups exert a stronger influence over collective behaviour.  To support this, 
Mayo notes how production-line workers made informal local agreements to set 
a pace of work just sufficient to meet immediate targets but also to avoid hard 
physical effort and to keep future production targets low.  
 
Gray and Starke (1988) have examined how organizational aims may be 
compromised by informal interpretations; observing that informal group 
subcultures are frequently at variance with the publicly stated aims of the 
organization.  As observed by Gray and Starke, a significant origin of 
noncompliant behaviour is a conceptual tension between the formal 
organization
13
, which assumes loyalty as a basis for attachment to the 
organization, and the informal group, which asks only for cohesiveness among 
its members.  Informal groups define themselves with reference to a shared 
private cause of some kind, which may include gaining collective satisfaction 
from acts of defiance against organized authority (Gray and Starke, 1988). 
 
Differing concepts of organizational purpose inform how managers in public or 
commercial organizations interpret their own roles (Mintzberg, 1990).  The 
trader‟s instinct does not align with the regulator‟s “unitary” or “public good” 
ambitions for his work, as described by Horwitz (1991).  According to Horwitz, 
public-sector staff values may be expected to include:  Shared common interests 
and objectives, harmonious enterprise, and relating to the employer organization 
as a common source of loyalty.  These values contrast with the commercial 
sector‟s “pluralist” conception of corporate purpose (Fox, 1966).  Commercial 
actors more readily accept that their organization can include competing groups 
with local allegiances, recognizing that creative conflicts may spur on the 
development of new products.   
 
Mullins‟ (1985) “gap” between formal structure and informal behaviour may be 
seen as a challenge to self-regulation, which relies upon organizational structures 
                                                 
13
 Which could refer to either a regulator or a commercial employer 
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behaving as prescribed.  In reality, any published representation of structure 
(such as a hierarchy, organogram, or corporate annual report) may not indicate 
how decisions are taken in practice.  The question of identifying “who‟s really in 
charge?” is thus of critical importance to the operation of internal controls and to 
the personal efficacy of risk management officers.   
 
This has implications for the CRO function and the present research which 
considers that function.  Organizational theory suggests that, to be effective, a 
CRO may need to realize that (formal) “team” designations do not account for 
the underlying influence of (informal) “groups”; indeed, the CRO should expect 
the two to differ (Mayo, 1949).   Second, an adept CRO may need to recognize 
that, unlike teams, which are formally recruited, informal groups self-select and 
converge around issues of perceived loyalty.  Such issues might be expected to 
include response to a perceived disruptive intervention, such as a demand for risk 
information from a regulatory officer or CRO.  In perceiving a demand as 
threatening, the informal group may characterize itself as a defensive unit whose 
self-appointed function is “collusion to modify formal working arrangements 
more to their liking” (Mullins, 1985, p531). 
 
Organizational studies broadly concur that informal groups self-create around a 
perceived common purpose of “deflecting challenges to engrained practices” 
(Huber and Rothstein, in press)(also noted in Mayo, 1949; Katz and Khan, 1978; 
Broadbent, Jacobs and Laughlin, 2001).  Of relevance to the present research 
context is Huber and Rothstein‟s (2013) observation that an organization‟s risk 
managers – such as CROs – may come under pressure to “amplify or attenuate 
risk assessments” because of their employer‟s “values, beliefs and interests”.  
This pressure may lead the risk manager to cope by filtering and reinterpreting 
“engrained organizational norms, practices and beliefs” (Huber and Rothstein, 
2013) until rule-violations become “normalized” (Vaughan, 1996).  Consistent 
with this view, one may expect to find a bank CRO coping by attempting to 
maintain an “illusion of control” – for example, by “stage-managing information 
disclosure” (Huber and Rothstein, 2013) or promoting “fantasy document” risk 




Kagan and Scholz (1984) advise that some disengagement may also be ascribed 
to simple “organizational incompetence” – that is, regulatees misunderstanding 
or not knowing about a rule (Merton‟s [1936] “imputed competence”).  
However, Kagan and Scholz (1984) also apply this notion of “incompetence” to 
a situation in which regulatees wilfully ignore the regulator; an effect which 
concerns the present research. 
 
A related effect noted by Dorner (1996) is that, when “rule-violations” pass 
unchallenged, practitioners tend to devalue the authority of the regulator.  As a 
result, where no other incentives to comply are present, regulatory compliance 
may be expected to decay over time.  This decay effect may be more pronounced 
in a regulated business which has a “cultural legacy” of “show[ing] little 
inclination to conform” because its “professionals [prefer to] trust their own 
approach” (Kurzer, 2001).  As “powerful institutions”, banks are well placed to 
“ward off claims for an alternative construction of cognitive framework and 
action plan” (Kurzer, 2001).  The field research which follows in Chapters 5 – 7 
will review found examples of these and other related ex-ante, deliberative 
coping phenomena.  
 
Whilst these literatures site “rule-breaking” within theories of regulation and 
organization, coping is also a significant topic of concern for social psychology, 
considered in section 3.4 below.  
 
The problematics of organisations where culture reshapes formal structures are 
discussed by McDowell (1997) among other facets of her gender-based social 
study of bank staff in the 1990s.  This study – based, like the present thesis, on 
empirical work in the form of conversations with bank employees – notes that 
individuals‟ conduct is susceptible to cultural reshaping by the dominant beliefs 
and attitudes which are brought to work by a distinctive type of employee, 
referred to as the “Type A” (who is typically aggressive and individualistic).  As 
McDowell observes, organisations function by constructing attitudes and beliefs; 
in banks, she notes, there is a strong gender component to this.  One practical 
manifestation of this value system is a predisposition to hire strong-willed 
(typically male-aggressor type) individuals in sales functions.  Any other staff 
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who are not male aggressors – which as McDowell notes, implies women, but as 
the present research will consider, may apply to “back office” types such as risk 
managers – are likely to find will find themselves under cultural pressure to self-
restrict to “a small number of acceptable ways of presenting themselves at work” 
(McDowell, 1997).   
 
In a field study of providers in another financial service subsector (insurance), 
Leidner (1993) notes a similar pressure on workers to conform to expected 
stereotypes, generating “problems of self-identity”; “having to be, while at work, 
someone they did not want to be” is a source of stress, and hence a possible 
driver for coping (Warr, 2002), a causal connection which is of interest for the 
present study.  Leidner (1993) also notes that financial employees faced with 
aggressive “norm violation” by powerful others will adapt their own behaviour 
to accommodate it.  This corroborates Vaughan‟s (1999) findings of 
“normalization of deviance”, a process in which employees perceive themselves 
as lacking the authority, or support of others, to challenge assertive rule-
breakers.    
 
These studies inform an understanding of how employees‟ sense of self can have 
an impact on their cognition of what constitutes accepted or acceptable 
behaviour.  In the workplace setting of corporate banking, with markets trading 
in high-value financial contracts, a machismo-driven value system drives 
employees‟ expectations of career progression and success.  These aspects of 
self-image are thus constructed with reference to a hierarchy where assertive and 
single-minded behaviour is respected, but as a result devalues others such as 
women of child-bearing age and “non-A types”.  This influence is most directly 
experienced in the workplace, where the present research will be set, although 
McDowell (1997) notes as further indication of the culture‟s pervasiveness the 
male-aggressive orientation of work-related social activities outside the office. 
 
The activities of supervision, enforcement and compliance may all be 
alternatively seen as forms of expressive behaviour within organizations.  Whilst 
preoccupied with demonstrating their focus on carrying out compliance activity, 
both commercial and public-sector organizations may meanwhile “misjudge 
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serious risks”, sometimes with catastrophic results (Janis, 1972; Vaughan, 1999).  
Bardach and Kagan (1982) suggest that regulated actors may be expected to 
resent their regulator, as a normal response to any experiences of “site level 
unreasonableness” following, for example, over-zealous enforcement actions.  
On the regulator‟s side, expressive behaviour may compensate for a lack of 
value-based justification of activities: beyond the mechanistic activities of 
reporting on compliance monitoring and enforcement, regulators find it hard to 
quantify the benefits of their “risk control accomplishments” (Sparrow, 2000). 
 
Regulatees are though understood to be responsive to governments‟ need for a 
regulator to deliver public reassurances (“rhetorical instruments”), such that all 
concerned can carry on with their business without attracting public concern  
(Clarke, 1999; Sparrow, 2000; Carpenter, 2001; Hutter and Power, 2005).  
Practitioners understand that they are required to play a part in public 
reassurance, with periodic shows of support for the regulator (Smith, 1995; 
Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin, 2001).  Power (2007) even refers to the 
“signalling” activity of regulatory box-ticking as a “risk-based control ideal”.  
There is cycle of demonstrative activity on both sides, sending amplified signals 
of reassurance into the public domain; the regulator‟s staff may also make 
“expressive interventions” (Sparrow, 2000).   
 
The notion of regulation as an expressive or performative activity raises the topic 
of “creative compliance: theory of organizational behaviour considers the 
“creative reframing” of personal experience, rooted in Goffman‟s reflections on 
self-presentation (1967) and the “frame” organizing of social experiences (1974).  
Research in this sub-field observes regulatory enterprise as a “drama”, complete 
with stage, performers and audience (Vollmer, 2007); alternatively (Snider, 
1991) as an iterative “regulatory dance” of attempted enforcements and 
practitioner side-steps.  Kaplan (2008) argues that at times of public uncertainty 
about a risk, control innovation will follow on from a “framing contest” – that is, 
that a new control may be proposed by whichever policy advocate succeeds in 




Organizations respond to, and cope with (see 3.4) the task of risk management 
with divergent approaches: it is seen by business as best managing circumstances 
for private profit, and by regulators as providing public reassurance.  The 
practical consequences of this approach, for CROs, will be noted in the 
discussion of empirical findings (see section 6.4).  For the present, it may be 
predicted that the function of risk management will be found to be conceived 
differently by public-sector and commercial actors.  These different conceptions 
of risk will now be explored. 
 
A regulator, tasked with protecting the public interest, seeks to prevent 
commercial actors from taking undue risks; thus risk management, to a regulator, 
is a matter of restraining undesirable behaviour.  In this view – to oversimplify – 
risk is bad and must be controlled, for example by compiling a risk register 
listing defined hazards to be avoided or mitigated.   
 
Commercial actors, by contrast, primarily conceive risk as the opportunity for 
profit (Bernstein, 1996).  In this view, risk cannot be fully defined or explained 
by quantitative techniques.  A behavioural study of financial market traders has 
noted that they come to rely on “tacit, difficult to articulate, knowledge, 
heuristics, and private information”; they distrust “mechanical” calculations of 
risk because these can be “easily defeated by [the] human opinions and beliefs” 
which have greater influence on market price movements (all cited phrases: 
Fenton-O‟Creevy, Nicholson, Soane and Wilman, 2005, p202).   
 
Thus traders‟ notion of a non-rational “sixth sense” for risk conflicts with a 
regulator‟s approach to managing risk by rationalization, quantification and 
audit.  From the individual trader‟s point of view, a regulator‟s case officer lacks 
the experience necessary to have developed a perception of commercial risk.  
Studies of the cognitive process (Zeman, 2008; Kahneman, 2011) suggest that it 
may not be possible for an “outsider” to grasp that intuitive risk perception may 




“No amount of scientific exploration of a sense we lack will ever 
give us a feel for „what it‟s like‟ to have and use that sense… 
Subjective, first-person knowledge seems to lie beyond the reach 
of science.”    (Zeman, 2008, p191) 
 
 
3.3.3  What might new research expect to find within the 
organization?    
The expressive view of organizations, discussed above, suggests that regulatory 
compliance activity may sometimes be performative.  Within this view, one may 
interpret banks‟ creation of the role of CRO itself as a piece of regulatory 
performance – as Power (2005) suggests – designed to demonstrate publicly that 
banks take their public risk reporting function seriously.  This implies a strategic 
form of “coping” at a corporate level, with CRO as an embodiment of coping.  
The present research should consider the notion that the CRO is a “coping 
person”, and that this notion moves beyond earlier theory.  As a significant factor 
in human response to risk, coping is given consideration in a separate subsection 
(3.4.3 below). 
 
To summarise on organizational theory:  Literature suggests that a researcher 
may expect to find signs of decoupling between the formal rationalisations made 
by an organization, through its structures and systems, and the practical realities 
of how staff engage in daily work (Lipsky, 1980; Leidner, 1993; Warr, 2002).  
Such decoupling may induce “coping” responses, especially where individuals‟ 
expectation of self-determination are under pressure – as when an external 
regulator seeks to impose new risk controls.  This expectation is now considered 




3.4  Individuals responding to risk: decisions, sense-
making and coping 
3.4.1 Introduction  
Although, as noted above, significant literatures study regulation and 
organizational behaviour, it is also clear that human efforts to control of risk are, 
more than any other factor, dependent upon how an individual responds when 
called upon to engage with and manage risk.  How individuals perceive their 
own contribution to any collective efforts to manage risk, and critically, how 
they make sense of the information and instructions given to them – or lack of 
these – may determine whether a system succeeds in exerting control, or fails to 
do so.  
 
Compliance with a regulatory demand may be a direct response to some action 
from within the regulatory system, such as the threat of detection or enforcement 
action; or it may be the product of a judgement based on social risk perception.  
The literature distinguishes between regulatory theory (see 3.1) and human 
decision theory, some of whose key concerns are now noted. 
 
3.4.2  Decisions and sense-making 
Modern understanding of how humans make decisions from incomplete 
information follows from Arrow‟s (1958) utility theory, which considers how 
psychological and economic factors produce choices under uncertainty.  
Decision theory developed by way of taking into account practical study findings 
about the effects of neural phenomena on decision-making, such as heuristics 
and cognitive biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974;  Kahneman 2002, 2011).  A 
related group of studies meanwhile examined the impact of social interactions on 
individuals‟ risk perception (Fischhoff, 2002).  These interactions inform public 
conceptions of risk and what is an appropriate level of concern about it, such as 
when considering “How safe is safe enough?” in relation to new technologies 
(Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read and Combs, 1978).  Related taxonomies of 
human interactions with risk have grouped significant factors into heuristic sets 
(Renn and Klinke, 2002; Saltelli and Funtowicz, 2005) and stages of a social 
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amplification process (Pidgeon, Kasperson and Slovic, 2003).  Within the past 
20 years, decision theory has also been directly informed by advances in the 
understanding  of human cognitive processes – modeling effects such as sense-
making (Weick, 1995), bounded rationality (Gigerenzer, 2002), affect (Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters and McGregor, 2004) and mirroring (Zeman, 2008).   
 
Within the subset of risk-cognitive studies, sense-making has emerged as a key 
concept, following first use of the term by Merton (1936) to describe how a 
group may respond in ways not intended by a control system – as for example 
when regulatees reinterpret (imprecise) rules in ways that favour their own 
interests.  Weick (1995) regards sense-making as a critical component of 
decision-making, supporting this with a series of forensic analyses of how 
informal groups made catastrophic decisions as a result of it (Weick 1990, 1993, 
1996).   
 
Regulatory theory, by contrast, is concerned with risk perception only as it 
informs the political wish to control and modify human behaviour, and so to 
inform the political enterprise of policy design.  This field of theory is less 
concerned with psychology and more with the operation of bureaucracy, the 
suppression of unintended consequences, and how best to apply compliance 
controls  (as noted, thematic concerns in the work of Ayres and Braithwaite, 
Clarke, Bardach and Kagan, and Sparrow). 
 
Both corporate organizations and government agencies are susceptible to a 
tendency to make sense of their organizational purpose by seek self-comforting 
affirmations of their power to control their operational environments (Clarke‟s 
[1999] “fantasy documents”).. The work of Kahneman and Tversky, Slovic, and 
others acknowledges that decision-making under uncertainty is not, in any case, 
wholly accounted for as a product of rational assessment: judgement is subject to 
the intervention of heuristics and biases which interpolate personal perceptions 
and preferences into the decision process.  Decision-making under uncertainty 
may therefore be better characterised as the product of “bounded rationality” 
(Simon, 1956; Gigerenzer, 2002; Kahneman, 2002), in which rational evaluation 
78 
 
is understood to be limited by such factors as personal cognition and availability 
of information. 
 
Biases within informal groups also intervene to shape organizational attempts at 
decision-making.  Shaping informal groups‟ attitudes, individual risk perception 
may be seen as an outcome of a sense-making, or reconciliation, process of 
balancing conflicting or unclear formal demands; of creating apparent rationality 
out of incomplete information.  Coping is the practical expression of this 
outcome. 
 
Regulators‟ attempts to translate written rules into practical behaviour-change 
face a number of stumbling-blocks familiar to regulatory theory.  These include 
regulatory unreasonableness (Bardach and Kagan, 1982), when the costs of 
implementation are seen to exceed its benefits; and organizational incompetence 
(Kagan and Scholz, 1984) when a new rule is ignored or misunderstood.  
However, a primary challenge is the phenomenon of coping among regulatees – 
a form of sense-making in action.   
 
3.4.3  Coping and noncompliance  
The following subsection considers the organizational and cognitive difficulties 
which are addressed by theories of coping, and suggests where the present 
research might expect to find evidence relevant to the theories. 
 
In considering sense-making, Weick (1995) notes that individuals progress from 
sense-making to “coping” as a way to reduce the tension between formally 
designated controls and (often conflicting, informal) personal experience.  For 
Weick, coping is sense-making translated into action as it attempts to remedy the 
“slippage between theory and action”;  it is the human intuitive attempt to 
“impose order on a sprawling problem” even though that order is “only partial” 
and, critically, includes the “seeds of its own validation” (Weick, 1995, p123).  
Individuals first use sense-making as an informal way of organizing of risk 
information, then as individuals or in informal groups put into action a coping 
strategy, much as informal groups reinterpret the formal demands of the 
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organization (see 3.3 above).  Weick‟s forensic studies (1993, 1996) suggest  that 
one may expect to encounter sense-making among any new cadre of corporate 
officers who have been assigned a risk control task.  In the present research, bank 
CROs may be predicted to conform to this expectation. 
    
Organizations face the problematic that they must manage external pressures, 
including regulatory demands, in order to maintain their legitimacy.  Yet, with a 
rationality inconsistent with the expectations of the external environment, the 
organization is likely to devise its own unique ways of functioning (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977).  Because of this disjuncture, a regulation which sets out to control 
an organization may fail to gain traction over the problems it seeks to manage.  
Heller (1996) warns of a “gap between the aims of… [the] organization… and 
what actually happens”.   
 
Theories of coping are of value in seeking to explain and understand the 
behaviour of employees who have been presented with conflicting demands.  
Literatures discussing the forms which coping may take are concentrated in two 
fields of research.  Scholarship on organizational behaviour considers how 
organizations are structured, with interpretation of rules subject to modification 
by informal groups.  Social psychology separately considers how individuals 
perceive their organizational environments and respond to the problems which 
may emerge.  Both fields of scholarship are now considered. 
 
Banks‟ risk officers may be expected to be subject to tensions between internal 
and external demands (Hutter and Power, 2005) and in particular, between the 
demands of regulators, sales staff, and Directors.  Regulators require transparent 
public reporting of risk; by contrast, salespeople may be expected to regard risk 
reporting as an unwelcome distraction from selling; and Directors to be primarily 
interested in securing commercial profits.  Studying the attempts of organizations 
and individuals to resolve tensions between various workplace demands, 
scholars have proposed theories of coping to explain and predict institutional and 
individual behavioural responses.  These theories have been developed through 
studies of the organization (March and Simon, 1958; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Lipsky, 1980; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997) and social psychology (Aldwin and 
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Revenson, 1987; Latack and Havlovic, 1992; Lazarus, 1966; Warr, 2002).  Both 
fields of scholarship are now considered.  By focusing on the responses of senior 
risk officers in banks to various pressures in their role, the present research 
provides a contextual setting in which both understandings of coping may 
potentially be observed and examined. 
 
Formal rules (such as regulatory risk controls) may be expected to clash with 
organizations‟ informal routines of everyday practice (Mayo, 1949) – in banks, 
as practiced by sales staff and Directors furthering their commercial goals.  On 
the one hand, a CRO tasked with supporting formal rules may find it practically 
difficult to maintain compliance where these rules clash, ex-ante, with “the 
(informal) way we do things around here” (Spitzer, 2009).  On the other hand, 
the CRO may find it necessary to make an ex-post cognitive adjustment to 
“make sense” of inconsistencies.  Coping might thus be regarded either as a 
conscious product of habituation, or a less rational after-effect of cognitive 
dissonance.  As will here be discussed, organizational coping theory tends to the 
former view; social psychology coping theory to the latter.  
 
Organizational theory connects the phenomenon of coping with a central 
problematic “assumption that organizations function according to the formal 
blueprints” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  Whilst on the surface the organization 
represents that its control systems are fully functional, this representation may be 
achieved by means of “buffering”, “loose coupling” or even “decoupling” 
between formal structures and informal behaviours;  organizational actors cope 
with conflicting pressures by “decoupling” the formal “organization chart” 
(“what they say they do”) from the informal, found version of structures or 
procedures (“day-to-day work”, or “what actually happens”) (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977).  Decoupling would, for example, allow a bank to publish externally 
rational-looking reports of risk exposures – Meyer and Rowan identify 
econometricians as typical actors in this process – which do not in fact account 
for the bank‟s internal rationalities or decision-making processes. 
 
Organizational decoupling of inconsistencies can entail coping strategies which 
the present research may expect to find in banks:  setting of ambiguous goals; 
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suppression of data on technical performance; fragmenting activities between 
“autonomous sub-units”; and, perhaps most significantly for a bank CRO, 
leaving individuals to “work out interdependencies informally”.  Senior 
management of the organization may also consciously act to “maintain face”, 
despite knowledge of coping, by maintaining an “aura of confidence” around 
formal control systems (March and Simon, 1958) and may seek to “minimize 
and ceremonialize inspection and evaluation”, so as to prevent awkward 
revelations of local “deviations that undermine legitimacy” (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977).        
 
The present research may therefore expect to find a bank CRO experiencing 
pressure to employ risk modelling for the abusive purpose of “ritual” or 
“ceremonial assessment… [to] introduce ambiguity” and so “buffer [the bank] 
from failure” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  In this analysis it is argued that coping 
is an ex-ante, strategic, and calculatively rationalised activity carried out with the 
intention of avoiding regulatory interference in routine business – a behaviour 
which Kagan and Scholtz (1984) foresee, and warn about. 
 
A further relevant subset of organizational studies is the forensic analysis of 
disasters, with many scholars identifying the behaviour of informal groups as a 
significant contributory factor (Rolt, 1955; Turner, 1976; Perrow, 1984; Kletz, 
1993; Dorner, 1997; Vaughan, 1999).  Scholars including Vaughan (1999), 
Hutter (2001), Weick (1996), Turner and Pidgeon (1997) regard catastrophic 
control failure as a foreseeable consequence of informal groups‟ attempts to 
reconcile the difference between the formal organization‟s idealized version of 
the world, and the reality experienced by employees.  Turner (1976) argues that 
organizations unwittingly “incubate” catastrophic control failures because they 
find it difficult to conceive how a problem may occur in a given system; Perrow 
(1984) suggests that it may be impossible for a modern organization to 
comprehend its own complexity, so that sooner or later its close-coupled control 
systems may be expected to generate an unforeseen “normal accident”.  Weick 
(1996) examines how inflexible organizational hierarchies of control may induce 
a cognitive response, “sense-making”, which has repeatedly generated fatal 
consequences.  Turner and Pidgeon (1997) alternatively suggest that 
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organizational culture produces a form of selective attention, whereby informal 
groups filter and reinterpret external demands in ways that fit more comfortably 
with formal organizational demands and informal practices.   
 
Social psychology theory, by contrast, considers how risk perception and affect 
(“what the demand looks like and feels like to us” [Warr, 2002]) may explain 
coping, studying individuals‟ responses to workplace pressures for decision-
making.  This is also a relevant context in which to consider the activity of risk 
management in banking, which has been described by its practitioners as 
working to “reduce uncertainty” so as to “promote exploration of opportunities” 
for commercial return on risk-taking (Blunden and Thirlwell, 2010).  Such an 
approach acknowledges the centrality of “judgement under uncertainty” 
(Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982) to the banking enterprise, implying that 
the rational exercise of expert judgement in relation to uncertainty is the defining 
characteristic of the Risk Manager role.  However, theories of social psychology 
(and of organization - see 3.3 above) recognise that informal responses to risk 
information may significantly disrupt formal exercising of judgement. 
 
The present study argues that rational engagement with risk decisions is also 
disrupted by individuals opting to disengage from decision-making interactions – 
a behavioural “coping” response (Lazarus, 1966; Aldwin and Revenson, 1987).  
This behavioural response is typically present in circumstances of uncertainty 
where a decision-maker is additionally subject to various “stressors” (Warr, 
2002; Skinner, Edge, Altman and Sherwood, 2003), which may discourage full 
engagement.  It is significant both for general scholarship and the present 
research that coping occupies a separate theoretic space from decision science; 
whereas decision science tends to focus on rational calculation, coping theory 
concerns routines, social pressures and affective factors.  Coping is regarded, in 
this field, not as a component of decision-making but rather as an alternative to 
it, or “flight” from it (Latack and Havlovic, 1992; Warr, 2002).  Any strategy of 
coping – whether started deliberatively or intuitively – is essentially reducible to 
“approach avoidance” (Skinner, Edge, et al, 2003): that is, either an action or 
“mental strategy” (Latack and Havlovic, 1992) to avoid making a decision, or 
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even to avoid engaging with the problem for which a decision is required 
(Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). 
 
With this difference of approach in mind, this subsection now considers the 
phenomenon of coping as the appropriate focus for the present research, and as 
distinct from a focus on decision-making under uncertainty. 
 
Social psychologists conceive workplace coping as a “person-environment 
transaction [arising when] an individual appraises a situation as stressful” 
(Aldwin and Revenson, 1987; Latack and Havlovic, 1992).  Such coping may 
entail cognitive (sense-making) and/or behavioural (action-taking) efforts to 
reduce stressor “demands and conflicts… that tax or exceed a person‟s 
resources” (Lazarus, 1966).  Significantly for the present research, which is 
concerned with senior risk managers‟ responses to uncertainty, coping theory 
defines a stressor situation as “characterized by uncertainty and important 
consequences” (Latack and Havlovic, 1992).  Aldwin and Revenson (1987) 
argue that, since coping is a complex, dynamic process whose “factor structure 
varies”, it is less amenable to explanation by quantitative study (psychometrics) 
than by qualitative appraisal of situations in which it arises.  The present study 
adopts a qualitative approach, as further discussed and justified in Chapter 4. 
 
Warr (2002) identifies generic “stressor” factors, either “absent positives or 
present negatives”, which may be expected to have relevance for research set in a 
bank risk office.  Of particular expected interest are the “absent positive” factors 
of personal control, good interpersonal contact, and valued status among 
colleagues.  Warr‟s “present negatives” may be expected in the present research 
to include: uncontrolled, imposed or conflicting demands; unsupportive personal 
interactions; and “normative conflicts” including a discomforting “pressure to 
adapt” to others‟ norms.  The same stressors are notably identified in empirical 
studies by Leidner (1993) and McDowell (1997) among financial services 
salespeople.  Leidner (1993) notes as a central problematic the tension of 
“suppress[ing] the self  [to] adapt to the requirements of the organization”, 
recalling Warr‟s (2002) stressor of “excessive depersonalization… treating 
individuals as objects rather than people”.  A coping response may be expected 
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where an individual is under pressure to accommodate “norm violations” by 
others (Leidner, 1993) – and even more so where there is an organizational 
culture of “normalized deviance” (Vaughan, 1999).  Coping strategies which 
CROs may be discovered to use will be discussed following presentation of 
empirical findings
14
.   
 
Becker (1963) has argued that, since deviant behaviour is socially constructed 
(when it is identified and labelled as such), it is necessary for other people 
cognitively to acknowledge a deviant act;  when coping denies such 
acknowledgement, deviancy may pass unchallenged.  This concern is a further 
motive for the present research:  taking into account also the findings of Leidner 
(1993), McDowell (1997) and Fenton-O‟Creevy (2005) among financial services 
employees, the present research may expect to discover at least some of the 
stressors which are preconditions for coping.  That is, as many of the factors 
which social psychology identifies as generative of coping are already known to 
be present in banks, it is of natural interest to a researcher to discover whether 
coping is indeed found.   
 
These constructs collectively support the notion of regulatees‟ coping responses 
as occupying the gap between regulatory intentions and enacted practice in the 
regulated organization.  The (already noted) subset of literature focusing on 
collective deviant behaviour arising in stressful situations (in the work of Weick, 
Perrow, Kletz, Clarke and Vaughan) continues to be augmented by a flow of 
topical case studies (such as Macrae [2007],  Downer [2009], Kodate [2009] and 
Etienne [2010]).   
 
Recent studies by Yapp and Fairman (2005, 2006) of food industry actors have 
identified and taxonomized certain marginally non-compliant behaviour,  
expanding on Hawkins‟ (1983) original propositions.  Yapp and Fairman 
conclude that noncompliance may routinely result from actors innocently or 
wilfully disengaging from regulatory requirements, justifying coping on grounds 
                                                 
14
 Instances of coping phenomena reviewed in sections 5.3, 6.3 and 7.4; the “strategic coping” 
options perceived by CROs in section 7.5; and concluded upon in section 8.3. 
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of time constraints or other commercial pressures.  This builds on theoretic 
notions of satisficing
15
 (Simon, 1956), performativity
16
 (Goffman, 1967) and 
culturally conditioned coping in commercial settings (Dorner, 1996) where 
 
“breaking safety rules is usually reinforced, which is to say, it 
pays off.  [The] immediate consequence is only that the violator is 
rid of the encumbrance the rules impose and can act more freely.  
Safety rules are usually devised in such as way that a violator will 
not be instantly blown sky-high, injured or harmed in any other 
way but will instantly find that his life is made easier”.   
(Dorner, The Logic of Failure, 1996) 
 
The general premise is that when their rule-violations pass unchallenged, 
regulatees tend to devalue the regulator‟s authority.  Gonzales and Sawicka 
(2003) study the operation of these “conditioning effects”: the non-event of 
catastrophe following rule-breaking “teaches” the practitioner that it is 
acceptable – and even apparently safe – to ignore the rule.  Minor legitimations 
of non-compliance accumulate, over time, to produce to a mass acculturative 
rule-breaking effect across the organization. In a common phrase: “Familiarity 
breeds contempt”. A succinct summary is provided in Rolt‟s (1955) study of 
transport disasters; railway maintenance staff whose non-compliance  brought 
about a major crash had been  
 
“so sure of their ability to carry out their work… that they had 
come to look upon the business of protection as a mere 
formality.”  
(Rolt [1955], p128) 
 
One must however avoid any easy assumption that non-compliance is 
automatically a product of opportunistic or wilful misunderstanding.  As 
Braithwaite V. (2003) notes, there may be simple (motiveless) confusion 
between the formulation of a rule and its practical application.  It may be 
“far from certain… whether or not a person interprets the 
[compliance] request in accordance with its intent”  
(Braithwaite, 2003, p276) 
                                                 
15
 That is, producing a “good enough” result.  From Simon (1956):  People “adapt well enough to 
„satisfice‟; they do not, in general „optimize‟” (p136) 
16
 That is, acting in ways that give the appearance of compliance, whether or not in fact 




Acknowledging this problematic (of whether it is possible, or useful, to seek to 
attribute any clear motive to coping), the present research will not assume that 
regulated actors set out to commit illegal acts as such.  Rather, it will investigate 
whether they conceive coping strategies merely as minimising regulatory 
disruption to commercial trading.   
 
In a commercial organization, one might expect to identify various characteristic 
approaches to coping, ranging from individuals who challenge what they find (at 
the extreme, even, the “whistleblower”), to the quiet collaborator who simply 
wants to keep their job at any cost.  The present research wishes to distinguish 
between habituated forms of noncompliance, which will here be termed 
“coping”, and more aggressive or opportunistic challenges to the regulator, 
commonly described as “gaming” the rules.  The term “coping” will be used here 
as this may denote a range of behaviour including accidental (if favourable) non-
compliance and negotiated regulation.  The terms “gaming” or “game-playing” 
are avoided as these presume a more determined or instrumental approach:  
“Parties may not know that they do not have a shared 
understanding; or some or all of them may realise that different 
views exist, and may seek to advance their own view as the 
correct one. Hence, it may be a misnomer to describe such 
contests as `game-playing‟. A game generally relies on a very 
strong shared understanding between the players of the purpose 
and meaning of the rules. Thus, the term `game-playing‟ implies 
an instrumental view of rules, rather than an interpretive view.” 
      Picciotto (2008, p.7) 
  
For the same reason, the present research avoids the inference that imperfect 
compliance must have a malicious intention.  As a less emotive term than 
“gaming”, “coping” allows for this ambiguity of motive, and so better suits the 
current purpose. 
 
3.5  Emergent focus of the present research 




Research is needed to address the concern of how the ideals of regulatory design 
are, in practice, compromised.  As the thematic grouping of literature in this 
chapter implies, this may be considered at three levels.  First, at regulatory 
systemic level, it is necessary to consider factors which lead a business sector to 
disregard its regulator‟s authority.  Second, at the level of the regulated 
organization, it is necessary to examine how internal tensions between profit and 
public accountability may fail to be resolved.  Finally, at the level of the 
individual in a risk management function, it is necessary to examine how the 
performance of a specified risk-control job may become compromised by these 
internal tensions, and how the individual may come to be pressured into finding 
coping strategies in order to make apparent sense of such tensions and to survive 
in the role. 
 
The present research will focus on an individual actor, the CRO.  As a risk 
specialist, often newly appointed, the CRO was expected to protect the public 
interest, especially in the banking sector where the volume, value and complexity 
of risks are great.  It will consider that actor as a focal point for understanding 
the onset of noncompliant responses to regulation.  By studying how the CRO 
interprets the organization‟s stated goals, and experiences of cultural constraints 
limiting their attempted exercise of authority, it is possible to better understand 
how, by informal means, banks resolve conflicts of interest over regulatory 
purpose.  The present research will address its task in the form of this summary 
question:  
 
Do bank risk officers exhibit coping responses towards the 
regulator‟s demands for public risk reporting? 
 
The, possibly central, role of the bank CRO in enabling or condoning 
noncompliance deserves research consideration of its own, which the present 
study will provide; Chapter 4 will develop this from a premise towards a 
research programme.  
 
No study yet directly considers how bank CROs‟ risk perception is a factor 
shaping coping responses to regulatory demands.  The functional role of the 
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CRO has been reviewed by commercial consultants (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
2007; Deloitte and Touche, 2007;  Moore Carter, 2009) and by academia (Power, 
2005; Hall, Mikes and Millo, 2012).  The current research aims to examine, by 
gathering primary evidence, the notion suggested by Power‟s (2005) analysis and 
here expanded, that the CRO is an agent for institutional coping. 
 
Theories touching this proposition have been considered in this chapter, 
including antecedent models of coping behaviour and research into 
noncompliance in other sectors.  To maintain clear separation of theory and 
practical elements, the methodological considerations and techniques deployed 
in preparation for the primary research will be addressed in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4:  RESEARCH METHOD, DESIGN AND DATA 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Chapters 2 and 3 have looked at the emergent phenomenon of the CRO, 
reviewing risk regulatory developments and literatures of regulation, the 
organization, and risk perception.  The literature has suggested that these three 
theoretical ways of considering how CROs engage with their responsibilities 
predict that they will display certain types of behaviour as a consequence of the 
situation they find themselves in.   
 
Chapter 4 will now consider the most appropriate way to investigate how CROs 
respond to demands to interact with regulation and with their employer 
organization, and how they attempt to resolve apparent conflicts of purpose 
within their role.  This chapter presents and reflects on the methodology to be 
used in the current research, considers limitations faced by the researcher and 
explains how these were managed. It explains why a qualitative approach was 
adopted and supports the choice of research design and respondent group, and 
the formulation of questions.  It notes practical issues encountered by the 
researcher in the course of collecting and analysing the data, and considers 
questions of ethics, validity and reliability. 
 
It is hypothesised that UK bank CROs resolve tensions in their role, including a 
possible problem of lack of authority, by resorting to coping strategies and sense-
making.  Original research is proposed to develop an understanding of the 
problem in three main aspects: regulatory, organizational and psychological.   
 
The CRO is a natural focal point to investigate, as research understanding is 
directly informed by CROs‟ practical experience of the problem of defining their 
role.  The research can attempt to discover: How does a CRO routinely attempt 
to make sense of a role which seems to be subject to many, often conflicting, 
demands? – a productive strategy is to ask CROs directly in person to recount 
their experiences of working relationships and of any challenges to their 
authority.  As has been seen, the formal function of the CRO role has been 
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researched elsewhere, but less attention has been given to its informal, 
experiential aspects.  In simple form, one might wish to ask of CROs:  What is it 
like to be a CRO attempting to assert authority?  What actually happens when 
you do?  To be able to obtain answers to these questions from multiple CRO 
respondents would allow a researcher to assemble a composite picture of 
personal experiences of working relationships.  Analysis of such insights would 
be of some value to scholars, practitioners of risk management, and regulators. 
 
This chapter will consider what research needs to be done to secure data which 
informs the three aspects of the problem identified with reference to theory of 
regulation, of organization, and of social psychology.  It will propose and discuss 
how these three aspects may be understood by investigating three working 
relationships which are central to the CRO‟s attempts to make sense of their role:  
These are the relationship with the regulator‟s case officers, with traders, and 
with senior management colleagues.  Elements of the CROs‟ working 
relationships which correspond to the three theory groups are information 
disclosure, the informal organization, and sense-making among senior 
management. 
 
Tensions in the CRO role may be predicted to arise from being required to 
discuss and manage potentially conflicting expectations about risk.  These 
discussions involve the CRO with three proximal actors on an almost daily basis: 
regulatory case officers, traders, and senior managers.  The CRO of course has 
many other interactions, but these three are regarded, as may be seen, by CROs 
themselves, as the most significant.  To understand how the CRO addresses the 
tensions arising in the three key working relationships requires information about 
the content of these daily interactions.  One clearly appropriate way to find out 
about this content is to ask CROs in person to talk about the interactions.   
 
The rest of this chapter will expand on this proposed research approach, then 





4.2  A research approach: How best to gain 
understanding of CROs’ multiple problems?   
 
4.2.1  Defining a respondent group 
The review of circumstances and theories in Chapters 2 and 3 indicates that new 
research might examine whether a CRO finds themself, in practice, treated as the 
pivotal figure in a bank‟s production of public reporting to risk regulators.  
Understanding of CROs‟ personal experience of preparing such reports is the 
heart of the research topic.  A priority is thus to obtain first-hand accounts of 
these experiences, from as many CROs as possible. 
 
The target respondent group may therefore be defined straightforwardly as chief 
risk officers in UK banks, identified as such either by the formal title of CRO or 
by an analogous job function (and corroborated as such by the respondent).   
 
In research discussing interactions between CROs and other actors, notably 
regulatory staff, banks‟ traders and Directors, a natural onward line of enquiry 
would also be to interview these actors.  Pursuit of a greater quantity of collected 
data has been restricted by three factors, one conceptual and two practical, as 
follows.   
 
First, the research focus is on the CRO experience.  This research approach 
allows that the CRO may be found to “embody” a corporate strategy of coping 
compliance – that is, as an individual in whom the bank vests all of its need to 
maintain a deliberately distanced relationship with the regulator.  Interactions 
with other parties are of interest only in so far as they inform the incumbent‟s  
perception of the CRO role. 
 
Second, the resource constraints of an independent PhD project require a focus 
on core subject-matter.  This can mean (reluctant) acceptance that it is not 





Finally, and as found in practice, as the quantity and quality of material produced 
from interviews with CROs emerged, this evidence suggested that there would 
be a more than sufficient body of original material from CROs alone to merit 
review and analysis at this research level.  As the research is concerned with the 
point of view of the CRO, it is reasonable that this view is the one sought in the 
empirical work. 
 
The researcher notes that this is not the first investigation of CROs‟ perception of 
their role; however, the present research approach is distinctive, for reasons 
given in the remainder of section 4.2.  Before 2008, the CRO role had already 
attracted the research attention of management consultancies whose motive for 
enquiry is self-evidently the pursuit of sales opportunities.  Two such studies 
(Deloitte, 2007; Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2007) offered functional definitions 
of the CRO role, with varying levels of instrumentality and executive authority.  
Since these studies have a commercial agenda to promote CRO confidence and 
recruitment, neither of them approaches the phenomenon of coping. 
 
4.2.2  The research approach: qualitative, interview-based 
Having identified respondents who can inform the present research topic, the 
practical questions arise of how to make a research approach, and the most 
appropriate technique of enquiry which will yield useful response material. 
 
The decision here to pursue a qualitative, rather than quantitative, approach 
follows directly from the nature of the research question.  The present research 
concerns attributing meanings to actions and the understanding of human 
behaviour and decision-making.  Hence the “analytic induction” offered by 
qualitative research is a fitting research approach (Flowerdew and Martin, 2005).  
(By contrast, quantitative methods might best address concerns of amount and 
frequency, typically where there are many cases need to be compared or tested 
[Darlington and Scott, 2002; Flowerdew and Martin, 2005]).  The behaviour of 
CROs is seen to flow from complex interactions of rule design, organizational 
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culture and private sense-making; these interconnected problems appear unsuited 
to numerical analysis but would be well served by a qualitative interview-based 
approach, as will now be proposed and discussed. 
 
The decision was therefore taken to pursue this research using semi-structured 
qualitative in-depth interviews, usually with one interview per respondent but 
with an option for follow-up interviews, as for example when respondents have 
unusually rich or complex experiences, or have recently changed employer and 
are making sense of new circumstances.  
 
Behaviour may be best understood if observed by more than one method 
(Silverman, 1993; Darlington and Scott, 2002), such as by considering 
contemporarily published comments in documents such as corporate and news 
media reports, as well as interviews.  Such “triangulation” by multiple methods 
increases validity and reduces bias (Flowerdew and Martin, 2005).  
Consequently, this research pursued qualitative methods through semi-structured 
interviews with CROs practising in banks active in the UK, supplemented by a 
limited number of interviews with other relevant corporate officers, and 
continuing review of quality news media coverage. 
 
This research proposes use of interviews with CROs to elicit narrated accounts 
of their own experiences of responding to demands for risk reporting; to discover 
whether these responses included coping; and if so, to investigate the nature of 
coping responses in the context of the banking sector.   
 
Interview questions would need to be sufficiently flexible to allow for varying 
definitions of the CRO role; and not to anticipate the CRO‟s allegiance to any 
one culturally-defined group within the organization, such as “back office” risk 
controllers or “front office” salespeople. 
 
The research aim is supported by its empirical and evidential, rather than pure-




The semi-structured interview format allows for qualitative and open research 
questions, tied to a question schedule which may also provide structured prompts 
to respondents to construct a narrative account of their experiences (“tell me 
about a time when…”), as a valid way for respondents to frame their concerns.  
Where several respondents may be found to frame their experiences consistently, 
this supports consistent analysis. 
 
To consider, for a moment, other research methods which could have been used 
but were rejected: Paper-based questionnaires might have attracted a reasonable 
level of response but lack the ability of the semi-structured interview to realign 
quickly to focus on an emergent area of strong concern, or to identify and prompt 
detailed recall of a significant formative experience.  A more mechanistic and 
less personal research technique such as an online questionnaire might also have 
been able to attract responses from other proximal actors, establishing 
knowledge of the points of view of regulators, traders and Directors.  A series of 
telephone interviews might have secured some meaningful response – and 
indeed, telephone introductions helped to enable access to some previously 
unknown respondents.  However, it quickly became clear, as expected, that 
CROs were most at ease with the interview format of a personal conversation in 
a private room with a trusted individual researcher; respondents themselves 
confirmed that personal confessional elements of their recounted experience 
would not have been committed to any other format, and certainly not to an 
impersonal questionnaire.  Finally on this point, as discussed above, as a matter 
of practical project management it was also soon clear that securing access to 
spend significant time with CROs was itself a challenge worthy of a 
postgraduate research project.  What began as a practical limitation soon 
emerged as a research strength, in that concentrating on CROs supported a depth 
of qualitative investigation which might not have been available had the research 
pursued a larger number of shorter encounters.  By spending two or more hours 
with each respondent, the researcher had the latitude to explore more fully the 
three dimensions of problems set out in Chapter 3 – that is, CROs‟ experiences 
of working relationships with the regulator, traders, and Directors, building up a 




4.2.3  Research typology and goals 
Hart (1998) has reviewed the function of social research, surveying various 
approaches to conducting it and proposing a range of appropriate objectives and 
practical outcomes for the research task.  Within Hart‟s framework, the current 
research is designed to present an illuminative evaluation; that is, it seeks 
qualitatively to highlight the existence of certain behaviour or attitudes in order 
to enable better policy-making and more appropriate practitioner behaviour.  
Such research need not seek to prescribe any policy follow-on.  It examines how 
its respondents behave only as a potential key to why they do so
17
, and as to how 
their communications express sense-making.  The research aim is exploratory, 
seeking to improve understanding of a phenomenon (in this case, the possible 
existence of creative coping responses to regulatory compliance obligations).  It 
is also descriptive, with depth-interview question responses offering an empirical 
critique of the working hypothesis (that CROs respond to the regulator‟s 
information demands with various coping strategies).  
 
An illuminative evaluation approach requires that respondents be willing, 
themselves, to explore and reflect in the significance of the experiences they are 
describing.  In this regard, prompted recall of “stories” is a valuable research 
approach which is now discussed.  Van Evera (1997) argues that, far from being 
unreliable data, spoken statements and stories have a distinctive research 
attribute:    
 
“the insights of actors or observers who experienced [a 
phenomenon] one seeks to explain… often observe important 
unrecorded data… they can suggest hypotheses that we could not 
infer from direct observation alone”.      (Van Evera, 1997, p26) 
 
Scheytt, Soin and Metz (2003) further suggest that asking practitioners to give an 
account of their experiences offers one of the best means of exploring “the 
characteristics of control” in a regulated market.  A research approach based on 
„stories‟ may thus be to taken to apply in the current control context – regulated 
banking – as a reasonable way to embark on probing the phenomenon of coping.  
                                                 
17
 Hart (1998) uses the term “ethnomethodological” to describe this approach, although I will not 
be using this descriptor as it is potentially misleading in the current context. 
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Particularly rich narratives might be expected where respondents perceive the 
regulatory regime to be onerous and the regulated activities are fast-moving, as 
in the current research context.  
 
A research approach of soliciting narrated experiences offers certain advantages 
for the analyst:  It explores the research topic empirically (how prescriptive 
demands from regulators were answered with sense-making behaviours).  It 
offers the prospect of capturing personal accounts – albeit in sense-making form 
rather than literal truth – of experienced situations in which regulatory 
interventions produced either the intended behavioural changes among the 
regulated, or perhaps induced the production of fantasy representations of 
compliance.  Table 4.1 illustrates the main benefits and potential objections to 
“stories”. 
 
Table 4:1: Benefits and potential objections to “stories” 
Benefits Potential objections 
Any primary research into coping 
responses (potentially including “rule-
bending”) must overcome the obstacle 
of how to elicit meaningful responses 
from respondents who will be unwilling 
to self-incriminate.  Stories are a non-
confrontational form for exploring 
private rationales and informal sense-
making. 
A story is not a literal truth, so may be 
challenged as unrepresentative or even a 
fantasy.  Scheytt and Soin (2003) counter that 
Weick‟s (1995, etc.) findings over his long 
career cannot be dismissed as insignificant:  
Weick‟s narrative-based studies suggest  this 
may be the single most effective means of 
understanding sense-making in organizations; 
and that an account of literal truth is not 
necessary to establish such sense. 
Stories remove the predictive, false-
certainty (yes/no) and quantifying 
tendencies of linear question-and-
answer formats.  This also mitigates 
certain response effects (in particular 
Mayo‟s [1949] Hawthorne effect - 
respondents second-guessing “right” 
answers in an attempt to ingratiate the 
interviewer).  
The researcher may read into a story a 
meaning which is not inherent.  Czarniawska 
(2004) warns against this “constructionist” 
tendency.  Once aware of this, the research 
can resist the bias by maintaining self-
awareness of his/her objective presence in the 
process. 
Narrative enables various subsequent 
qualitative assessments, such as 
discourse analysis.  This supports the 
aim of the current research to establish 
the perceived existence of coping 
behaviours, rather than quantifying or 
estimating the extent of these. 
Narrative offers little support for quantitative 
assessment; but quantification is not the aim 






Analysts including Hajer (1995), Silverman (1993), and Czarniawska (2004) 
recommend the use of recounted experiences as a raw material for understanding 
sense-making in organizations.  Hajer describes actors as generating “story-
lines” from “various discursive categories to give meaning to social phenomena” 
(Hajer, 1995).  Silverman commends interview-based qualitative research as a 
powerful way to access everyday sense-making: 
 
“Researchers too readily assume that some topics are private 
matters to which we cannot get direct access.  [But] by analysing 
„common sense‟ in fine detail, research can often make a direct 
contribution to professional practice. …Our common-sense 
knowledge about the way in which the world is organized is being 
used all the time – things may just be „hidden because of the 
simplicity and familiarity‟.”   
(Silverman, 1993, p185) 
   
Czarniawska (2004) also notes with approval how, in practice often, experts‟ 
“answers given in an interview are spontaneously formed into narratives”.  Hajer 
(1995) suggests that this is because professionals like to reduce complex 
understandings and multiple social realities to commonly understood elements in 
the form of story-lines which can be retold, making for “coalitions” of peer-
group understanding, views held in common which bind together informal 
organizations.  These are, he suggests, important means by which an informal 
organization shares expertise in solving, or at least recognising, problems and in 
constructing responses to external challenges (such as, one might say, 
unwelcome demands from a regulator).  Story-lines are thus an appropriate 
resource to consider in the context of the present research, which aims to probe 
how informal organizations make sense of, and respond to, such challenges. 
 
Spoken statements are further regarded by analysts as a significant source of 
research understanding, on the basis that 
 
“language profoundly shapes our view of the world and of reality, 
instead of being merely a neutral medium reflecting it”. 




Exponents of research by soliciting spoken material (such as Hajer and 
Czarniawska) also consider that when recounting an incident, a respondent is 
deploying language to define problems and create meanings.  Czarniawska 
points to workers‟ telling of stories as a way of circulating knowledge within 
their community; stories are a  
 
“preferred sense-making currency of human relationships, (for) 
pattern-finding”. 
 (Czarniawska, 2004, p38) 
 
 
Hajer (2006) argues that the study of spoken statements is an effective way to 
investigate how regulated actors interpret public policies of control.  He offers 
some methodological suggestions which are now reviewed and accepted for use 
in the present research.   
 
On a point of research in practice, it could be established by pilot interview 
questioning that opportunities for a “story” response are broadly welcomed, so 
supporting continued use of this approach in the main research.  In speaking 
about a concern or incident, the interviewee can – and as established in practice, 
often does – volunteer a “story-line” as a way of producing meaning from a 
sequence of events.  To make sense of events and to produce structure and 
meaning, an interviewee may assemble “ideas, concepts and categories” into a 
story.  This summarises more complex factors into a form of narrated 
 
 “short-hand… which assumes [perhaps falsely] that the more 
complex narrative is available in the mind of the receiver and can 
be activated by giving a cue („you know what I mean‟)”.  
(Hajer, 2006) 
 
Regarding subsequent data analysis, the thematic-analytical approach, and 
indeed the present research, does not start from an assumption of full 
understanding but progressively builds up understanding through a series of 
overlapping activities.  Hajer (2006) suggests that appropriate elements of 
discourse-based research activity are: An initial desk research review of 
commentaries in the field (such as news media and learned journals); pilot 
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interviews and journal reading to develop a structure for depth interviews; then, 
following interviews with key respondents, repeated interpretative readings of 
interview transcripts.  Through these steps, Hajer proposes, research may 
identify commonly acknowledged “key moments and incidents” through which 
respondents  “produce meaning” – identifying salient factors and making sense 
of events.      
 
Hajer‟s approach is supported by Czarniawska (1998, 2004, 2008), another 
prominent analyst of spoken statements and sense-making via stories.  
Czarniawska advocates the research technique of studying transcriptions of semi-
structured interviews as a valid method of collecting  
 
“various types of inscriptions of „conversations‟ that perhaps were 
never enacted”. 
(Czarniawska, 1998, p66)  
 
She argues that the “story” version of an event can be a relevant research 
resource even if it is a condensed, or approximated, account of earlier events or 
even multiple earlier conversations.  As advocated by Hajer and Czarniawska, 
these methods offer an effective means of engaging with and analysing the 
culture of “storytelling” or “war stories” which is a prevalent cultural feature of 
the UK financial sector (as the current empirical work bears out: see Chapters 5 
to 7).  Review of narrated accounts of experiences is thus an appropriate research 
approach both for the nature of the question and the culture of the sector studied. 
 
4.2.4  Ethical considerations 
In preparing to question senior managers on the sensitive topic of non-compliant 
behaviour, it was necessary to keep in mind the potentially serious consequences 
for respondents:  disciplining, possible dismissal, or even legal action in the 
event that a disclosure implied criminal intent.  Of particular concern in 
approaching CROs is that the CRO role itself demands a high level of 
professional discretion.  Besides overcoming practical barriers to access (gaining 
trust, getting past „gatekeepers‟, understanding a new technical language), there 
is the subject-matter of the research:  In an already sensitive field, the researcher 
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may be seen as asking respondents to breach professional confidence by 
disclosing non-compliance.  
 
In line with current practice at King‟s College London and current commercial 
practice, ethical considerations were addressed with care.  These included 
securing voluntary participation and informed consent supporting the purpose of 
the study; not putting participants at risk, and preventing harm; protecting and 
respecting privacy; and presenting respondents‟ views accurately (Creswell, 
2003, pp63-67). Given the sensitive nature of the research topic, great care was 
taken to avoid compromising any individual respondent‟s position. 
 
With the onset of a banking crisis in 2008, it also became clear that a researcher 
must take exceptional care to avoid identifying any casualties of the crisis – 
either institutions or individuals.  Every interviewee was asked in advance of the 
interview whether there were any topics on which they would not be willing to 
be quoted; all interviewees re-confirmed that they were content to be quoted on 
condition of anonymity, including the researcher‟s assurance of care taken to 
anonymise any quotes and to remove any location, dateline or other data which 
might identify a respondent.  Respondents were also given assurances on 
confidentiality of records, including secure storage of data; that audio and 
transcribed data are to be destroyed on completion of the research project; and 
that transcriptions and other work-in-progress analyses will themselves be 
stripped of any identifying features (hence respondents are identified only as 
“C27”, etc., throughout the current research).  For research integrity, original 
data remained open to research supervisors‟ access whilst this dissertation was 
being compiled. 
 
In the practical context of the interview, ethical considerations were handled in a 
conventional manner:  Each respondent was sent, and approved before giving an 
interview, a letter of ethical undertaking (see Annex 2).  This letter follows the 
standard required of all postgraduate researchers for King‟s College London, 
with details specific to the present research project, and was lodged with the 




4.2.5  Expert-respondents as true representatives  
Research using experts (including experienced and senior business managers) 
enjoys theoretical support as a reasonable approximation for larger numbers of 
less experienced respondents.  Cooke and Goossens (2004) conclude that 
experts‟ “implicit level of subjective confidence, or degree of belief” is more a 
source of comfort than concern.   
 
Arnell, Tomkins and Adger (2005) argue that expert views may be regarded as a 
fair proxy for those of larger populations, as long as the experts are recruited 
with some formal criteria and procedures for ensuring reliability and credibility.  
These criteria might include, as they suggest in the academic field, “reputation, 
experience and published track record in the field, diversity of background, 
balance of views, and of course, interest and availability”.  In the case of UK-
based bank CROs, the relatively small universe of potential respondents, and the 
seniority and expertise inherent in the CRO role, indicate a representative group. 
 
Low-level triangulation provides reassurance as to the consistency of findings 
among respondents drawn from a limited universe:  In this case, 35 interviewed 
CROs represented more than a third of the relevant identifiable population 
(estimated as almost 100 in 2007
18
); these respondents were themselves further 
qualified as representative by expertise (Arnell, Tompkins and Adger, 2005).   
 
Regarding the quality of interview responses, it is also relevant to recall that, in 
practice, the main field research was conducted during a period of unprecedented 
public scrutiny of the banking industry, with extensive and concurrent public 
domain (media and political) commentary on the industry‟s control problems.  
Respondents were reflexive to this environment and were, as a result, more self-
analytical and self-critical than might have been expected had the research been 
conducted in less turbulent times.   
 
                                                 




4.2.6  Semi-structured interviewing 
Qualitative enquiry particularly assists an exploratory approach, where the issue 
is emergent (as here, in the case of the evolution of the CRO function, both as to 
role and in response to regulation which is itself rapidly changing).  This 
approach enables construction of a language of reference where no formally 
structured language previously existed; and encourages “inductive inference” 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994) in the assembly of patterns from findings.  
 
Social research interviews tend to adopt one of three alternative formats: 
unstructured, semi-structured or structured.  If semi-structured or unstructured, 
they should be “in-depth” – that is, allowing time for more detailed responses – 
so as to probe more deeply for qualitative data (Martin and Flowerdew, 2005).  
Taking account how little was previously known about the research topic a semi-
structured in-depth interview is expected to be the least restricting, most fruitful 
approach for expanding knowledge and allowing new perspectives to emerge.   
 
The semi-structured in-depth interview is particularly advocated (by for example 
Hajer and Czarniawska) as a format which allows respondents to make sense of 
their experiences by “arranging events” into narrated stories (Czarniawska, 
2004).  This “guided” format enables the researcher to be flexible in exploring 
newly-found phenomena whilst at the same time using a defined set of questions 
(Gilbert, 2008).  Furthermore, the semi-structured interview method removes any 
semblance of quantitative compliance checking, overcoming the inherent 
difficulties of a sensitive topic: The potential for self-incrimination when 
reporting actions which may have been non-compliant or even fraudulent (Lee, 
1993). 
 
The format retains some of the established limitations of interview-based 
research:  It may transpire that respondents do not produce complete or 
consistent narratives; may bias their answers towards the perceived expectations 
of the interviewer; and may not admit to views on especially sensitive topics.  
These limitations are offset by “low-level triangulation” in the process as a 
whole (see „Validity‟, in 4.3.3 below); and with regard to the research task which 
103 
 
is not to quantify any found phenomena but simply and qualitatively to establish 
their existence. 
 
4.3  Research aim, rationale and questions 
4.3.1  Purpose, originality and desirable outcomes  
The research sets out to discover, and locate within existing theory, the nature of 
one regulated community‟s responses to a regulator‟s demands for information.  
The community under scrutiny is UK-based Chief Risk Officers (CROs) 19 in 
banks. 
 
Theories, and studies conducted in other sectors, suggest that coping
20
 responses 
are prevalent and widely accepted among certain regulated actor groups.  This 
phenomenon has not previously been studied in the UK banking sector.  This 
lack of research knowledge may have persisted partly because of significant 
practical and conceptual obstacles to addressing it.  Such difficulties include 
gaining access to an elite and closed professional group; obtaining and holding 
the confidence of respondents; and demonstrating sufficient authority and 
knowledge to maintain respondents‟ full trust and co-operation.  This research 
has become possible because of the researcher‟s experience and reputation 
within the industry. A history of trusted personal contact with senior bankers has 
enabled access to, and maintained trust within, a respondent group that might be 
otherwise inaccessible.   
 
The working hypothesis is that, as observed among managers in other sectors
21
, 
senior managers in similar roles sometimes devise ways to deflect the regulator‟s 
demands for information, but in the banking sector this deflection takes on more 
evolved forms of coping, including the institutional creation of a Chief Risk 
                                                 
19
 Or other individuals with different job titles but CRO functional roles; see schedule of 
interviewees at Annex 5 
20
  As discussed in Chapter 3, “coping” is here used to mean, in essence, actors interpreting a 
regulator‟s demands in ways that favour continuation of existing behaviour, with least disruptive 
intervention. 
21
 For example, and as previously discussed: healthcare in Bevan and Hood [2005] and Kodate 




Officer (CRO) function.  The research investigates the ways and extent to which 
the CRO (who embodies a newly-defined risk control function) maintains banks‟ 
established coping behaviours when responding to the regulator.  
 
A desirable outcome of the research is scholarly understanding of the 
phenomenon of coping strategies among a previously unstudied group. It has 
been acknowledged at the outset that the target respondent group might be 
unwilling to discuss the coping phenomenon, both because of a convention of 
discretion in the sector and simply to avoid self-incrimination.  A principal 
methodological challenge is therefore to obtain responses with robust research 
validity.  The resulting material may also be expected to inform the wider policy 
debate around better regulatory design; and to offer a sound premise for further 
research (see Chapter 8). 
 
Regarding originality: Given a range of possible factors sustaining the coping 
phenomenon, it is appropriate to explore the financial sector‟s responses to 
compliance demands by using a research approach which has proved useful in 
identifying coping behaviours in another UK regulated sector.  Both the 
literature search and pilot interviews are seen to suggest that the current research 
can produce original insights.  The likely nature of these insights is now briefly 
considered. 
 
First, original research may be able to present new evidence, having used 
questions not previously asked, directed to a sample group whose experiences of 
a phenomenon have not previously been examined.  The present research seeks 
to locate its findings with theory and studies of coping behaviour among other 
regulated groups (Bevan [2005], Fairman [2005], McGoey [2007], Kodate 
[2009], and Etienne [2010]).  It may further consider this behaviour as a possible 
manifestation of a control “fantasy” (Clarke [1989, 1999]); or of “normalized 
deviancy” (Vaughan [1996]). 
 
Second, the research approach specifically acknowledges three related 
disciplines:  Rooted in an empirical study of behaviour in corporate 
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organizations, it also refers to continuing debates in the fields of regulation and 
risk perception. 
 
4.3.2  Overcoming interviewer positionality and other 
obstacles               
Each respondent arrives with his or her own expectations of the process and their 
own view of the researcher‟s position within this.  At first the researcher is more 
likely to be perceived as an “outsider”, becoming an “insider” for the purposes of 
sharing private knowledge as greater trust is established.  Once initial 
respondents established that the research originated from a respected university 
and was known to the principal trade association, they were more willing to take 
the researcher into confidence.  In this way one may maintain positioning as an 
objective observer, rather being assumed or co-opted by respondents as an 
insider (or “participant-observer”). 
 
With supervisor approval it was possible to use the university‟s livery for any 
printed correspondence, and the college email address for any message 
exchanges. This was important to avoid respondent preconceptions or 
identification of the research interests as coming from “one of their own”.  At the 
outset of interviews, the researcher presented as having no commercial 
attachment to the subject matter and no employment in the business of banking 
risk management. 
 
As a research topic, coping might be expected to deter responses if approached 
quantatively.  It would be difficult to design a research structure yielding valid 
quantitative data on regulatory non-compliance among senior managers, because 
respondents may be predicted to be unwilling to share information in a form in 
which they are self-incriminated.  As with any social field research, care is 
necessary to avoid directivity and response effects (Lapiere, 1934); in practice 
the researcher must anticipate and sometimes deflect respondents‟ impulse to 




Respondents‟ resistance to agreeing to interviews was not found to be a 
significant practical problem; more so was the practical consideration of their 
maintaining and agreed clear time for appointments. The background presence of 
a financial market crisis throughout the roll-out stage of the research may 
account for non-attendance of two targeted respondents at appointed interviews; 
and continued unwillingness of some others to schedule an interview 
appointment. 
 
4.3.3  Scope, focus and validity 
In order to establish a realistic expectation of the scope of this research, and 
inferences from its results, it is appropriate here to set out what matter is 
included and excluded.  This subsection will also confirm, with reference to 
research theory, that a limited group of respondents may be interviewed to 
establish that coping may exist as a normal response. 
 
Regarding the question of breadth versus depth of targeted research group, the 
focus is on how experiences of holders of a specific role (Chief Risk Officer) 
reflect informal behaviours in the organization.  Respondents‟ assertions are 
validated by comparison with other respondents‟ accounts and with external 
commentaries offered by market analysts, news media and published regulatory 
reviews.   Hajer (2006) recommends final follow-up interviews with a few key 
actors as a method of triangulation – that is, confirming that the researcher‟s 
conclusions about the meaning and significance of key factors are both 
consistent and supported by respondents‟ own sense-making.  In the present 
research, the second-interviewing of seven CROs helped to provide this 
confirmation.  
 
Multiple-method research is typically advocated because of its advantages for 
triangulation (overcoming bias and establishing validity) (Silverman, 2004; 
Martin and Flowerdew, 2005).  However, any research approach may introduce 
some forms of bias – even if only when a respondent second-guesses the 
researcher‟s intention in framing a question (Lapiere‟s “respondent bias” [1934], 
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or Mayo‟s “Hawthorne effect” [1949]).  Triangulation22 helps to establish and 
adjust for a range of differing viewpoints, and interrogate the validity of any 
individual response.  In the present research, limits of access and of absolute 
numbers of target respondents reduced capacity for triangulation.  Low-level 
triangulation, in the form of comparison between 47 respondents‟ narratives, and 
external commentaries by market analysts, regulators and journalists, gives a 
necessary level of comfort for a qualitative study which makes no claim to offer 
statistical inferences.  To reiterate: This is a qualitative approach whose purpose 
is to illuminate, explore and describe the phenomenon of coping, if found. 
 
At this point it is also relevant to note management of researcher bias, discrepant 
information, and corroboration (triangulation) of findings by any alternative 
sources.  Creswell (2003) notes that validity in qualitative social research does 
not carry the burden of connotation that it would in quantitative research (that is, 
of statistical “reliability, consistency, or generalizeability” [Creswell, 2003, 
p195]).  Although the present research is not framed in such a way as to require 
numerical reliability
23
, it is nevertheless desirable that objective verification is 
present.  Low-level triangulation was effected by multiple readings and review of 
the interviews alternately considering participants‟ macro, meso and micro 
perspectives (Kodate & Dodds, 2009).   
 
Finally, as to sample size and quality, with a limited number of bank CROs 
existing – indicated by pilot research respondents, and the British Bankers‟ 
Association, to number less than 100 in 2007 (see 4.2.4 above) – the issue of 
sampling was of less practical significance than merely succeeding in gaining 
access to as many of the target individuals as possible.  As senior managers, the 
targeted interviewees could reasonably be regarded as a meaningful base of 
respondents, representative of the collective views of those they manage (see 
discussion of expert-respondent characteristics in section 4.2.5).  The size of the 
                                                 
22
 Flowerdew and Martin define triangulation as “cross-referencing of one piece of evidence with 
another in order to better determine what the actual position is” (Flowerdew and Martin, 2003, 
p157) 
23
 Hammersley defines reliability as “the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned 
to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions” 
(Hammersley, 1992, 67). 
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target cohort may be expected to vary over time, and did so especially during the 
period of most concentrated fieldwork, 2008 – 9, which coincided with market 
turbulence inducing job losses and management restructuring in many banks.  
Despite good personal communications with respondents, their seniority and the 
circumstances an often-urgent need to attend to market emergencies meant that 
securing interview appointments continued to present a practical challenge.  
Respondents represented a high level of expert knowledge; all had qualified in at 
least one profession (law, chartered accountancy, or banking) at least 10 years 
previously, and in most cases nearer 20 years previously; and were currently or 
recently responsible for managing a headquarters-based team of risk officers.  
Thus the interviews accessed more than 350 years of accumulated professional 
experience.  The eventual total of 35 CRO respondents (see 4.4.3) may be 
regarded as providing a meaningful base for empirical findings.   
 
4.3.4  Framing the question 
As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, the central research question seeks only to identify 
whether or not banks in general, and by implication their risk reporting officers 
in particular, produce coping responses when asked by the regulator to make a 
public risk report.  In plain form the research question is: 
 
Do bank risk officers exhibit coping responses towards the regulator‟s 
demands for public risk reporting? 
 
As suggested by the sector‟s history (Chapter 2) and by theory (Chapter 3), the 
researcher might expect to find coping as a normative response in the banking 
sector.  
 
Since this research is interested to discover the nature of the, hypothetically 
central, role of the bank CRO in enabling or condoning noncompliance, some 
supplementary questions arise to focus on the CRO‟s involvement.   
 
As noted, pilot interviews established that it was reasonable to pursue an 
investigation into the coping phenomenon occurring in banks.  For reasons of 
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maintaining respondents‟ trust and engagement, the interviewer could not pose 
the research or supplementary questions directly; this would amount a direct 
accusation of noncompliance.  Instead, the topic of enquiry was approached by 
way of prompting respondents to recollect related incidents and concerns, in the 
manner recommended by Czerniawska and Hajer.  The underlying questions 
were meanwhile borne in mind to direct the ensuing course of the conversation.   
 
Supplementary questions were formulated to act as a guide structure for 
prompting recollections of incidents; these are now listed.  In the event that 
coping behaviour was described as occurring, these supplementary questions 
guided conversation towards its perceived origins and the possible involvement 
of the CRO: 
 
What role do CROs perceive themselves to play when coping responses 
are produced? 
 
Is coping (or creative compliance) regarded as a normal, or even expected 
response to the regulator?  How do managers rationalise any coping 
activities? 
 
What forms do coping responses take?  Are these analogous with forms 
of coping already found in other sectors? 
 
The subsidiary questions serve to locate the core question more precisely within 
relevant fields of scholarship, such as theory of regulation and of organization.   
 
The question of the CRO‟s role must in practice be raised not as a personal 
challenge to the respondent but by means of a lateral move: prompting CROs to 
recollect personal experiences of their employer‟s approach to risk governance.  
The CRO‟s own approach to the role may be taken to express how risk 
governance will be enacted and publicly reported.  One might conceive of the 
CRO as personifying the bank‟s public reporting of risk – as perhaps did their 
employers, as this research aims to clarify.  A final focal question, again 
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unspoken but drawing towards a research conclusion, concerns the CRO‟s 
authority in practice: 
 
Is the CRO given, or able to create, any authority?   
 
This suggests that a respondent may volunteer the perception that the CRO role 
owes its existence to a creative strategy of the Board: that the CRO has been 
installed as a means of coping with (deflecting) the regulator.  If this is 
perception is offered, it is of interest to probe whether the bank and regulator are 
also seen to have recognised this as a strategy of evasion.  The schedule of 
questions and prompts used in the research interviews is attached at Annex 1. 
 
With research approach, target respondents, rationale and question premises in 
place, the final section of this chapter will present the actions taken in practice to 
conduct the primary research.  
 
4.4  Conducting the primary research  
4.4.1  Preliminaries 
Introductory readings sought an overview of literatures linking regulation in 
action, organizational behaviour, and risk perception.  The scope of review then 
broadened to include literature with a clear connection to the framing of 
regulation for corporate business and the corporate response to regulation.  This 
helped formulate a prototype research question and to test it for validity among a 
pilot group of practitioners.  (See also discussion of validity in 4.3.3 above.) 
 
Directed introductory reading was initially within three analytical perspectives:  
regulation in action, organizational behaviour, and risk perception.  This was 
followed by deterministic pursuit of commonest occurring and most cited 
references from that reading.  Electronic journal searches also yielded articles 
consistently relevant to the current research topic. These activities generated an 
initial working bibliography of approximately 50 books and 200 papers.  These 




4.4.2  Selection and recruitment of respondents, pilot 
interviews; timing 
Research respondents for initial or “pilot” questioning were pre-selected by the 
researcher, from existing knowledge of industry participants, to help to validate 
and define the scope of the later rolled-out research.  The first three pilot group 
interviews were determined by availability following introductions from industry 
colleagues previously know to the researcher; however, a policy of “snowball” 
(further discussed below) enabled access to a wider base of respondents.  Of the 
35 CROs ultimately interviewed, only one was personally known to the 
researcher before the primary research commenced in 2007.   
 
At the end of each pilot interview respondents were invited to nominate industry 
peers to participate in later interviews and also to provide or point to sources of 
listings of CROs.  By these means it was possible to make initial and 
reciprocated telephone contact with 35 respondents not previously known to the 
researcher.  CRO names were also found and checked with the assistance of the 
information offices of trade associations and online directory searches.   
 
A research function of the pilot interviews was to test whether the research 
critique of theory had practical reference for the actors in the field.  Exploratory 
interviews also helped to establish that the research could expect to elicit in-
depth responses.  These pilot interviews' stated aim was to hear about CROs‟ 
experiences of how their organization behaved in response to the regulator‟s 
requests for risk reporting.  Pilot interviews further confirmed that the research 
premise would not be rejected as irrelevant, trivial, already addressed, or 
unfocused.  They informed understanding of the topic and helped to shape a 
schedule of questions for the final interviews, with questions probing issues not 
previously reflected in the literature.  Pilot respondents were typically Directors 
of bank business divisions, with responsibility for governance, risk and 
compliance matters; recruited deterministically, among practitioners known to 
the researcher.  The first 15 respondents‟ willing co-operation indicated that the 
researcher might now expect further senior respondents to participate and to 
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discuss sensitive topics; and that the research topic is original.  Having tested and 
adjusted the schedule of questions, the second phase (main) interviews could 
then be conducted at greater length. 
 
The conducting of pilot interviews also provided a structure from which it was 
possible to reflect on positionality and interview techniques; and to reject certain 
assumptions:  For example, one explanation for coping behaviours 
(conservatism, resistance to change, Rothstein‟s [2002] “attenuation”) was found 
not to be perceived as a significant factor.
24
 
The issue of a representative sample of bank CROs is partially complicated by 
absence of a consistent definition of a CRO: whilst some heads of Risk have the 
formal title of CRO, many, by their own and others‟ accounts, “exist as” CROs 
without being precisely designated as such.  Whilst ambiguities of definition and 
designation meant that there was (and remains) no exact number of CROs extant, 
it was nevertheless possible to ensure selection of appropriate respondents by 
employing some straightforward rules.  The first and most straightforward of all 
was the precise job title “Chief Risk Officer”, as checked on a respondent‟s 
business card and cross-checked in the bank‟s published organisation chart or 
Annual Report.  Next, a similar job title might unambiguously indicate CRO 
functionality (such as Director: Head of Risk; or Managing Director: Risk).  The 
researcher also asked British Bankers‟ Association (BBA) for sight of its own 
list of attenders at a regular, invitation-only, CRO Forum.  Finally, early 
respondents were encouraged to nominate CROs known to them in other banks – 
a form of “snowball sampling” – although such nominations were also cross-
checked with employers‟ literature, business cards, and published lists where 
available.   
 
                                                 
24
 As noted, counterintuitively, by Viscusi (1992), Rothstein [2002] and Carpenter (2004), strict 
adherence to regulation can itself be a form of strategic resistance to change.  For example, 
Viscusi finds large firms using this technique to keep new competitors out of established 
markets: “capital costs of achieving compliance represent a barrier to the entry of newcomers 
into the industry. …surviving (large) firms often have a strong vested interest in the continuation 
of a regulatory system.” 
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Identification of respondents by these means produced a target list of 
approximately 70 confirmed individuals occupying UK-based CRO (or directly 
analogous) roles in banks during 2006-7.   
 
Interviewer access to respondents was a significant research challenge, overcome 
by means of a combination of personal introductions from known colleagues (in 
each bank, or through the BBA), and telephone calls to “gatekeepers” (CROs‟ 
personal assistants or deputies).  Although persistent attempts were often needed 
to establish direct contact with and gain access to the earliest set of respondents, 
for the pilot interviews, by the time of the main interviews many CROs were 
more willing to talk – partly, as they admitted, because the financial market 
turbulence then underway made risk governance an attractive topic for 
discussion. 
 
By these means the researcher achieved approximately a 50% sample of 
potential subjects – given the above caveats about role definition – a significant 
proportion of all identified bank CROs at the time. 
A recent study (Hall, Mikes and Millo, 2012) has examined a small number of 
CROs; the present research sought to hear accounts from as many CROs as this 
project practically allowed.  With a relatively small number of potential subjects, 
it was a reasonable research ambition to achieve interviews with half of the 
extant group as identified in 2007. 
 
In case the data outcome of 50 subjects depth interviewed appears modest, it is 
worth here setting out some of the practical challenges of securing access.  Even 
when meeting by way of an introduction from another CRO, trade association, or 
industry colleague, a target respondent CRO would not normally be inclined to 
give high priority to attending a two-hour meeting with an independent 
researcher.  Booked interview times were often set several months ahead and 
many were subject to rescheduling, especially at after the sector-wide onset of 
crisis in 2008.  Securing, and adhering to, a scheduled meeting time was a 




Regarding the historical timing of the interviews, it is notable that the majority of 
material was collected whilst a banking crisis was in progress (with Northern 
Rock during 2007, and across the sector from mid-2008).  This crisis may be 
seen as presenting short-term tactical problems of achieving access – as noted 
above – but it the concurrent crisis in financial markets emerged, as interviews 
progressed, as an incentive to more thoughtful responses.  CROs‟ co-existence 
with a crisis was spontaneously seen by many respondents as an opportunity to 
reflect on systemic problems, and to be more willing to discuss doubts.  Thus, for 
all the practical problems it created, the banking crisis may be regarded as 
providing a net benefit to a research piece focused on regulatory efficacy. 
 
On a related point, the progress of the financial crisis during 2007 – 2009 
affected the answers given by respondents. Although this effect was not foreseen 
in the research design, nor specifically analysed within the remit of the research 
– whilst it is occurring, after all, the trajectory of a crisis is not clear – 
nevertheless it is appropriate to reflect on certain apparent changes in CROs‟ 
perceptions.  The research conclusions in Chapter 8 include some reflexive 
observations on how the passage of time (in particular, during a crisis) was seen 
to impact on respondents‟ views. 
 
 
4.4.3  Main data gathering 
After the 15 exploratory interviews were conducted in London in two phases, 
between October 2006 and May 2008, final interviews were held between 
August 2008 and December 2009.  55 main interviews were conducted with 47 
respondents including 35 designated CROs.  Eight respondents, including seven 
CROs, were depth-interviewed more than once.   
 
Interviews were typically managed over three stages: first an informal 
conversation to establish credentials and check whether the CRO would consent 
to a depth interview; second, a interview lasting typically 90 – 120 minutes; and, 
finally, a further 60-minute interview with certain respondents whose 




All interviews were conducted face-to-face, except where practical 
circumstances prevented this; in the event, only two main interviews had to be 
conducted by telephone.  All respondents gave consent for their words to be 
quoted on condition of anonymity.  Analysis of the data does not disclose 
specific sources although the nature of each respondent‟s commercial activity is 
sometimes evident from their response content, for example when describing a 
sales incentive used for a specific product or market. 
 
Data was gathered by the interviewer sitting with each respondent, with their 
express consent, recording their responses. Each interview was initially audio-
recorded, producing an mp3 format sound file on a voice recorder.  Sound files 
were then transcribed to Word text format, adding time codes for each two 
recorded minutes to assist back-reference to audio.  Text transcription was to 
enable various analyses including highlighting of key recurrent topics and 
vocabulary; drawing analogies and observing patterns between different 
respondent accounts; and selective highlighting of self-contained story accounts 
of coping phenomena. 
 
As discussed at greater length elsewhere (see general Introduction and Chapters 
1 and 2), it is germane to note here that the interviews were conducted against 
the background of major turbulence in financial markets, with events which have 
subsequently been seen to mark a paradigmatic shift in relations between the 
banking industry, its regulators and relevant public policymakers.  The timing of 
the research is noted to have had some effect on the nature of respondents‟  
answers given, with more extreme examples of abuses being noted; however, it 
is not the purpose of the present research to identify levels of abuse as “typical” 
or “atypical” – merely to discover whether abuses occurred at all and if so 
whether these were internalised as normal behaviour within the routine 




4.4.4  Data review and analysis  
Following the method supported by Hajer (2006) and Czerniawska (2004, 2008), 
data analysis started by focusing on a review of transcribed interview texts, 
identifying story-lines and common informal terms used to describe and explain 
responses to regulators‟ demands for compliance.  Next, highlighted patterns 
within the reviewed material were sorted into categories (three overall, sorting 
for the sector/regulator, organizational and personal views).   
 
These three initial categories corresponded to distinct fields of scholarship, 
reached deductively from the earlier review of the academic literature, and also 
corresponding to a similar analytical framework proposed by Kodate and Dodds 
(2009) for the study of non-compliant behaviours in another professional context 
(healthcare provision).  Within the three categories, further detailed sorting of 
themes developed inductively from repeated readings (Silverman, 2004).     
 
In the event, concerns about possible problems of positionality were not found to 
have arisen: CROs showed no sign of being in awe of the research process;  most 
were quick to offer frank opinions even where these contradicted their employer 
bank orthodoxy. The semi-structured qualitative interview format, with a trusted 
researcher, was in practice an effective medium for encouraging respondents to 
give narrated accounts of non-compliant behaviours and to express opinions on 
sensitive topics.  For example, even at the pilot interview stage, respondents 
were ready to address the sensitive topic of the “maturity or otherwise” of FSA 
case officers.  This led on to the questioning of subsequent respondents about a 
related sensitive topic, the perceived potential for abuse by FSA of confidential 
disclosures in order to mount high-profile retrospective enforcement actions (the 
“symbolic enforcement” risk identified by Hawkins [1983]). 
 
The research yielded insights from a respondent group not previously questioned 
about their experiences of noncompliance.  The data gathered, in the form of 
interview transcripts, offered the prospect of various forms of improved 
understanding, including:  A new synthesis of related understandings of coping 
behaviour found in other regulated groups; of how informal organizational 
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culture produces unwanted outcomes from formal control designs; of the 
existence of “fantasy” control plans; and of senior managers‟ heuristic 
conceptions of appropriate response when faced with irreconcilable conflicts of 
purpose.   
 
The rest of this report, Chapters 5 – 8, will now review and reflect upon the 
empirical findings.  The three-chapter review of research findings in Chapters 5 
– 7 explores how respondents have behaved, as a potential key to why they do so.  
It will also consider how sense-making of incomplete or conflicting requirements 
may lead to coping behaviour.  Although reflecting on various explanations in 
Chapter 8, this field research remains by nature exploratory, having aimed to 
identify the existence, and possible characteristics, of coping as a phenomenon 
among bankers.  This is consistent with the research aim here presented, 
allowing for the possibility of empirical support for the working hypothesis that 






CHAPTER 5:  CROs’ RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE FSA 
 
“The trouble with principles-based regulation is that there are  
parts of the market that are not very principled”  (C12) 
      
 
5.1  Introduction 
The first four chapters of this thesis have concerned research context, theory and 
development of a methodology for empirical research.  From this chapter 
onwards, findings and conclusions are drawn from the field research. 
 
This research considers how, on behalf of banking organizations, risk officers 
respond to regulators‟ demands.  It seeks evidence in the form of a CRO view of 
responses that may appear to comply with the regulator‟s demands, yet which on 
closer study show that no behaviour has been modified.  Rather than attempting 
to advance a theory, the present study collects practitioners‟ accounts of real 
experiences, seeking to add empirical evidence to the body of practical 
knowledge informing the design of regulatory policy. 
 
Chapters 5 to 7 will review findings from CROs‟ descriptions of their day-to-day 
interactions with the FSA and bank colleagues.  These include accounts of some 
vivid but commonly experienced situations, such as physical avoidance of 
contact between traders and risk managers; bankers‟ selective reporting of risk 
data; and a commercial culture that belittles the significance of regulation. 
 
The banking industry‟s control structure before 2008 may be described as a 
version of enforced self-regulation.  It was appropriate to investigate whether 
bankers saw themselves as having supported this regulatory system as a matter 
of principled conviction, or merely as an expedient.  Within that system, the 
creation of the CRO role may itself be regarded as part of a strategic “game of 
compliance” played by banks and some other industries.  If a game existed, any 
appointed CRO may be expected to have experienced some personal conflict 
between responsibility to a commercial employer, on one hand, and the public 
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good, on the other.  Empirical research findings will look at how CROs perceive 
and attempt to resolve that conflict. 
 
This chapter will now review CROs‟ recounted experiences to see how they 
perceive the efficacy of the regulator:  Was the FSA‟s stance seen as “light 
touch” (with a good level of understanding, if at arm‟s length), or “out-of-
touch”?  The chapter reviews, as here described by CROs, whether bankers 
regarded enforced self-regulation as an opportunity to push back against the 
regulator, to (in C11‟s phrase) “bargain down” or (as C3 puts it) “play the grey”.  
The combination of complex rules and the FSA‟s policy of light-touch oversight 
has been widely seen as favourable to the sector‟s interests, but did it also 
inadvertently support senior managers who sought to manipulate risk reporting? 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 will consider respondents‟ experiences of engaging with the 
commercial culture of the bank‟s traders and senior management, respectively.   
 
Before moving to review CRO experiences of non-compliance, the next 
subsection will first consider the nature of interaction between CRO and FSA as 
formally intended.     
 
5.2  The CRO role, and FSA interaction, as designed  
5.2.1  The FSA‟s expectations of the CRO role 
 
There was, and is, no universally binding job description for a CRO:  
 
“the rise of the Chief Risk Officer has no specific institutional 
location or sponsorship, emerging from the practices of large 
financial and utility firms”    (Power, 2005, p26) 
 
As the regulator notes in a recent risk review (FSA, 2011), many senior 
managers continue to be designated a CRO (formally or informally) as long as 




“4.4 The person who is responsible for overseeing the risk 
management function is commonly, but not exclusively, referred 
to as a Chief Risk Officer (CRO).” 
 
“4.10 The [effective] CRO… was also a member of the executive 
risk committee and had overall responsibility for risk within the 
organization.” 
(FSA, Solvency II, Feb 2011) 
 
A view more characteristic of the majority is articulated by research respondent 
C18: that whatever conflicted realities and compromises were found, the CRO 
should aspire to serve a higher purpose consistent with the FSA‟s “orderly 
markets” mandate: 
 
“There are pure motives… You want fairness in the market, you 
think that people ought to come with clean hands and behave 
appropriately.”  (C18) 
 
Some respondents understood their appointment as CRO as a general instruction 
to support risk-awareness in their employer bank.  As C34 set out to show, a 
CRO could be a change agent sending out a message that  
 
“risk-awareness is for all.  That risk management is not just a task 
for specialist risk analysts. Everyone in the business has a 
responsibility for it.”  (C34)  
 
C5 saw the same obligation as a matter of promoting good risk governance 
throughout the bank: 
 
“Good risk management is just good management.  That‟s it.”  
(C5) 
 
That said, many respondents questioned the extent of the FSA‟s own higher 
purpose and even its legitimacy as a watchdog for the business of banking; these 
doubts will be considered later in this chapter.   More than one respondent 
referred to the genesis of the FSA as being “because the Bank of England had 
been seen to fail” (C23) after the Barings and BCCI crises; in this respect at 
least, any new regulator is assessed against a history of lack of regulatory 




The present research did not set out to study a banking crisis specifically but 
rather certain preconditions for noncompliant behaviour in the form of 
compromised risk reporting, which may be expected to contribute to a crisis.  It 
considers what happened to the power of a regulatory agency in practice when 
resisted by the power of the banking sector as a whole.  Respondents were also 
asked what they perceived to be their bank‟s attitude to public responsibility – 
that is, managing risk to ordinary citizens.  Evidence of a bank‟s engagement 
with risk to the general public might be expected to include support for the 
development of new risk governance initiatives, for example seeking dialogue 
with designers of regulation or setters of enforcement policy, or it could include 
work on advancing the concepts and models of risk management.  The semi-
structured interview approach also allowed for a discussion about any 
involvement in formal assessments of regulatory powers and compliance policy, 
or any interaction with organized public-interest groups. 
 
Several respondents, such as C17, initially suggested that a system of enforced 
self-regulation shows that policymakers have a naïve faith in the agency of the 
market as protector of the public interest:  
 
“I suppose everybody just somehow thought that the invisible 
hand
25
 would do the job of reminding us about things like 
prudence and counter cyclicality during the boom times.  But 
funnily enough, that didn‟t happen.”         (C17) 
 
As this chapter will now show, the common target of criticism was in practice 
not this “invisible hand” but a regulator whose vision was seen to have failed.  
This chapter therefore focuses on bank risk officers‟ response to expectations of 
the FSA:  Did a “light touch” policy turn out to be, in practice, out-of-touch with 
market realities?   
 
                                                 
25
 A reference to Adam Smith‟s theory of market forces acting for the public good. 
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5.2.2  CROs‟ expectations of the FSA 
C4 expressed a commonly-held view that the FSA, as a regulator inexperienced 
in banking supervision, lacked the expert stature and accumulated wisdom of its 
predecessor: 
 
“After the FSA arrived, it was quickly seen as a box-ticking 
animal.  Regulators started to hide behind the rule book.  What‟s 
needed are more experienced supervisors who understand 
business, ideally because they used to do it.  The FSA just seemed 
to get rid of the collective memory which the Bank of England 
used to have.”  (C4) 
 
As predicted by Black (2003), the FSA as a new regulator was seen to struggle to 
command respect as long as banks continued to regard it as lacking authority, 
and hence lacking some legitimacy.  CROs sensing this lack of authority 
answered the researcher‟s open question “What is the regulator doing?” (Or 
“What is regulation for?)” with some cynicism.  Some, such as C12, saw the 
FSA as the product of a historical accident, as a performative act by central 
government, a poorly conceived outcome of “a policy called „Something Must 
Be Done‟” (C12).  Another respondent, C17, explicitly supported Power‟s 
(2005) idea that the CRO role itself is the product of the same regulatory urge – 
that is, the political expedient to “do something” which results in a new recipient 
for “blame-shift” within the organization:   
 
“Let‟s be realistic.  The only reason CROs were originally created 
is because there was a moment when markets and regulators 
needed them to catch the flak.”     (C17) 
 
As will be explored further in Chapters 6 and 7, once in office CROs quickly 
came to regard their technical credentials as less significant than the attitude they 
present to co-workers, especially on the trading side of the business.  A key 
theme emerging from this study is the realisation, common to all CROs shortly 
after arriving in office, that there are aspects of the role which were not clear 
from its job description.  To a greater or lesser extent depending on the employer 
culture, the role entails engaging with the regulator‟s reporting demands with a 
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combination of direct and indirect responses, simple verifications and sometimes 
complex obfuscations. 
 
Whether each CRO ultimately regarded their own tenure as a success will be 
seen, over the following three chapters, to depend on how effectively they 
engaged with the regulator, the bank‟s sales staff, and its senior management.  
Their response to being appointed was affected by factors including the 
professional knowledge they brought to the role; colleagues‟ level of respect for 
the strategic task of public reporting, and tactically for the regulator‟s staff; and 
the extent to which they were prepared to negotiate around their own principles 
and preconceptions, to achieve a pragmatic (if sometimes non-compliant) way of 
working. 
 
5.2.3  Regulatory policy issues seen to affect the CRO‟s 
relationship with the FSA 
Respondent C12 offered a critical appraisal of the policy rationale which created 
the FSA: 
 
“Why did we get the FSA?  Self-regulatory organizations had 
been seen to fail miserably under the Tories.  So, regulation is 
always in response to something.  What happens is that the 
general public, Joe Public doesn‟t like whatever‟s happened and 
it‟s fed through to the politicians.  The politicians say, right, well, 
something must be done, we‟re going to do something about 
this.”    (C12) 
 
As apparent from C12‟s view and similar comments from other respondents, 
bankers may see it as easy to look down on the regulator‟s staff, and may see 
themselves as enjoying a form of privileged exclusion from having to engage 
with public concern.  Past complicity between practitioners and regulators was 
cited as a factor – that it suited everyone to not to raise any objections, at least as 




 “It was all right for the City to look away from certain 
troublesome issues for as long as everyone chose to believe the 
assumption that the underlying market is not going to change.”  
(C12) 
 
It is a short step to conclude from this rationale, as respondents reported 
colleagues inferring, that the regulator is generally ineffective.  This perception 
recurs in many respondents‟ accounts of the regulator‟s staff failing to secure 
banks‟ wholehearted response to demands for information.   In practical terms, 
the regulator‟s efficacy was seen to be put to the test day-to-day as case officers 
asked for information and bankers responded to these requests.  As will be seen, 
respondents offered many examples of negotiated, indirect or blocking 
responses, begging consideration as to whether the regulator was indeed 
receiving an expected response, or if not, what was happening in between request 
and response. 
 
Regulators themselves accepted, at least after the 2008 crisis, that certain 
unforeseen risks including a liquidity famine may have tested to destruction 
“rational” assumptions and concepts of risk modelling.  As the FSA‟s own self-
review of the crisis noted, the market shock raised  
 
“important questions about the intellectual assumptions on which 
previous regulatory approaches have largely been built… (in 
particular) the theory of efficient and rational markets”  
(Turner, 2009b, p39).   
 
Respondents suggested that banks might have better helped their own cause by 
challenging the assumption of rationality – that is, that market prices might be 
relied on to find and securitise credit, or define risks quantitatively, or expect 
markets to self-restrain, or float an innovative financial product.  Turner had 
admitted to a collective “intellectual failure to understand… huge systemic risk, 
the whole system was risky”  (Turner, 2009a), and present research respondents 
shared concerns about certain fallacies which appeared to have informed 




Firstly, CROs objected to the “Newtonian rationale” (C4) that rules will “act as a 
lever” (C4, referencing Seddon, 2008) to restrain bad behaviour in regulated 
groups.  That is, a regulatory control which expects people to modify behaviour 
as if responding to Newton‟s Laws of Motion (action and reaction) takes no 
account of real human behaviour.  In particular, it fails to recognise cultures of 
informal organization, and the role of affect in human decision making:  the 
notion of a “moral economy”, or more plainly, whether it “feels right” to support 
a given course of action. .   
 
Secondly, respondents pointed to the unreliable assumption by regulatory control 
designers that “all other factors remain constant” (ceteris paribus).  As C17 says, 
background factors and assumptions do not in practice remain constant – 
especially at times of crisis: 
“It‟s all very well designing risk controls that function under 
ordinary market conditions, but surely the whole point is to be 
able to prevent the damage caused when market conditions 
change, especially for the regulator‟s credibility?”  (C17) 
 
In fairness, it should be noted that policy advisers also acknowledged this as a 
point of weakness during the year after the 2008 shock.  As one said, in the 
broader context of public protection, crises are not “distractions” from 
policymaking, they “are part of the job”; resilience to crisis is  
“one of the most important parts of the whole system [because]  
these things have a huge capacity to throw off everything else.”    
(Macrae, 2009)  
 
In the case of the banking crisis, regulatory policy based on assumption of 
constant underlying conditions (“ceteris paribus”) self-evidently failed to allow 
for the complexities of global markets and human behaviour.  Even as they 
admitted their own role in clinging to risk metrics, many respondents noted that 
the regulator seemed unprepared to respond to, let alone anticipate, the resulting 
market shocks. 
 
CROs suggested that side-lining the regulator continued to be seen by bankers as 
normal even after the credit crisis, since their employers directed them to act as if 
profit, personal and corporate power were more significant motives than any 
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public good.  (Such instructions will be directly examined in Chapter 7.)  
Respondents did not regard rational disagreement with this as a strong enough 
argument to prevent the industry “capturing” its regulator. 
 
New research ground was indicated by a consensus among respondents that 
CROs are actors in a “game” of reporting (C4).  Resistance to the regulator is 
seen as applying a form of risk homeostasis – that is, as C4 puts it, that bankers‟ 
level of engagement with the regulator reduces as the level of regulatory 
demands rises: 
 
“Absolutely there‟s a tendency to shift towards playing the system 
if the regulator seems to be intervening too much.  The more the 
intervention, the more people shut down their engagement with 
the regulator.”    (C4) 
 
On the other hand, this might appear to contradict the analysis, also common 
among respondents and axiomatic in regulatory theory, that too little threat of 
enforcement also encourages noncompliance.  From this apparent contradiction, 
it is appropriate to move to consider what methods the CRO did expect the FSA 
to deploy when asking a bank to account for its risk decisions. 
  
5.2.4  Ways that the FSA could call the CRO to account for a 
bank‟s risk decisions 
Respondents were invited to describe experiences of the various demands that 
the regulator could make for information and compliance reports.  Although 
there are many specific instruments for compliance demands, in the form of a 
range of pro-forma letters, forms and reports, five principle types of demand 
emerged.  These are now considered in turn. 
 
Firstly, the regulator routinely asks to see an audit trail:  That is, documents 
confirming the simple completion of a financial transaction or a product-based 
group of transactions.  This type of reporting is intended to make clear the 
existence, participants in, value and timing of a transaction. Although this may 
be demanded as a matter of routine public accountability, as will be seen the 
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practical reality of receiving repeated requests to account for the same 
transaction is a source of friction between CRO and FSA.   
   
Secondly, again as a matter of routine accountability, the regulator could ask the 
bank to demonstrate the validity of its chosen risk models by conducting and 
reporting on various forms of stress testing.  The CRO was answerable to the 
regulator for calculating risk exposures and testing the soundness of the 
econometric risk models that the bank had adopted.  Stress tests take basic 
transaction data and may either adjust various risk assumptions (such as, what if 
buyers start to offer a lower price for the product?) or run a product through a – 
sometimes very extensive – series of simulated trades to see how it performs 
under repeated use.  The regulator‟s willing belief in (possibly manipulated) self-
reported stress test results was seen by many respondents as a sign of intellectual 
weakness – or acquiescence in a flawed system for the sake of a quiet life. 
 
Thirdly, the regulator could ask the risk office to produce or update an 
assessment of the regulatory capital the bank now needed.  This is an estimate of 
how much of its own money the bank should hold against the possibility that a 
deal or product may collapse.  (Lacking the capital to cover their own losses in 
2008, some banks had to ask HM Government for bail-outs; CROs reported that 
the regulator regarded public outrage about this as the main driver of FSA 
requests subsequent to the 2008 crisis.)  As will be seen, one of the factors that 
most shapes a CRO‟s experience in their role is how this mediation plays out day 
to day, as they attempt to reconcile the bank‟s demands to tie up less capital 
against public concerns to increase it.    
 
Fourthly, the CRO could be asked to report on how the bank accounts for its 
general governance of risk, including how it processed transactions and created 
the resilience needed to survive various forms of crisis.  The regulator could ask 
about plans for surviving a projected crisis resulting from an internal issue, such 
as information systems failure, or external factors such as a counterparty going 
bankrupt.  The CRO might be asked to report on a broad range of management 




Fifthly, under money laundering regulations and criminal law, banks have a duty 
to report early to the regulator the event of any suspicious activity by customers.  
Certain criminal transaction activities occur in recognised patterns, moving 
money around in ways that have no apparent commercial rationale.  The onus 
rests on banks to spot movements of money which are inherently suspicious, and 
to report these.  There are legal and regulatory penalties if a bank fails to spot a 
transaction which subsequently is found to have involved criminal money. 
 
The following section will move on from CROs‟ expectations of the FSA to 
review their experiences in practice. 
 
5.3  CROs interacting with the FSA: experience in 
practice 
5.3.1  Introducing CROs‟ response strategies 
In a view shared by many, C20 appreciated that the regulator‟s aims were valid 
but suggested that these failed to recognise that CROs‟ engagement with the 
regulator was powerfully influenced by commercial pressure from within the 
bank: 
 
“The goals of financial regulation are essentially right.  The regulatory 
regime is essentially a good one that‟s just been very badly implemented.  
The (regulators) just didn‟t do their job properly, did they?  But then, 
many (bankers) were not actually very good at what they were doing 
either, ethically or intuitively.  Many of us [CROs] thought their job was 
to find a way around regulation as opposed to implementing it, as to do 
[that] would be too like actually representing the regulator.  What were 
they doing?”     (C20) 
 
Equally, respondents described a “decent and honourable” (AD2) quiet majority 
of commercial bankers who conducted ordinary lending business and who regard 
their aggressive colleagues (especially derivatives traders) as “out on a limb” 
(AD2).  Unfortunately, it is the traders who are regarded as having set the robust 




“Many [bank staff] look across their bank and say „I didn‟t do that;  I 
work in this bank and I didn‟t know we did that.  All I‟m doing is lending 
money to a farmer, I make money every year and we have a good 
reputation and I don‟t know what those [trader] guys are doing.‟ There‟s 
many more of those people than the ones who were, you know, out on a 
limb.  And they must feel badly let down.”     (AD2) 
 
Reflecting on this mood among non-traders, respondents used a range of 
summary terms to characterise their employer bank, with some terms used 
consistently (such as by C15, C20, C23 and C27): one might be working for a 
“good bank” (still thriving), a “bad bank” (such as one that failed in the 2008 
crisis), or an “incompetent”/ “out-of-its-depth” / “muddling through” bank (one 
whose ambitions had exceeded its skills, and was the credit crisis a chastening 
experience).  CROs frustrated with the regulator‟s perceived shortcomings did 
not necessarily feel this way because they worked for a “bad” bank. 
 
The “out-of-depth” trading style was highlighted by a respondent who referred 
the researcher to an incident recounted in Lanchester (2010).  Talking to a senior 
product engineer who had invented one of the first and most successful credit 
derivative products, Lanchester found her “baffled” by the enormous quantity of 
her type of contract that other banks were now managing to sell:  “How are the 
other banks doing it… making so much money?”  She was, says Lanchester, so 
used to applying her own rigorous approach to risk management that it “never 
occurred to her” that her competitors were making sales by the simple expedient 
of ignoring “all the risk controls [she] adhered to”. 
 
The “bad bank”, by contrast, is reported by one employee CRO (C35) as 
knowingly using the apparatus of regulatory risk reporting to obfuscate: 
 
“Like many banks, after the crash when the regulator turned up the heat, 
we set up a „bad bank‟ subsidiary, put all our trash assets into it, and tried 
our hardest to sell it off.  Keep it all off the balance sheet.”   (C35) 
   
 
As a broad finding, respondents were unanimous in expressing concern – 
sometimes verging on contempt – for the regulator‟s limited understanding of the 
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practical realities of banking services and products.  Lack of resource was widely 
recognised as a factor: 
 
“We worked out that we were supervised by just four FSA staff 
who were covering the whole of our UK operation – that‟s more 
than 12,000 of our staff.”  (C34) 
 
Given the consequent and acknowledged pressure on FSA staff to produce 
results from supervisory visits, CROs described a clear tension between 
voluntary engagement and consequent risk of punishment.  Consensus emerged 
that it was normal to acknowledge the regulator‟s staff and to be conventionally 
polite with them, but to avoid volunteering information.  There are many subtle 
inflections and techniques of putting this approach into practice.  These will be 
grouped thematically, in line with respondents‟ descriptions of how they manage 
interactions with the regulator apparent strategies for engagement.  The strategies 
may be broadly described in terms of demand management, organizational 
measures and presentational measures.  
 
As earlier compliance studies predict, respondents such as C19 also suggested 
that there was a correlation between the pressure from the regulator to show 
compliance and practitioner willingness to achieve compliance – or at least the 
appearance of – by any means: 
 
“There‟s a growing concern among us that it‟s not that firms are 
getting more compliant, it‟s just that we‟re getting better at 
playing the game of regulatory reporting.”   (C19) 
 
C19 raised this from the point of view of commercial concern, suggesting that 
the problem is less that reporting may be a form of game than that such a game 
might be stopped if too many industry-side participants are seen to profit from it.  
A key reason to conduct the current research has been to access accounts of 
“what actually happens” – how banks process, or fail to process, regulators‟ 
formal demands into responsive action.  Respondents have endorsed this 
research approach, broadly confirming the sector‟s recognition that a light-touch 
regulatory regime may unintentionally encourage bankers to develop coping 




A central problematic of enforced self-regulation is asymmetry of resource 
between regulator and regulatee, and hence the regulator‟s restricted access to 
information.  In the present context, CROs and their regulated colleagues 
recognised that source of regulatory reporting demands was an agency with 
limited resources; that is, that in practice the FSA could never deploy the staff 
resources necessary to exercise full oversight over all banking activities.  
Bankers were well aware that the regulator‟s staff had to rely on industry 
practitioners for practical know-how, product information, and access to data.  
Many respondents accepted that the FSA displayed some self-awareness about 
its own limits in this regard; many also offered views and experiences of this 
problem affecting their work directly.  Views ranged from sympathetic support 
for the FSA, accepting that their task is hard, to frustration that regulatory staff 
appeared unable to understand their own task, to outright hostility even at the 
highest level of management.    
 
Respondent SM1 provided the most vivid narrative of all of a hostile encounter 
between regulator and bank: his Chairman had once deployed the ultimate block 
against the regulator‟s requests, a tactic jokingly known as regulatory arbitrage 
(or jurisdiction-hopping).  Acknowledging first that “FSA supervisors are under 
tremendous political pressure”, SM1 describes how his Chairman uses a political 
threat to stop the FSA in its tracks.  When the regulator “threatens” his bank, the 
response is  
“just [to] say, right, we‟re going to move to another jurisdiction.  Now as 
a regulator, what do you do?  …the bank‟s next conversation is directly 
from the Chairman to [then Chancellor of the Exchequer] Gordon Brown 
– and not just some minor Treasury man – and it goes like this:  „Now 
Gordon, you come in here and explain to me why you want to take one of 
the largest banks in the world out of the UK‟.  Now, that may not be a 
standard game-play, but it‟s one hell of a response to being pushed into a 
corner!”                       (SM1) 
 
On a more routine level of risk monitoring, respondents noted a difference 
between expert cultures of the FSA and the banks regarding which risks are 
significant, sometimes translating into the regulator‟s lack of resources, or 




“Regulators actually do understand that gaming of the rules goes 
on.  Within the FSA there‟s a constant discussion about how to 
train their people, or get people in who understand where 
gaming‟s going to occur.  Though it‟s not generally articulated in 
those terms – it‟s articulated as „how can we get the people in that 
will understand what this business is doing‟!”      (C15) 
 
Such “expectation gaps” were widely perceived and may be seen as a normal 
risk attaching to any regulatory attempt to deploy a system of control (as 
predicted by Goffman, 1974; Kaplan, 2008).  Some examples of banks‟ 
strategies for resisting the regulator‟s questions are provided in the sections 
following.   
 
5.3.2  Demand management: Exerting control of intellectual 
property (risk models, products) and data production 
CROs described being willing to mount a technical challenge to the regulator 
based on the bank‟s use of proprietary risk models.  Bankers‟ selective use of 
risk models and data was seen by CROs – and indeed the FSA – as a major area 
of uncertainty, making banks vulnerable both to local manipulation and to wider 
market shocks.  C25 admitted to one form of “risk model abuse”: 
 
“Sure, we do stress testing, but what a lot of people actually do is 
run the tests until they get the numbers they wanted to see.”      
(C25) 
 
It was also common practice, according to respondents, for bankers to select a 
different risk model for each new product based on how well the risk model 
supported the product‟s expected profit margin, and regardless of whether this 
represents a balanced analysis of product risk.  Even when a risk model was 
conceptually valid, its validity might be compromised by misapplying it to an 
irrelevant product.  Bias in selection of a risk model might be compounded by 
marketing staff‟s tendency to “cherry-pick” data when running the model.  
Some, including C3, rationalised “marketing support” as not necessarily a risky, 




“The creative-interpretative side of my job is the most interesting 
part, is what I enjoy most.  As a CRO I‟m absolutely here to 
reconcile compliance needs with marketing needs.”   (C3) 
 
Models were also ruthlessly deployed in response to regulators‟ requests for 
specific types of information, ignoring wider concerns of whether they were 
measuring the appropriate categories of risk.  The models, said C34, were chosen 
to 
“satisfy the regulator‟s evidence requirements rather than address 
the actual elements of risk.”                    (C34) 
 
Respondents were convinced almost unanimously (with the notable exception of 
C14, a dedicated econometrician) that the most significant precondition for a 
market storm was traders‟ tendency to seek false comfort by producing 
econometric models and tests, even though they knew that test results were 
sometimes derived from selectively gathered data.  C12 offered a striking 
analogy: 
 
“The banking industry‟s biggest problem has been belief in their 
risk assessment and management system.  Bankers basically had 
this comforting myth that you can just kind of stick a „risk probe‟ 
into any project, like checking a turkey in the oven.” (C12) 
 
In the present research, most CROs self-critically questioned the nature of 
model-based rules, and modelling assumptions.  Many supported this view with 
examples of personal experience of situations where risk-modelled assumptions 
had to be called into question.  Many also questioned a broad assumption 
implicit in the use of quantised risk models, which could be summarised as:  
Why would any policy designer expect model-based rules to be effective in 
holding institutions to public account, when the regulated community itself 
selects both the risk models and the data that populates them?  C12 described 
how risk analysts developed “twenty-twenty hindsight” after a crisis.  Similarly, 
C20 concluded that “so often the simple questions weren‟t asked because they 
were hidden by metrics”; and C12 expands upon the conceptual problem: 
 
“Saying „this is what our probabilistic risk model tells us‟ of course 
concealed the actual situation, which was about unknowns, or known 
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unknowns.  Models give a great view of the overall shape of results, but 
no assigned probabilities that would help you for example with timing of 
any specific occurrence.  Stress testing gives you no indication of what 
actually happens.  We have to do more to improve our understanding of 
incomplete information, of uncertainty.”       (C12) 
 
C12 concluded that a bank such as his could (and in the event, did) fail because 
its risk models were simply incapable of capturing real-world uncertainty.  These 
experiences validate theorists‟ warnings that risk models should never be 
regarded as “truth-generating machines”, either by regulators or  practitioners: 
even  if a regulatory process demands “the answer”, all that a risk model can be 
expected to do is show a simplified version of a system or relationship – but 
never “fundamentally represent” it (all phrases from Holmes and Graham, 2009, 
p161). 
 
Respondents were concerned not just that the “flexible use of risk models” 
(C27‟s phrase) came to compromise risk reporting on single transactions, but 
that other, related forms of manipulated risk reporting ultimately came together 
with models abuse to destabilise the whole banking market.  For example, as 
directly corroborated by several respondents‟ experiences (C4, C12, C20, C27, 
C34), a common failing was for risk data to be aggregated into a model which 
reported figures at Group level within the bank, so concealing some significant 
risk exposures at divisional level.  Thus the bank‟s reported view of acceptable 
risk might have “lost some vital perspective”, noted C4, albeit one which “FSA 
case officers were unqualified to advise on” (C4). 
 
One dissenter from this view, C14, should be acknowledged, as he represents an 
alternative rationale that this researcher has heard widely expressed in the sector 
and which many bankers still subscribe to.  In a notably circular argument C14, 
an econometrician, interpreted the 2008 crisis not as destroying risk-model 
assumptions, but rather as presenting an opportunity to further refine them: 
 
“Our methodologies work as well as they‟re designed to.  We 
need to, like, go back, check the assumptions and refine the 
models.  I wouldn‟t say the stress-testing model is dead, it just 




All other respondents to the present research – and indeed HM Government‟s 
own subsequent review (Turner 2009b) – argued that regulatory controls failed 
when bankers clung to the belief at sector level, until it was demonstrably too 
late, that all model-derived control systems worked as they were designed to.  In 
C4‟s analysis: 
 
“You‟ll never get to systemic risk by somehow going to each of 
the banks and trying to get the picture.  You can‟t see the system 
at a component level.  You‟ve got to go to all of them together 
and call on them to face up to a systemic problem.”     (C4) 
 
Many observed that it is unhelpful to blame risk models themselves for the 
abusive uses to which some were put:   
 
“Much of the risk modelling requirements are driven by 
compliance in the minds of the risk team, and are not much 
discussed around the business.”   (C6) 
 
Nor should a model be held to blame for being the carrier of corrupt data, as C27 
admits: 
 
 “It‟s easy enough to play with stress tests, you can run lots and 
lots of them, then report the best numbers.  The regulator is happy 
of course because you can say you‟ve done lots of runs of the 
test!”        (C27) 
 
Thus, risk models may rest on sound assumptions, which have been overlooked 
or misapplied in the pursuit of profit; or may be used to carry data which has 
been manipulated and placed within them to give the appearance of an 
acceptable risk decision-making process.  More than one respondent has 
suggested that senior managers may have knowingly engaged in combining or 
re-presenting risk data in ways which, though meaningless for practical 
commercial purposes, gave the appearance to the regulator of coherent risk 
metrics.  As noted by C20, CRO of a bank that subsequently failed, such risk 
management “philosophies” of presentation were “themselves very serious 




A concern on the regulatory demand-side was that the regulator was narrowly 
defining models in order to exclude having to think about wider questions of risk 
exposure.  FSA prescribed risk reports were  
“normally carried out at a senior level and using simplistic (and 
potentially misleading) top down approaches.  As the FSA 
process is highly prescriptive - I assume as they want to 
standardise the results across banks - the top down nature of these 
rules means that we can generate almost any result.”   (C27) 
 
 
5.3.3  “Bargaining down” (and bulking up) the quantity of 
reporting to be delivered 
Another significant subset of responses to the regulator‟s information demands is 
to negotiate over what data is really necessary to report.  This commonly takes 
the form of “bargaining down” the amount or quality of data required.   
 
As Rothstein‟s (2002) analysis leads us to expect, a new regulator with stretched 
resources may itself welcome ways to limit the defined scope of its own task.  
CROs recognise this structural tension for the regulator‟s case officers and, as 
C20 suggests, are content to play up to this: 
 
“There‟s a certain amount of pressure on FSA operational teams 
not to up the ante, meaning that „trouble making‟ is suppressed.  
Strong challenge is not encouraged either within the bank or the 
regulator.”           (C20)   
 
An alternative is to submit, sometimes voluntarily, large volumes of reporting 
information to the regulator such that there is more data than the regulator can 
reasonably be expected to review, or even comprehend:   
 
“There can be a game of quality-versus-quantity going on in some 
bank boardrooms.  Some banks defensively file billions of, for 
example „suspicious activity‟ reports… Other banks say, you 
know, we‟re going to be very [sparing], we‟re only going to give 
high quality reports, not just churn numbers to make it look 




C18 also accepted that the CRO role enables understanding, and participation in 
mediating, strategies of necessary adjustment played by regulatory staff as well 
as the banks.  The regulator, too, was seen to want to restrict the amount of work 
necessary, to “stave off government interference in how they did their business”  
(C18). 
 
Some respondents noted with approval that FSA case staff are themselves 
willing to keep matters simple by avoiding asking too many questions.  All 
accepted that the FSA needs to inform itself about products and markets and that 
practitioners must be the source of such briefings. Whilst routine transaction 
reporting is accepted, duplicated demands for information or demands for extra 
detail are regarded by, for example, SM1 as “disturbing the neutrality of the risk 
dialogue”.   
 
There is another self-serving rationale for minimal reporting of any concerns.  It 
could be potentially self-incriminating to share with the regulator what were 
initially private concerns about anomalies.  Several respondents reported 
instances of their risk management staff who had raised concerns with the 
regulator, only to find their information subsequently used by case officers to 
attack the bank.  Some banks used this concern to justify a response policy of 
erring on the side of being uninformative, rather than volunteering data.  This is 
justified by SM1, who as a business head recalls the regulator pre-emptively 
raising the issue: 
 
“The regulator may sometimes need to say to you; „I wish you 
hadn‟t raised this topic with me; it would have been all right if I‟d 
never needed to sign off on it but now because you‟ve told me 
about it I can‟t deny that I know, so it‟s too late.‟ A ridiculous 
conversation, but that‟s the issue”   (SM1) 
 
This scenario tends to confirm McGoey‟s (2007) observations that all parties in 
self-regulatory systems may have a conscious awareness of the value of 
“strategic ignorance”.  Broadly, for every CRO willing to volunteer concerns to 
the FSA and expose themselves to possible investigation, another would advise 
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withholding information – at least pending further internal inquiries – to limit 
their exposure to the perceived risk of aggressive enforcement action. 
 
The regulator‟s susceptibility to “bargaining” was understood by many to be not 
merely a product of time constraint, but also necessitated by the regulator‟s 
frequent changes of staff.  This aspect of resource constraint is now considered 
separately. 
 
5.3.4  Exploiting the “revolving door” 
Respondents justified their employer‟s limiting of organizational resources for 
compliance, on grounds of time and cost management.  A bank‟s own lack of 
time or personnel was cited to justify applying pressure back onto the regulator‟s 
case officers to try to reduce the quantity of reporting required; or to use lower-
cost resources, such as junior staff, to fulfil it. 
 
The regulator‟s own resources are, however, even more constrained and the 
banks are aware that this presents an opportunity to press for a regulatory 
“control bargain” (in Hood‟s [2002] phrase).  As previously noted, a regime of 
enforced self-regulation requires the regulator‟s staff to rely on the industry to 
provide data and to validate risk management concepts.  Over time, practitioners 
come to perceive regulators as always “a few steps behind us”.  Perceptions of 
case officers‟ limited competence become self-reinforcing; one experience of 
incompetence primes bankers to expect further instances.  An experience 
described by C4, typical of many, supports a common perception that the 
regulator‟s internal communication is ineffective, resulting in repeated demands 
for the same information.  This repetition is a form of conditioning which was 
seen over time to desensitise bank staff: 
 
“They [FSA] asked three times for the same transaction data.  
Now the more of that there is, the more people shut down their 
engagement [with the regulator].  It‟s not done in some conscious 
way, it‟s just because people get too busy, get swamped with 
compliance demands. So, over time, compliance requirements 
degrade in people‟s minds – it‟s just a process, just a piece of 




Many CROs observed, and regretted as a systemic vulnerability, that the FSA‟s 
case officers were unlikely to stay in post long enough to develop a good 
working relationship with their bank‟s compliance staff.  From among many 
examples, here is C26, who also draws his own conclusion: 
 
“So we went all through this process (with the FSA case officer) 
of „this is the money we‟re going to spend, this is what control 
we‟re going to build, this is how long it‟s going to take us‟.  As 
promised we went back to them with a progress update six weeks 
later, only to be met by someone I hadn‟t seen the first time, 
informing me that the first person I‟d met was a complete 
blithering idiot and had no idea, how could we possibly deliver 
that, and „no we don‟t accept your model at all‟.”  (C26) 
 
Bankers noticed high levels of staff turnover at the FSA and were willing to 
exploit this for information advantage.  One manifestation of this (as in the cases 
of both Northern Rock and HBOS, see Annex 4) was to take any opportunity to 
defer giving concrete answers or data in anticipation of a change of case officer – 
described by C4 and others as a “revolving door” effect.  Stalling in this way was 
planned to have the effect of making a regulatory demand go away.  
Respondents spoke, typically with a grin, about managing to defer some demand 
from the regulator until the problem vanished with the person.  This outcome 
was regarded as a success for the firm and for the office of CRO; as a saving of 
resources. 
 
A variant on the “revolving door” tactic was to stall by deploying the 
consultative process itself to raise counter-queries.  C24 offered an example: 
 
“Because of the bank‟s offshore business, they were asked by the 
FSA to complete a Section 166 report – the FSA wanted to check 
that the bank was properly managing and documenting its 
arrangements for governance, continuity planning and security 
across its sprawling empire.  The bank took months negotiating 
with the FSA the scope of the review; it was a battle of attrition 
with the FSA all through the scoping phase, just to keep reducing 
the scope.  In the end it came to a point where the original Section 
166 demand became unnecessary – it was almost as if the FSA 




It would be unfair to characterise CROs as generally enjoying such opportunities 
to exploit the FSA‟s staffing system.  Most CROs expressed regret or frustration, 
rather than opportunism, in response to the event of rapid staff turnover. 
 
Before 2008, many bankers had chosen to interpret the FSA‟s light-touch regime 
as an endorsement of the commercial view that inspection demands could be 
negotiated away or simply deferred pending a change of case officer.  As the 
FSA itself later admitted (Turner 2009b), in the cases of Northern Rock and 
HBOS, frequent changes in case staff had indeed blinded the regulator to the 
seriousness of some problems.   
 
5.3.5  Redefining compliance: the manipulation of regulatory 
capital reports 
More than one respondent referred to the industry‟s history of low regard for the 
compliance process; “my colleagues often refer to compliance as „a brake‟ on 
ingenuity” (C12). Other less polite phrases are also used to indicate that 
regulators frustrate trading.  
 
All respondents were asked for their broad view of the extent to which regulation 
may or may not be burdensome; whether the compliance task imposed was a 
reasonable one.  C2 shares the clear consensus that, before the market crash at 
least, the burden does not justify the benefit:  
 
“The amount of time it takes us to „be regulated‟ – for us to deal 
with the people who are regulating us – increased dramatically 
over the past three years (to 2007)”   (C2) 
 
C2 and others (C4, C18) suggested that undue cost is seen as a reason to 
challenge regulatory legitimacy.  Some respondents suggested that any increase 
in detailed rules meant that the regulators were making work for themselves, 
implying:  the more rules, the less compliance.  While CROs said that they 
understood that coping was clearly not the response the regulator intended, it was 
still a logical response.  As C27 said, in corporate terms it was “the expected 




“With so many new rules it is not surprising that CROs focus on 
ticking boxes rather than ensuring proper self-assessment of risk.  
The focus is on meeting regulators‟ demands, with no concern as 




“Controls were developed with a view to satisfying the regulator‟s 
evidence requirements rather than addressing actual elements of 
risk.”  (C34) 
  
In terms of the impact of all this on practical reporting to the regulator, one risk 
construct most commonly referred to as “playable” was the definition and 
calculation of regulatory capital.  As every respondent confirmed, banks hated to 
tie up in-house any capital which could be, as they would see it, better used in 
the markets.  Regulatory capital was, in these terms, money which the regulator 
was telling the bank it was not allowed to use in any way except to hold on 
account against the chance of a transaction going bad.  Bankers universally saw 
this as a form of (costly) self-insurance.  C27 said that it was “standard 
reporting” for a CRO to compile a self-assessed regulatory capital figure and that  
“despite, or perhaps because of, the volumes of text in the 
regulatory guidelines, each bank seems to have a different 
approach. Lately (post-2008) as the regulator is trying to get all 
lenders to use the same, simplistic, „slotting‟ approach, so there is 
a lot of gaming going on, each bank trying to get as many loans as 
it can arbitrarily defined as 'good' so as to attract the least amount 
of capital (requirement).” (C27) 
 
Although there were, and still are, rules as to the margin of regulatory capital 
required, the actual regulatory capital figure that a bank reports is in practice a 
matter of negotiation between the CRO and the regulator.  The regulator wants a 
higher figure, as better insurance against bank failure; the bank wants a lower 
one, so that less of its funds lie idle.   
 
For many a CRO, therefore, situated in the middle of this negotiation, a defining 
feature of their employment has been the pressure to reduce regulatory capital.  
As C11 recounted, a CRO could quickly become popular among colleagues by 
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concentrating on reducing their employer‟s costs of regulatory capital – that is, 
by estimating a lower figure and presenting this to the regulator as fact.  Careful, 
and indeed selective, interpretation of rules and definitions was the key, said 
C11: 
 
 “As it was a major bank, I managed to find £12billion of 
regulatory capital to release within six months there, mainly by 
„playing‟ the rulebook.  The Board said it was an excellent return 
on the cost of hiring me!”  (C11) 
 
Some respondents referred to this as evidence of a wider, so-called Goodhart 
Effect
26
 encouraging traders to report compliance in the narrowest possible 
terms, whilst otherwise continuing “business as usual”, with behaviour 
unchanged.  Two respondents offered an analogy for how this works in practice.  
First C12:   
 
“The fact that you‟re using something changes it, so a risk 
indicator will affect the thing it‟s indicating.  You know, if you‟re 
hitting something with a stick, the stick changes shape.”   
      (C12) 
 
This perception recalls the “Goodhart effect” (noted in Chapter 3), that the act of 
being measured changes the behaviour of the people who are meaured; and also 
Mackenzie‟s (2008) thesis, developed from Friedman, that risk models act as “an 
engine, not a camera”. 
 
C35 reads the situation as a plain matter of quantity of supply and demand:  
 
“More regulation simply opens up room for more arbitrage.  
There are just so many smart people out there!”          
     (C35) 
 
A related point concerns systemic skew of incentives: within most banks, 
compliance activity is structurally arranged and accounted for as a cost centre.  
                                                 
26
 After Charles Goodhart, LSE Professor and former Bank of England Monetary Policy 
Committee member, who proposed “Goodhart‟s Law” of regulatory design failure: “that when an 
indicator is made a target for the purpose of policy, it loses the information content which 
qualified it as a target in the first place”  
143 
 
One simple indicator of the bank‟s good intentions (or otherwise) for compliance 
is the level of resources that the bank chooses to make available to support 
compliance activity.  As a qualified lawyer and veteran of several compliance 
departments, C18 suggested that there is an easy way to measure how seriously a 
bank takes its duty to compile compliance reports:  
 
“It‟s easy to tell how much real power any bank‟s compliance 
function has – just see how much budget it gets. That‟s the 
Finance Department‟s way of saying „we‟re prepared to give only 
this much resource to this activity‟”     (C18) 
 
Whilst generally well-intended, CROs‟ responses to FSA requests for 
information are often attenuated by concerns about resource implications and the 
degree of perceived need.   
 
A further type of manipulation concerns how the CRO deploys staff to present 
the requested information to the regulatory case officer.  Examples of this are 
now considered.  
 
5.3.6  Presentational strategy: Stage-managing the regulator‟s 
access  
Three CROs described a strategy of carefully organizing a physical process of 
how they presented their staff and information to the regulator (C29 calling this 
“stage management”).  This may be seen as a conscious effort to lower the 
intensity of any dialogue with the regulator, by orchestrating how it is played 
out.  C29 said that it gave him “some amusement” to arrange case-officer 
interview appointments in a sequence ensuring that his “dullest” staff members 
“get plenty of face time first”; multiple members of the compliance team could 
be deployed to meet case officers so as to “bore them to distraction”.  Several 
other respondents described deliberately fielding junior staff to talk to the FSA, 
as a similarly attritional strategy. 
 
C6 rationalised a “stage management” strategy as a matter of plain practicality 




“You know they [case officers] have got to write something, so 
you‟re happy if they find a couple of things.  And you may, you 
know, point them in certain directions – you know, make sure you 
control who‟s in the room and who‟s having a conversation with 
them, that they sit with that person, this compliance guy, this risk 
guy is to sit next to them.”   (C6) 
 
C26 is equally frank about deploying this strategy, even telling the regulator that 
it is happening: 
 
“I always tell our case officers „you can have access to anyone 
you like but you need to go through me‟.  You [meaning I] co-
ordinate it.  You can‟t block it but you can control it, steer it, and 
usually in the main they will sort of give in to being manipulated, 
because it just goes with the territory, or they don‟t see it, or they 
choose not to see it.  You make a character judgement of your 
case officer and then against that reading of them you arrange 
how your staff engage with them.”   (C26) 
 
5.3.7  Presentational strategy: “blinding with science” 
The quality of the regulator‟s staff was widely regarded as a significant point of 
risk control weakness.  C15 offered a stereotypical view of senior FSA managers 
is as technocrats, remote from trading activity: 
 
“The FSA had very much bought into a simplistic, black-and-
white, even ivory tower approach that what businesses were able 
to do… bizarrely it was almost blind them with science.  We say 
„actually you‟re not very close to what‟s happening in the real 
world, you know things have moved on very quickly, you need to 
understand the commercial realities we‟re facing‟.”   (C15) 
Though they were not so remote from the trading floor, junior and case-officer 
staff were commonly perceived as not being competent to handle the task 
required.  A common presentational tactic responding to this perception, said 
C15, was to call their bluff; to “blind the case officer with science” on the basis 
that they will either pretend to understand, or be “too embarrassed to ask the 




CROs also noted that their banking colleagues were accustomed to keep case 
officers at arm‟s length by using jargon terms to perpetuate a culture of expertise.  
They saw this as a strategy of forcibly creating social distance between banker 
and regulator as a way to establish and emphasise case officers‟ self-perception 
of inferior status in any dialogue.  C26 offer the – highly contentious – argument  
that regulatory staffs‟ perceived low status is a reflection of inferior rewards: 
 
“What you learn is, the reality with every regulator inevitably 
because of the compensation they pay, is that they‟re often less 
competent than the people they‟re trying to regulate.”  
    (C26) 
 
This also suggests that case officers and CROs are conscious of one another‟s 
perceived status as, respectively, unwelcome visitor and cost-centre employee.  
Conversations with visiting case officers are seen as potentially uncomfortable.  
Respondents rationalise this discomfort as resulting from case officers‟ simple 
incomprehension of the business or product, compounded by staff turnover 
which exacerbates lapses in knowledge.  Encountering “a whole new team” of 
regulatory cases officers, a CRO may regard them as “learning at our expense”           
(C26).  In such circumstances the CRO might readily conclude that the need to 
repeat explanations limits the possibility of raising any genuine concerns, let 
alone whistle-blowing in the event of serious concerns.  Respondents also 
recognise that insensitive handling of these issues in face-to-face meetings with 
the regulator might amplify the damage if case officers then chose to pursue a 
tough prosecution. 
 
Respondents remarked on various relevant factors contributing to the low 
perceived status of regulatory staff, including their inexperience, poor 
compensation, and lack of an authoritative presence.  These perceptions 
encouraged a form of instrumental conditioning among compliance staff; 
expectations were lowered to the point where banks did not expect case officers  





“It‟s all very well the bank reporting formal risk breaches and 
stuff, but few of the FSA case officers are experienced enough to 
realise that sometimes it‟s more a case of – „do you know,  this is 
a business that you guys really shouldn‟t be in‟.”    (C4) 
 
Risk Office‟s production of papers for the regulator could also be stage-managed 
to some extent.  CROs did not always regard production of “audit trail” 
documents as time wasted; sometimes this process could itself form part of an 
alternative strategy for disengagement.  An alert CRO could see that the 
regulatory burden might, paradoxically, be reduced by increasing the amount of 
paperwork volunteered to the regulator, so as to preoccupy them.  C18, for 
example, watched colleagues use the tactic of “keeping the regulator busy” by 
voluntary and pre-emptive filing of a large volume of reports “just to look like 
they were really doing their homework right”  (C18).  This response is a creative 
alternative to seeking to reduce the regulatory burden by negotiation - 
“bargaining it down”.   
 
5.3.8  Selective presentation of credentials 
The regulator could ask bank staff to explain any activity they were engaged in, 
under the “comply or explain” rule, one manifestation of the “light touch” 
regime.  This request could be either pre-emptive or retrospective.  Routine, pre-
emptive gathering of information by the FSA was accepted by CROs as a 
“necessary evil” or “friction cost of business” (as phrased by TA1 and C12 
respectively).  However, CROs broadly expressed resentment at the wasteful 
duplication of effort involved in filing multiple reports of transactions.  This 
factor was seen to drive a number of identifiable forms of coping behaviour. 
 
Responding to simple requests for information from the regulator, CROs were 
typically cautious about suggesting a “best practice” approach to engaging with 
the FSA day-to-day.  Despite being tasked with upholding, in C4‟s words, a 
“social responsibility line about always helping the regulator”, they characterised 
dialogue in practice as incremental; that is, taking small steps towards engaging, 
rather than aiming to be all-inclusive.  C6 described a strategy of being helpful 




“Less is more, in terms of information provided.  Let (FSA) find 
their way to the information.  If a question is asked, answer the 
question, but maybe don‟t broaden it up if you don‟t need to.”     
(C6) 
 
A variant of this was to “push and push back”, according to C26, reflecting a 
common perception that people “disengage” when the regulator is seen to be 
“intervening too much” (C4). 
 
These views should be balanced by the observation that most respondents said 
that their banks would prefer to avoid impasses by showing the regulator that 
they were already taking reasonable precautions.  C32 indicated that there were 
various ways to give the regulator a clear sign of good intentions in routine 
compliance practices: 
 
“Some sensible procedures are obvious to do – such as having 
senior officers sign off on drawdown.”       
   (C32) 
 
However, most respondents resented the inroads made by regulatory demands 
into commercial time – or, more significantly, they resented having to justify 
making demands on their front-office colleagues‟ time.  Even the CRO of a 
“good bank”, such as C2, could be critical of the FSA for demanding too much 
information and then apparently not using it: 
 
“The FSA routinely demands trading activity reports which 
duplicate information we have already given them.  It‟s not 
unusual to be asked three times by three different [FSA] people 
for the same set of transaction details.  We know for a fact that 
this information the FSA gets is not used by them.  A huge 
(transaction) database sits at Canary Wharf but the FSA hardly 
looks at it.”       (C2) 
 
This resonates with others‟ experiences of doing their best to comply, only to 
find that the regulator‟s response to their response was not what they might have 




“So they self-disclosed (to the FSA), then next thing you know 
they‟ve got a big fine and been sanctioned.  That‟s not necessarily 
the right message (for the FSA) to be sending to the market, it 
makes it difficult for people to be open and honest with the 
regulator if they know they‟re going to end up with a big fine and 
lots of adverse publicity.”      (C2) 
 
CROs‟ experiences of interaction with the FSA, often contradicting expectations, 
have been considered;  the following section reviews these findings to conclude 
on the efficacy of engagement between the two sides. 
 
 
5.4  Conclusion:  Was the regulator perceived to be 
effective?  Did the CRO engage?  
Out of these interviews a picture begins to emerge of a new and extreme form of 
disengagement with the regulator.  This phenomenon, which will here be 
described by the phrase “beyond capture”, is a potentially significant finding 
which will be returned to in Chapter 7, where CROs‟ experiences in the 
Boardroom are reviewed, and in the Conclusions in Chaper 8.  In an informal 
summary offered by C12, the “beyond capture” phenomenon may be said to 
have arisen  
“not because banks are Too Big To Fail; it‟s more that they are Too Big 
To Care”  (C12) 
 
“Beyond capture” is the outcome which may be predicted to occur when a self-
regulatory supervisor tries (and fails) to achieve meaningful engagement with a 
sales-driven and massively-resourced commercial sector with an overwhelming 
belief in the supremacy of its own informal business culture. 
 
At a routine level, respondents reported seeing signs of internal tensions within 
FSA itself regarding the practical shortcomings of light-touch, as opposed to 
granular or detailed information-gathering.  On a related point, many CROs also 
offered the view that Turner‟s (2009b) review of the crisis was flawed because it 
concentrated on regulatory control systems whilst offering no practical 
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suggestions for tackling the more urgent issue of banks‟ cultures of compliance 
(considered further in the chapter 6).   
 
The evidence supports a finding that, even before the 2008 crash, CROs were 
wary of the optimistic policy rationale that self-regulation works because 
markets will allocate resources according to profitability.  Regulatory 
compliance was seen by banks as a cost to be suppressed.  There was some 
concern that regulatory policy was naïve in assuming that traders would ever 
take into account the public good – even in the narrowest sense of any concern 
for a viable long-term market.  In practice, said CROs, banks regarded short-term 
profit as routinely dominating all other concerns. 
   
In this regard, C4 was nostalgic for the regime of the recent past (pre 1997) in 
which there was a well-established way to stop dangerous opportunism; having a 
regulator whose personal authority bankers would respect.   
 
“In the days before the FSA, if you were called up in front of 
Eddie George [Governor of the Bank of England] it really meant 
something, public shaming, it used to hurt, the whole world knew 
your business and it would be frowned upon.”   (C4) 
 
Although in the (1977 - 2009) “light touch” regime dialogue with the regulator 
was welcome, there was seen to be a danger in sharing private concerns with a 
regulator who might return to use these confidences as the basis for a public 
prosecution.  However, simple enforcement was not seen as the better 
alternative, as C3 said:  
 
 “Regulation by enforcement, I‟m not a big fan of it.  If you 
cannot come clean about a failure you have identified – and 
certainly that can be a very dangerous thing to do – then the 
relationship with the regulator gets a bit tricky.”      (C3) 
 
Respondents with experience of enforcement in different jurisdictions, notably 
the US, perceived marked differences in the impact of regulatory enforcement on 
personal attitudes. Two widely admired exemplars were reported to be the „old‟ 
Bank of England under Governor Eddie George in the 1990s, whose ability to 
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„look you in the eye‟ was seen as a great asset to orderly market making; and the 
no-nonsense approach of the US market regulator, the SEC, as C4 recalls: 
 
“the [US] Department of Justice comes into the bank with the 
guns and the handcuffs, and massive fines… when you‟ve seen 
the Feds coming in with handcuffs and a gun and marching 
someone away, it‟s terrifying, that sticks in people‟s minds and it 
gets around the marketplace.  But the [UK] principles-based 
approach is a much, much easier game to play against… the FSA 
just has to put its trust in an awful lot of people.”    (C4) 
 
One might, then, have expected to find CROs supporting the notion (after 
Sparrow, 2000) that government produces new rules performatively – that is, 
producing symbolic expressions of power rather than real instruments of control 
over a sector.  CROs and their firms did perceive a systemic weakness in 
regulatory policy and design; they knew but do not publicly acknowledge that 
the validity of risk models rests on flawed assumptions, and that enforced self-
regulation with its light-touch and principles-based approach also relies on the 
same assumptions.  However, if respondents did perceive the regulator as 
engaging in symbolic acts, such as levying a big fine against a well-known 
brand, they interpreted this as an acceptable move within a mutual “game” of 
regulation in which coping responses are legitimate on either side: 
“Oh yes, of course when [bank name] were fined, it was just their turn to 
be made an example of – it may be ours next – that‟s what the FSA has to 
do to show it‟s doing something.  „Buggins‟s Turn‟.” (C24) 
 
Another fallacy of financial regulation recognised by respondents was that it may 
justify itself on grounds of evidence-based rationality, even though financial 
markets should not be expected to act rationally.  As C12, an investment bank 
CRO and self-confessed “casino supporter”, put this, the regulator makes too 
optimistic an assumption : 
 
“The trouble with principles-based regulation is that there are 
parts of the market that are not very principled.”       (C12) 
  
The underlying question is more one of business ethics than regulation for its 
own sake: Did bankers support the system out of genuine commitment to its 
values, or out of expediency?  On a related point, were gaps in the regulatory 
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framework respected or seen as fair game for creating profit opportunities?  As a 
veteran of two post-crash bank rescues, C24 offered this outlook on what was 
wrong and needed to change: 
 
“[The old] regulatory complexity was self-defeating… a spiral of 
ever-increasing product and risk complexity being chased by 
ever-increasing regulation.  Banks loved it because the more 
complex the rules the easier they are to bend and exploit.  Better, 
now, to simplify the [regulatory] code to core rules and measures 
designed to make the whole industry transparent even to lay 
people.”  (C24)     
 
Although respondents offered many, often colourful examples of subversive 
conduct, it would be misleading to draw from these incidents a general 
conclusion that all CROs were actively complicit in subverting the regulator‟s 
information gathering.  Most remained diligent in fulfilling routine reporting 
requirements where there was little room for manoeuvre.  
 
Rather, these incidents begin to bring into focus a notion that CROs draw upon a 
range of partially-compliant responses.  This range varied with individual CRO 
and may be informed by the individual‟s response to the culture of the employer 
organization.  Some described their response as “making sense” of sometimes 
conflicting or incomplete information about risk and compliance expectations.  
This recalls the idea of sense-making as suggested by Karl Weick (1995); that is, 
of a private attempt to complete an unclearly defined task by filling in the gaps 
between known instructions.  With some consistency emerging in these narrated 
accounts of coping responses, it is now possible to begin to group certain 
attitudes thematically.   
 
The CRO‟s personal response to the employer culture might take one of several 
defined directions according to whether he/she regards the employer as a “good”, 
“bad” or “muddling” bank.  In a good bank, a CRO was unlikely to find 
troubling behaviour, as the prevailing culture was of “doing the right thing”, 
including early and voluntary disclosure of any compliance concerns.  But CROs 
in “bad” or “muddling” banks, that is, banks which failed, said they faced a 
difficult choice.  They may have passively acquiesced with the bank‟s resistance 
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to the regulator (whilst hoping that no major incidents occur during their term in 
office); or they may have actively engaged in resistance; or they may have 
objected to the manipulation of risk reporting, and suffered the consequences.   
 
The reality of that choice might vary from day to day and meeting to meeting.  
The overriding profit motive, gross asymmetries in reward and perceived status 
between sales and back-office, and simple self-preservation often produced a 
culture in which minimally informing, bargaining or gaming against the case 
officer was regarded as an appropriate response to an information request.  Most 
respondents were content to use the word “game” to describe this in the privacy 
of the interview.  However, it is telling that an apparent taboo on acknowledging 
the existence of such a game began to lift after the event of a market crisis had 
forced participants to reconsider it:  
 
“So yes, I hear a question now that you didn‟t hear so much in the 
past, it‟s sort of: „OK, so that‟s what the regulators say; but how 
much do we care? How much do we feel we actually have to 
along with that?‟”     (SM1) 
 
SM1, who in addition to Risk Office duties headed a business within the bank, 
also discussed how regulatory engagement was missing from new product 
development.  He acknowledged that the time pressure to bring a new product to 
market is a key issue in compliance, noting a cultural “history lesson” in the 
sector: as regulators tend to be “miles behind us", it is rational to rush products 
into the market - the regulator “will catch up with us eventually but not just 
yet‟.”   (SM1) 
 
This asymmetry of timescales was a generally acknowledged control problem.  
The conventions of company financial reporting to shareholders (Power‟s 2004 
“audit rituals”) were seen as irrelevant because of their focus on quarterly or 
annual timeframes; by contrast many banking products operate either on a very 
fast (minutes), or very long (decades) timescale.  Short-termism is a related 
concern, with C16 offering a plain account of how this major control asymmetry 
supported abuse by sales people – highlighting bankers‟ own limited job tenure 




“Anyway, how do you regulate something with very long-term 
effects, that may create a risk or loss long after the people who 
thought of it are retired and putting their feet up in Barbados?”       
(C16) 
 
As noted in Chapter 3, researchers have already observed the existence of a 
conceptual gap between those who produce regulation, and those who are 
“consumers” of it (regulatory agencies and regulated actors).  In the present 
research, policymakers were seen still to be assuming that the act of producing a 
regulation itself exerts some power over the community that is to be regulated.  
Respondents suggested that this belief may have followed on from an assumed, 
but defunct, rationale of conventional command-and-control; that is, that what 
matters most to the regulatory bureaucracy is the act of creating a framework to 
acknowledge the presence of risk (Seddon, 2003).  A regulatory instrument may 
not support decisions on practical engagement with risk, although it may of 
course influence them; such decisions are left to the discretion of the regulatory 
agency tasked with day-to-day control. CROs perceived emphasis on 
“abstractions” of risk (Seddon, 2008) rather than any practical objective of 
“genuine engagement” with what regulatees actually do (Macrae, 2009).  C6 was 
unconvinced by the FSA‟s occasional attempts to overcome abstract rules by 
attaching itself to banks‟ commercial initiatives: 
 
“What we quite frequently see is the regulator basically trying to 
assess where the herd is and then taking the leading point as the 
control.  So, say the regulator perceives you (as a bank) as being 
good at doing something, they will take that as a model and push 
that around other companies. They‟ll sort of say „that‟s how 
company A does it, how do you do in comparison with that?‟.”    
(C6) 
 
C6 also suggested why this may be a naïve strategy for a regulator to adopt: 
 
“Now of course because companies A, B, C and D will talk to 
each other quite frequently, they‟re going to realise that actually 




It is reasonable to infer that, if regulatory decisions (to intervene, or not; to 
accept the validity of a risk model, or not) were based on “following the herd” – 
and that this was widely perceived by CROs to be the regulator‟s strategy for 
(dis)engagement – bankers might conclude that they had little to fear from the 
FSA.   
  
In the aftermath of the 2008 crash, there was speculation that UK financial 
regulation lacked legitimacy.  Respondents commonly criticised the FSA, in 
common with other new regulatory agencies, for having a brief devised by 
government to be performative – that is, to express power symbolically (and so 
not necessarily to exert real control).  Allied to this was a perception among 
banks that controls rested upon risk models which themselves used flawed 
assumptions.   
 
Present research responses have confirmed indications from research in other 
sectors, that the broad efficacy of enforced self-regulation is open to question on 
several fronts:  is it a demonstrable method for modifying behaviour, and if not, 
why was it ever thought to be effective in curbing powerful commercial groups?  
If the efficacy of self-regulation is uncertain at a strategic level, what other 
assumptions by regulatory policy makers are also questionable?  
  
Enforced self-regulation may engage the attention of the regulated community 
but is perhaps only a „least worst‟ way for a regulator to attempt to overcome 
problems of access and data.  It is open to abuse by sophisticated players; and, as 
here seen, may even be seen by these players as a form of invitation to regulatory 
capture (as expected by Pearce and Tombs [1990], Sparrow [2000]). 
 
Knowing that such early studies predict that flaws in implementation may be 
expected, the present research invited respondents to reflect on any practical 
ways that the regulator might better control errant behaviour.  Despite recent 
critiques of the FSA‟s implementation failures (Turner, 2009b), it would be 
misleading to characterise the respondents as generally sceptical of regulation, or 
indeed as having a non-compliant attitude.  Rather, CROs saw themselves as 




The commonly declared intention, however, remained technical compliance with 
the minimum of adjustment, to “help find ways around regulation”  (C26). 
 
Such attitudes raise the question of how well regulation, as drafted, functions 
when faced with the reality of a room full of bank traders.  A recurring theme in 
conversations with respondents was that a rule may be technically correct but fail 
in practice because it takes no account of factors that motivate traders – „tribal‟ 
loyalties following informal organizational cultures, heuristics, and affect.  
Respondents derided the argument that regulation should work because it has a 
rational value system – this is seen as a bureaucrat‟s misconception of how 
commercial organizations engage with market realities. As the “meat in the 
sandwich” (between commerce and governance) (C12), the CRO had to 
reconcile the gap between risk assessment rationalities and sales staff behaviour 
(influenced by affective factors such as fear or exuberance).  This raises the 
question of how effectively the CRO was able to engage with the bank‟s traders, 
which is addressed in the following chapter. 
 
CROs appear to be suggesting that market shocks are a natural product of flawed 
regulatory policy assumptions, typically as to risk modelling (Merton‟s [1936] 
“unanticipated consequences” of the regulatory enterprise).  The following two 
chapters will review an alternative frame, that the engagement with the regulator 
is based on collusive trading of “knowing ignorance” (McGoey, 2007), a form of 
“Game of No Game” (Cohen, 2001).  (The schedule of interview questions 
recognised this possibility, asking whether CROs might perceive such factors at 
work, either privately or emerging from dialogue with the regulator‟s case 
officers.) 
 
CROs‟ reported experiences of day-to-day encounters with the regulator, whilst 
not individually significant, when taken all together amount to a larger 
suggestion:  That it is time to change how we view banks‟ strategic engagement 
with regulator.  The past concept of “regulatory capture” now no longer seems 
sufficient to describe how completely controls fail in the practical context of a 
156 
 
vigorous commercial market.  Present findings suggest that a new notion of 
capture is needed; this notion will be developed in Chapter 8.   
 
CROs indicated that bankers see the function of regulation as not to try to 
improve behaviour but merely to install a control mechanism which may be 
pointed to for reassurance whenever public doubts arise.  As expected, this 
echoes studies in other regulated sectors which found such perceptions to be 
preconditions for various forms of partial compliance – ranging from the quasi-
compliance of “ritual audit” (Power2006) to  more aggressive forms of coping 
strategies played against enforcers (such as Hood‟s “control bargains and 
cheating” [2002]; or Bloor and Samson‟s “market-fixing activities” [2009]). 
 
Banks, as seen (and of course represented) by CROs, appeared to care little that 
outsiders regard their staff as selfish opportunists.  Yet it would be dangerous to 
assume that the banking sector is entirely driven by selfish opportunism.  CROs 
perceived a “public good” component of regulation as being fulfilled by a two-
stage process, with regulation as a game played with a commercial first round, 
kept in check by a regulatory second round of catch-up, after some time lag: 
 
“The way that wholesale financial markets work is simply that the 
real margin of profit is to be made out of instruments which are 
brand new, before they become commoditised.  So by definition 
they are developed before other people, including regulators, can 
understand them.”  (C16) 
 
Two CROs estimated this time lag as up to two years.   
 
Although this and other tactics of “playing the grey” (C3) are widely noted by 
respondents, these are not seen as necessarily engaging in as a cynical 
manoeuvre; more as a commercially pragmatic response where an under-
resourced regulator is unable to keep track of fast moving product development 
in an aggressive and global market. Respondents offer a common rationale that 
this is merely how wholesale banking markets go about their business:  the 
essence of technical and highly mathematical banking instruments is to take 
advantage of uncertainties and anticipate developments by superimposing risk 
157 
 
value judgements.  With this motivation in mind, it is appropriate here to move 
on to examine more closely the CRO‟s experience of dealing with the bank‟s 
salespeople who make these judgements.   
 
Where this chapter has established that the regulator‟s demands may be 
“gamed”, the following chapter will therefore consider the role of sales staff as a 
possible source of the pressure to introduce alternative coping strategies.  The 
possible involvement of senior management as a further source of pressure will 




 CHAPTER 6:  CROs’ RELATIONSHIPS WITH TRADERS 
 
“Just because one has committed an infraction of a rule does not 
mean that others will respond as though this has happened.  
…Formal rules …may differ from those actually thought 
appropriate by most people.” 
      (Becker, 1963)  
 
6.1  Introduction: CROs engaging with bank staff; the 
formal and informal organization 
Where chapter 5 considered how CROs interact with the regulator, this chapter 
considers how CROs interact with bank staff.  A CRO‟s relationship with bank 
staff may be expected to influence the tension between the CRO and the 
regulator observed in the previous chapter. Chapter 6 will review CROs‟ 
experiences with bank staff to consider this influence. 
 
A particular focus of interest here is the nature of interactions between the CRO, 
as head of the bank‟s Risk Management staff, head of the entire back-office 
apparatus of book keeping, risk review and regulatory compliance, and traders
27
.  
Traders are the group of staff that the CRO is appointed to control, yet the 
practical control of traders is far from straightforward.  It is found to be, in 
practice, considerably harder than might have been expected, given the apparent 
authority vested in a CRO role. This chapter explores some factors which may 
have rendered attempts at control less effective than intended.  It will question 
the extent to which a forceful but informal group within the organization traders 
in banks might influence the overall response of the organization – that is, banks‟ 
traders – towards proposed risk controls. 
 
As found in other regulated organizations, one might expect to find banks 
responding to demands for compliance and greater risk control with various 
forms of creative coping strategy.  The CRO‟s personal experiences of 
                                                 
27
 “Traders” is here used as a summary term to include sales, marketing and product development 
staff; also collectively known as the “front office”. 
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compliance responses among sales staff indicate how their employer 
organization defines its engagement with regulation in practice.   
 
Negotiations about compliance occur between regulator and CRO (as seen in 
Chapter 5) and also between traders and compliance staff.  Regulators are seen as 
open to negotiation, with the chance to strike a control bargain.  Traders and 
CROs might be expected to perceive that the regulator is vulnerably dependent 
on such negotiations; this chapter will report whether this was found to be the 
case.  
 
6.2  CROs negotiating traders’ compliance:  What is 
supposed to happen? 
Before examining the evidence of what occurs in practice, it is useful to consider 
briefly how the CRO‟s requests to traders may be expected to work.  Any 
deviations from the expected process may then be more readily apparent. 
 
As the controller of the bank‟s public reports of risk exposures, the CRO has a 
direct interest in encouraging traders to adopt best practice in risk management, 
such as by adhering to agreed exposure limits, or raising early any concerns 
about unexpected product performance.  The CRO may reasonably expect to ask 
traders to produce risk information supporting these aims.  Some examples of 
relevant information requests follow. 
 
6.2.1  What information can the CRO ask traders to produce?  
Summarised from CROs‟ own broadly consistent descriptions of their work, this 
subsection outlines how a CRO and a trader are intended to interact in the 
normal course of business; the remainder of this chapter will then report and 
review actual interactions. 
 
The CRO expects to receive from traders, and is authorised to ask them for, 
routine information about the bank‟s exposure in terms of its trading positions 
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and products.  At its simplest, this is information about the value and volumes of 
trades (sales) undertaken and the structures of the financial instruments traded. 
 
At a higher level, the CRO is also tasked with overseeing, and is expected by the 
Board and the FSA to be instrumental in setting, monetary and risk limits on 
trading.  In discussion with the bank‟s Finance department and the heads of 
trading desks, the CRO may determine on the bank‟s behalf how much risk is 
acceptable to have tied up in any one product or trading activity.  CROs seek to 
achieve control by setting “book limits” for each trader – that is, to limit the total 
monetary value of product that any one trader or desk may have contracted for in 
their financial market at any one time.  Exceeding book limit is a potentially 
serious offence for a trader. 
 
As well as such controls exerted through the bank‟s own management accounts, 
the CRO uses tools formally recognised by the regulator as appropriate for risk 
control.  The FSA and other relevant authorities (such as the Basel global agency 
specifying Capital Adequacy standards) prescribe certain formats of risk test for 
a bank to use to show that risk-taking is at a level deemed acceptable to the 
public interest.  Among these, most CROs (see chapter 5) refer first to the 
regulatory capital standard, also known as capital adequacy, a control specifying 
how much of its own money, as a proportion of its capital, the bank must hold on 
account as a safeguard – that is, a form of self-insurance in the event that the 
bank‟s trades incur big losses.  Other compliance tools include various forms of 
test for risk exposure, such as stress testing, where a product is run through a 
series of (simulated) trades based on possible changes in trading conditions.  The 
stress test is a “what if?” scenario designed to challenge any unsound 
assumptions in the product‟s design or sales approach.  Another common form of 
test, trading simulation, involves running a large number of trades to see if a 
product‟s performance might deviate from the risk expectations designed into it; 
this form of testing (known as “Monte Carlo” analysis) is based on the 
assumption that simply increasing the volume of trading will help to flush out 




Traders are familiar with these forms of statutory test and with requests to 
provide routine trading and product design information to support them.  In a 
well-governed bank the CRO might reasonably expect traders to respond to 
requests for risk information by opening their trading books, or product designs, 
to the CRO‟s scrutiny.  
 
As will be seen, in practice the pressures of trading may mean that responses will 
not be immediate but may still be expected in reasonable time.  In the event that 
a CRO does not receive a compliant response, there are several options for 
pursuing the request for information, considered below. 
                   
6.2.2  Ordinary remedies when traders are unresponsive 
Although there may be an unresolvable tension between market-making and 
risk-restraining actors, there may also sometimes be valid reasons why a member 
of staff such as a trader cannot immediately comply with a senior manager‟s 
request for risk information.  The staff member may be away from their desk in a 
meeting, on holiday, or genuinely preoccupied with urgent business..  If, in the 
ordinary course of business, a trader does not respond to a CRO‟s information 
request, there are ordinary management controls which may be used to chase up 
the (apparent) non-compliance.  First, the CRO may simply repeat the request, 
perhaps with an incentive to encourage a compliant response, or a threat against 
continued non-compliance.  
 
If the trader continues to resist the request, or the level of information offered 
seems inadequate to the CRO, back office may seek other managers‟ support, 
initially from the manager of the trading team, then from senior management; 
typically, first, the Finance Director, then possibly also the Chief Executive.  
One respondent (C25) refers to this as “obtaining air cover”.  The CRO may also 
enlist general management (Board-level) support in the event that resistance to 




Finally, in the perhaps unlikely event that the Board does not offer support, as a 
public reporting officer the CRO has the option – at least in theory – of calling 
on outside support in the form of the FSA. 
 
As indicated by respondents, these are the formally organized options for 
escalating management of a problem; they are unremarkable as a set of 
management procedures.  However, as banks may have distinctive ways of 
invoking and responding to these procedures in practice, the rest of this chapter 
will now consider factors shaping how the risk reporting system is used in 
reality. 
 
6.2.3  Do structural tensions influence traders‟ responsiveness?  
Before moving on to review specific accounts of incidents, it is relevant to note 
the structural factors underlying this tension.  The following is a summary of the 
factors as respondents have characterised them.   
 
Whilst it is certainly not news to any CRO that there is organizational tension 
between commercial “front office” people and compliance “back office” people 
in any bank, this research reveals some striking and characteristic occurrences of 
this tension as experienced through routine interactions.  Again, all respondents 
saw this tension as an expected, even normal feature of working in a bank (in 
C15‟s phrase, having a “separate back office function”).  This is regarded as part 
of the business culture of banking, informing both conversations between 
employees and any dialogue with the regulator.  The structural factors that 
underpin these tensions follow.  
 
Sales-side staff, here collectively referred to as traders, are incentivised to sell, 
with large cash bonuses.  This conditions their approach to the job to the point 
where their prime, or even only, motivation is to make sales.  CROs perceive  
that traders may regard any other demand on their time, such as making a 
compliance report, as irrelevant; harder still to try to engage a trader in a 
discussion about an issue which may or may not become a sensitive point with 
the regulator.  when a colleague of C4 suggested to traders that it would be good 
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for relations with the regulator if they would kindly volunteer to report sales of a 
new product in greater detail, the suggestion was dismissed: 
 
“They were being warned and it was ignored.  He had to start 
lobbying, but he had real trouble making a watertight argument 
because it wasn‟t a binary, yes-or-no thing, more just that any 
sensible person would have gone along with it.”   (C4) 
 
The trader‟s task as an employee is defined in narrow terms as generating sales 
and avoiding incurring short-term trading losses.  A concern expressed by 
several respondents (C11, C23, C27) is that the trader role is designed to exclude 
responsibility for costs of sales, meaning the routine running costs of the 
business including office overheads and, significantly, costs of regulatory 
compliance.   
 
As employers, banks have thus intentionally designed the role of traders as 
insulated from any concerns about management costs – the intention being to 
focus all efforts on selling, with minimal distractions of book-keeping.  One 
effect of this role definition is to create an informal group culture of front office 
employees within a bank.  As described by C34, front office see themselves as 
“the people who sell”, and who may further define their role by what it does not 
do: any concern with “housekeeping”: 
 
“Trading desks may fix specific bits of noncompliance but don‟t 
make much attempt to consider why anything went wrong in the 
first place.”   (C34) 
 
One may regard this arrangement as a form of constructed optimism bias.  This 
bias may be compounded by a factor which respondent CROs commonly noted:  
that the demands of high-stakes selling attract a certain personality profile, 
described variously as “assertive” (C15) or even “bullying” (C5).  Moreover, 
CROs observed traders to attach more significance to achieving personal sales 
than any sense of the collective interest.  In any event the “collective interest is 
seen not to extend beyond the trading team” (C27).  Traders regard selling as 
“doing what the business wants” (C11); their outlook does not extend as far as 
the collective interests of the whole bank (employees, shareholders), nor as far as 
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the “orderly markets” which the regulator is required to supervise on behalf of 
society at large. 
 
Instead, traders‟ risk-taking is limited by more immediate and personal factors: 
their book limits; possible disapproval from a team leader; and fear of only one 
risk, short-term loss on a “bad trade”.  As a result the prospect of any loss other 
than one arising in the current (typically three-month) reporting window is not a 
deterrent, as the employer bank measures traders‟ success in terms of short-term 
volumes of product sold into the market. 
 
Where the trader‟s role may be interpreted as one of constructed optimism as it 
internalises the profit motive, the CRO role entails constructed pessimism.  The 
CRO is tasked with containing risk, which includes factoring in costs of sales 
(for example the costs of resourcing a compliance office, and the losses incurred 
on any trades which lose value over any timescale longer than the short term).  In 
marked contrast to the trader, the CRO routinely factors in and has to reflect on 
considerations of cost and public accountability.  Where the trader is largely 
protected from public scrutiny, the CRO routinely has to face the Board, and the 
regulator, to answer for risks taken.  It is self-evident that this asymmetry in 
personal responsibility for risks taken has the potential to create significant 
tension between traders and the CRO.  That potential, and practical experiences 
of it in action, is a key concern of the current chapter.   
 
Not all CROs accepted this, somewhat introverted, trading culture as found.  
Some described setting up outreach programmes to engage with traders and 
engender a broader understanding of business and enterprise risk, as opposed to 
market (that is, trading) risk.  C1 set up a “risk ambassadors” programme 
recruiting staff from all divisions for risk-awareness training.  C34 sent out a 
series of internal circulars “promoting risk-awareness” with the notion that 
“risk management is not just a task for specialist risk analysts; 
everyone in the business has a responsibility for it.”  (C34)   
 
From the evidence of respondents‟ experiences, those banks that had set up such 
“risk ambassador” programmes (C1) were the ones which best weathered the 
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2008 crash.  C3 for example described a “culture change programme” of 
seminars for traders to “make the [trading] floor more sensitive”, which  
“did get some results, I think.  It increased the sensitivity to these 
problems.  So you go through the exercise, you explain it to 
people, and the smart people will get it.  Some [business units] are 
better than others, conveying the message with strength and 
taking the message seriously.”   (C3)    
 
While respondents could choose to seek support from senior management, the 
Board or even call in the FSA, such remedies might be expected to be regarded 
as a last resort.  Seeking help from the regulator, in particular, was commonly 
regarded as a “nuclear option” (C16) with potentially career-damaging 
consequences.  Given the structures outlined above, one might expect to find 
some invoking of senior internal support, as a less optimal coping strategy, rather 
than risking more direct detriment to their careers.  This raises the related 
question of research expectations regarding the role of the Board, which is now 
considered.  
 
6.2.4  Note concerning the expected role of the Board 
Given the, somewhat skewed, weight of responsibility that the CRO bears for 
identifying and reporting risk, one might expect the Board to offer solid support 
whenever the CRO needs to resolve any risk issues arising from the trading 
floor.  At Board level, however, once again the CRO experience of engagement 
with risk issues deviates from the (idealised) construct of the control system, in 
ways which demand closer study.    
 
In fact, the Board‟s engagement with risk reporting is found by this research to 
be so strongly influenced by the informal organization and private incentives that 
it will be given a separate chapter to itself (see chapter 7).  The rest of the current 




6.3  What happens in practice: Negotiating compliance  
6.3.1  Control system ideals versus routine experience 
The previous section outlined options available for a CRO to take action to 
secure traders‟ compliance with requests for information.  The remainder of this 
section (6.3) now revisits each of the options from section 6.2.2, to reconsider 
and illustrate each one with CROs‟ narrated accounts of the responses actually 
received. 
 
At the end of the chapter, CROs‟ responses to these responses are also 
considered:  that is, the further options that a CRO might try to pursue in any 
subsequent attempts to manage non-compliant responses.  Raised here, but 
examined in detail in the chapter 7, is the related central question of whether a 
CRO‟s appeal for senior management support may be expected to achieve a 
positive outcome for risk control when ordinary attempts fail. 
 
6.3.2  Asking for information about risk: Regulatory capital 
manipulation, “structuring out” and other “ambushes” 
As noted, a key responsibility of the CRO is to produce a headline figure for the 
bank‟s Regulatory Capital and to publish this to the regulator.  Unfortunately for 
the CRO, following the description of systemic tensions with traders (see 6.2.3), 
it is evident that traders resent any back-office intervention which interrupts the 
flow of cash available for trading activity.  Several CROs, and notably C11 who 
discussed this concern at length, reported that regulatory capital is widely 
regarded by front offices as “a wasted asset” (C11); that is, potentially tradeable 
cash tied up by regulatory bureaucracy.  This source of conflict is a recurrent 
theme in interviews when discussing the subject of interactions with front office 
(and with Finance departments – again, see chapter 7).  
 
Traders‟ resistance to engaging with CROs‟ requests for support in reporting 
regulatory capital comes in many forms.  First, the front office may reject the 
CRO as a person who need not be taken seriously because he lacks direct 
experience of product development.  For example C8 recalls what happened after 
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she arrived in a new post and attempted to justify information requests on the, 
fairly straightforward, grounds that the information needed to be fed into the risk 
models which the bank used to calculate regulatory capital: 
“Whenever I moved around in the front office environment there 
was a lot of feedback about the Risk Office relying on 
econometrics too much.  We were looking at the [regulatory 
capital adequacy] numbers, for Basle, and fingers were pointing 
upwards to us saying „they don‟t quite understand our business, 
they‟re coming up with this number but we don‟t understand 
where it comes from‟.  As Risk Officer you do get used to that.”
  (C8) 
 
This sense of frustrated reasonable expectations is a recurrent theme which 
CROs quickly factor into their approach to the role.  Many describe adapting 
their behaviour, at first, to engage in minor tactics to conciliate with traders, such 
as by appealing to a sense of common purpose within the bank.  One approach, 
described by C7, is to suggest to the front office that “life would be simpler for 
everybody” if disparate risk reporting lines were combined, to reduce the number 
of requests for information: 
“Arriving as CRO, what I tried to do was make sure that all the 
separate risk functions were seen as one risk function.  There had 
been definite distinctions for example between compliance, 
operational risk and financial crime, even if they‟d been reporting 
to the same person.” (C7) 
 
Where C7 attempted to succeed by making common cause with the traders, 
others such as C15 viewed such interaction was a form of “game” to be played, 
of anticipating the traders‟ next move,.  C15 challenged the resistance of traders 
by  
“not becoming part of their game but by trying to understand the 
game so that we can see where there‟s a more rational answer 
than gaming [the risk controls].  I‟m trying to get back into the 
business and understand why they‟re trying to [game].  Then 
saying, actually there‟s a simpler solution which is that we‟ll get 
it right, let‟s fix it rather than play a game.” (C15) 
 
For C15 the tactic was to find, or otherwise create, an objective which the traders 
could  support.  By contrast, C7 argues that this approach can only work if the 
168 
 
front office involves the CRO in dialogue about product sales and development 
in the first place.  For C7, as for many other respondents, there was an 
unwelcome moment of discovery that that they had been “structured out” of 
product development discussions, either by not being invited at all, or by being 
asked so late in the development process that their opinion might be disregarded.  
A common concern was the likeliohood of discovering a problem with a new 
product only 
“after the events, because you haven‟t been in there [product 
development meetings] understanding and trying to pre-empt 
[risk] stuff that is bubbling away where it‟s very easy for those 
(product development) people to hide it.”    (C7) 
 
Another commonly experienced form of pre 2008 exclusion was for front offices 
to acknowledge that risk reporting is necessary but either to appoint directly or 
adopt from the back office a member of staff willing to support traders‟ 
requirements.  Many respondents recount the experience, again soon after being 
appointed to their role, of finding unwelcome surprises on entering the front 
office.  C12 recalls his bank‟s trading floor being literally inaccessible to any 
non-trader staff, having its own security-sealed suite in a basement,  
“out of sight of any of our retail banking staff – and of course me, 
at that point”   (C12) 
 
Two sources also reported, anecdotally, the case of a bank where there were two 
separate tiers of lifts in the office block; one with access to the trading floor, the 
other with access to the back office, and crucially neither one having access to 
the other department‟s workspace.   
C27 offered several alarming personal examples of “arrival week surprises”, 
some of which show extreme forms of direct structural challenge to the CRO‟s 
authority.  First, the front office simply assumed authority over a back office 
function (such as, here, credit lines – that is, the back-office limit on how much 
credit any one trader may risk in the market): 
“There was a „guru‟ in the front office who no one understood but 
he was somehow running the credit lines in the front office – and 
later of course we found he had built a model that hid all the front 




Second, when its new team of traders took direct action to create their own 
management systems, the same bank discovered that back office (and senior 
management) could be “ambushed” by ambitious traders into accepting a risk 
already taken.  C27 again: 
 
“The bank had hired in a lot of new „top traders‟ from big-name 
US banks, as they wanted to build an investment bank.  The old 
school, agricultural-bank guys on the Board were pushing back a 
bit but the trading guys would go in and blind them with numbers 
and cash returns.  There was an obvious gap not just in culture but 
in processing speed between the old, slow, steady back-office 
processing and the high speed the new traders wanted.  With a 
new trading floor the traders suddenly started trading lots of 
swaps.  The [back office] settlement team, who were used to 
processing just a few swaps contracts a day, started screaming at 
each other.  Then the settlement team started trying to hold the 
trading team to ransom, while the trading team just pressed on 
with a whole lot more [trades], but these looked like losing money 
because they‟d be fined for not settling correctly.”     (C27) 
 
Such extreme cases aside, respondents commonly cited examples of their 
employer bank empowering traders to take on a view of risk which should, they 
felt, be the CRO‟s function.  A similar, if more structurally embedded, surprise 
greeted C11, this time in the form of the prevailing culture around the purpose 
and significance of risk information in general: 
“I found that this bank encourages junior risk managers to make 
soft assumptions about risks”     (C11) 
 
– that is, junior back office staff were encouraged to adjust risk control models 
towards commercially favourable outcomes.  Meanwhile the front-office product 
developers in the same bank  
“…mostly treat with contempt any set of risk measures.  They see 
measures of risk as designed for „compliance‟, meaning for the 
back office to play with, rather than to protect the bank‟s 




The key to getting co-operation, for some, lay in building some form of strategic 
alliance with a “front office-type person”, says C7, who for a while after arrival 
had been finding that there were   
“constantly cases where we needed to extract information from 
some particular group of people that they weren‟t willing to share.  
Eventually I [co-opted] a senior product manager and then I was 
beginning to get traction.”   (C7) 
 
Traders told some respondents that the risks taken by one trading team need not 
be significant to the bank as a whole as they could be “diluted within the bank‟s 
aggregate figure for regulatory capital” (C24).  Clearly, though, if every trading 
team were to take the attitude that any local problems may be concealed within a 
larger figure for headline risk, this would build up into a real danger that the 
headline risk (regulatory capital) figure may end up hiding a significantly larger 
problem of unacknowledged risk-taking.  This is one reason why newly 
appointed CROs described spending much of their time seeking to clarify, for 
their own peace of mind, where the components of the regulatory capital figure 
come from.  Meanwhile longer-serving, and thus perhaps more jaded, CROs 
recognised that one way to make their own lives significantly easier was to 
succumb to front-office demands to manipulate the regulatory capital figure to 
keep it artificially low. 
As noted in 6.2.3, purely in terms of management responsibility traders do not 
need to concern themselves with regulatory capital reporting.  In fact, an even 
bigger concern for the bank as a business is its economic capital cost (or 
“business risk”) – that is, what it costs to fund the capital required to support the 
day-to-day operation of the whole bank.  Business risk is a feature of the internal 
management accounts, and is reported in moderated form in the year-end report 
of the bank as a public company, but this information does not concern traders.  
The only type of capital that concerns them, because they see any increase in it 
as effectively reducing cash available for trading, is the “technically prescribed, 
constructed and manipulable” (C24) figure for regulatory capital.  CROs 
themselves broadly acknowledged that regulatory capital is a construct, artificial 
and misleading:  




Nevertheless, front offices consistently demanded that CROs commit to lowering 
their bank‟s regulatory capital, and would provide information in forms that 
supported this aim.  Some went even further, such as by “going freelance” on 
risk, as C27 recalls, with an account of finding that one front-office team had 
appointed its own attached risk manager, who on closer examination was found 
to be   
“responsible for measuring risk for more than 50% of the bank‟s 
wholesale assets.  And this guy was being rewarded – with 
bonuses – according to how much he managed to reduce 
regulatory capital.”       (C27)        
 
The tension over regulatory capital highlights a contradiction at the heart of the 
CRO role:  For many banks, the CRO is there to help make a business case.  Yet 
the lowering of regulatory capital, often by means of CRO-endorsed 
manipulation, increases risk to the public:  Just as Northern Rock, the Scottish 
banks and others found in 2007-8, if a bank‟s trades go bad and it is 
undercapitalised, only a takeover or a bail-out from the public purse can rescue 
it.  CROs here admit to bearing some responsibility by succumbing to front 
office pressure to reveal less risk by maintaining accounting procedures which 
separated sales from headline figures. 
 
The reported figure for risk capital may be “constructed” (C24) by the CRO to 
allow a bank to keep separate the true results of sales activity (net profit, or 
margin) from the headline sales figure.  This reporting sleight-of-hand 
encourages front office teams to continue to claim superior status within the 
bank, as revenue generators meriting respect and support from everyone else.  
Although CROs recognise the problem, few are willing to mount a personal 
challenge to the embedded culture of sales reporting.  A common perception was 
that traders appreciated a CRO‟s efforts to reduce regulatory capital because this 
freed up more funds for traders to place in the market:.    
“As CRO I was told that my job was to reduce regulatory capital, 
pure and simple. Anything else was a side-show.”      (C4) 
 
If requests for day-to-day financial data could be routinely blocked, it might be 
expected that the CRO could seek to achieve greater success by applying 
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pressure elsewhere, such as by managing risk through the setting and monitoring 
aggregate targets for acceptable risk-taking.  The following subsection reviews 
respondents‟ experiences of taking this approach.  
 
6.3.3  Setting risk limits: “after the event” and ineffectual?   
When attempting to set a limit on levels of acceptable risk that traders could 
take, the CRO might perhaps have been expected to take comfort in the 
knowledge that this was executing a direct instruction both from senior 
management and the regulator:  to prevent the bank from slipping into 
“overtrading”; that is, to prevent it taking bigger market risks than it can fund 
from its own capital resources. 
However, as seen in earlier sections, because regulatory risk reports also rely 
upon the cooperation of traders in the verification of figures, some difficulties 
were encountered in practice.  First among these was the matter of timely 
reporting.  For the front office, compiling figures on trading volumes and risk 
profiles was regarded as a secondary activity to the primary matter of making 
sales.  The regulatory analysis of risk was also seen as less important than the 
practical testing of risks by markets (that is, by making sales and observing the 
result).  Regulatory risk reports were criticised as being retrospective, rather than 
having any significance “in the moment” where the financial markets judge 
values.  C6 explained this with an analogy: 
“Front office take a much more, sort of, „speed camera‟ approach 
to risk.  It‟s kind of „don‟t get caught, then it‟s fine‟.  Except that 
it‟s your job to take photos!  Whereas [back office] are geared up 
to taking the „health and safety‟ view, why they don‟t want to do 
things, and agree the rules defining where they want to be.”     
 (C6)   
 
As seen with regulatory capital reporting, the construction of regulatory risk 
reporting for individual products was, say respondents, regarded by sales staff as 
a matter for negotiation between product developers and CROs.  Sometimes 
even a negotiated agreement was seen as an afterthought, the main thrust being 
to get a product into the market.  Respondents pointed to this as one of several 
tactics used by front office to restrict the impact of the CRO on trading activity.  
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Product developers, said C26, could get the product risk profile they wanted by 
“cherry-picking” information to support their case.  Product teams were found to 
be meeting targets by 
“just pre-defining a population that was achievable.  You‟d 
superimpose criteria that excluded things that might be 
inconvenient... Like, „I‟m going to include this counterparty 
because they‟re clearly my friend‟.  It‟s kind of about finding the 
information you need, rather than just it naturally being there.”   
  (C26) 
 
C20 suggested that this behaviour prevailed because there was little systemic 
encouragement to consider loss-making consequences in a marketplace that 
focuses on short-term turnover – that is, simple headline sales.  The “virtuality” 
of financial products was, he said a significant factor, removing traders from any 
real sense of making profits and losses: 
 
“In the tangible world of goods, if you don‟t make something that 
works, you‟re found out very quickly.  But in our intangible world 
of promises you can lose „risk failures‟, or whatever you want to 
call them, for a very long time before they come home to roost.”       
(C20) 
 
Many front offices appeared to view public risk controls as something to be 
added on after a product had been specified.  There was seen to be a bias in 
action against engaging the CRO in dialogue about risk whilst the product is 
under development.  Respondents referred to this problem in various ways.  C27, 
C15 and C34‟s points illustrate the same, widely perceived, problem of their 
non-involvement in product design:  
“Risk systems have not been designed to anticipate risk but as an 
„after the event‟ task to satisfy the rules and ensure there was an 
audit trail to show the bank had acted within the rules.” (C27) 
 
“Even when you‟ve got a separate back-office risk function that 
does model validation or model running, they‟re still aligned too 
much with the business… [there‟s] inadequate challenge, not 
enough questioning of what goes on in those models, the huge 




“Risk office were just [expected to be] reactive to incidents and 
struggled to follow up [design] issues.”  (C34) 
 
Before moving to consider what happens when a CRO invokes internal (Board) 
or external (FSA) support when traders do not comply with requests for 
information, it is relevant to note that the personality of the CRO is also seen as 
having a potentially significant impact on interactions with traders.  A CRO may 
approach a front-office negotiation in various ways, which respondents broadly 
summarise into three approaches:  First, using robust demand and challenge; 
second, using gentle pressure for incremental change; third, trying to 
accommodate with existing practice (which approach may, over time, turn into 
simple acquiescence). 
 
Out of all CRO respondents, two were notable as CROs who had previously 
been traders, and were accorded a higher level of respect (and reportedly 
compliance) than others, although the respondent base is too small a number for 
this to be statistically significant.  For the rest, given an apparent tactical choice 
between robust challenge, incremental change, and acquiescence, many reported 
the experience as being pushed by the prevailing culture towards acquiescence.  
Some, such as C11 here, attempted to rationalise this as bowing gracefully to an 
unbeatable commercial pressure: 
 
“It can help to be quite focused on commercial outcomes if you‟re 
in a risk analysis area.  Why?  Because you‟re doing what the 
business wants.”         (C11) 
 
Some selected their response according to how willingly they expected to find 
engagement with certain different personality types encountered in the front 
office.  C5 acknowledged that  
“…you always have to worry if the product leader is a big, 
bullying kind of character, as then it becomes quite difficult to 
stand up to.”     (C5) 
 
Sometimes, differences in interpretation of compliance requests were ascribed to 





“The (back office) head of credit risk thought I was there to bring 
in controls and remove credit review from the front office; the 
traders thought I was there to confirm what they were doing and 
sign it off.”       (C27) 
 
The commercial imperative came not just from the trading floor but from an 
attitude of management higher up the bank hierarchy.  Selling was seen in the 
context of reporting corporate success, as C7 discovered as a legacy from his 
predecessor, calling into question the role of senior management in endorsing 
consequence-free sales activity.  Sales staff told C7 that  
“…the key objective here is to get as many of these new 
mortgages as we can on the books, to drive profitability. We 
realise that there are some flaws but that‟s not the priority for us.”
        (C7) 
 
C7 concluded that his predecessor had 
“somehow got carried along in this tidal wave of enthusiasm for 
profit, he sort of backed down from the issue to the point where 
some things started to go badly wrong.”       (C7) 
 
The role of senior management in relation to this culture will be examined in 
Chapter 7.  Meanwhile, the next subsection considers the CRO‟s options for 
engendering a more supportive response to internal compliance requests. 
 
6.3.4  Internal attempts to enforce compliance: three possible 
strategies emerge   
For the CRO attempting to achieve change, whether by major overhaul or 
through a series of smaller steps towards improvement, the challenge was seen as 
being how to react to an initial non-compliant response:  what should be the next 
move?   
Rather than immediately calling for senior management support, many 
respondents recognised that a second personal attempt to obtain compliance 
might give the traders a sign that the CRO expected not to be contradicted; that a 
more robust personality was at work.  If the aim was to earn traders‟ respect, this 
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strategy of returning to the challenge in practice achieved mixed results.  Some 
respondents then sought to deflect criticism by making allowances (that is, 
excuses) for front office staff hostility:  traders simply “get too busy” (C27); 
although the bank had a “great governance framework… [respect for it] on the 
front office side of the house does fall down rather” (C10); that compliance 
demands do not accommodate “the harsh realities of the commercial world” 
(C18).  A more reflective, and less evasive, explanation of why front offices 
succeed in rebuffing the CRO is that compliance requests are simply reconceived 
and then discounted “over time [as] just a process, just a piece of paper that 
doesn‟t mean anything” (C27).  
The challenge facing the CRO was thus to get these “pieces of paper” to have 
greater meaning.  C17 suggested that a CRO should consider the challenge in 
terms of how to communicate to traders one‟s attitude towards being appointed 
CRO in the first place.  Whether traders perceive the CRO as having authority is  
“a function of how you approach the (CRO) job.  If you‟re there 
just to count the beans, perhaps you‟re not going to do yourself 
any favours.  If you‟re there to add value in terms of new product 
design, maybe you‟re accorded greater respect.”      (C17) 
 
A willingness to acknowledge frankly the bank‟s commercial agenda, then, was 
seen by banking colleagues as a strength, whilst an adherence to regulatory 
compliance dogma tended not to win any allies.  For most CROs, making 
progress was a matter of accepting and working around the reality that they were 
nominally in a senior role yet in practice had little authority beyond what they 
could create for themselves through the use of charm, robust (ideally ex-trader) 
credentials or otherwise mere force of personality.  C20 defined the problem as a 
matter of how to make sense of, and move on from, one‟s personal experiences.  
Being given “nominal authority to intervene within the organization” did not 
result in an “experience that that authority is real”  (C20). 
 
The problem of achieving real, exercisable authority was defined by respondents 
as processing how the encounters with the front office escalate, either as to co-
operation or confrontation.  The following experiences illustrate some 
experiences of points on a notional “scale of compliance” ranging between full 
support and outright defiance; this notional scale is expanded upon in Chapter 8.  
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At the optimistic end of the scale, C20 was a challenger of the status quo and 
who experienced a violent reaction when he carried this challenge into the 
Boardroom (see Chapter 7).  C20‟s approach to his engagement was clear, 
robust, and showed a realistic appreciation of the challenges faced by a CRO in 
confronting the incentive structures that determine traders‟ behaviour.  Traders 
will “do things” (such as comply with a request for risk information) if 
“they think there is a negative if they don‟t do them and a positive 
if they do do them.  So:  we paid bankers to grow assets and what 
have they done?  They‟ve grown assets.  Amen.”   
   (C20) 
 
C6 described the challenge to the CRO as being to maintain the ability to give an 
objective opinion, and not to “go native in the front office”.  Both C20 and C6 
did not see this formidable hurdle as an excuse to capitulate to front office 
interests.  The front office was though found to be quite ready to use its technical 
knowledge and practical experience to undermine the authority of a CRO who 
tried to engage with it.  C15 found that product developers‟ disengagement from 
responsibility for risk reporting could be 
“quite assertive, reinforced by the technical expertise of the 
people that developed the [product‟s risk] model because nobody 
else really understands it.  They‟ll say, well this [risk office] guy 
is asking these questions because he doesn‟t really understand it.”  
  (C15) 
 
Meanwhile, at the opposite end of the scale, capitulation could appear as an 
attractive option for any CRO less keen than C20 to seek a personal profile as a 
campaigner for corporate probity (and more keen, perhaps, to regard acceptance 
of their salary as fair compensation for offering “flexible ethics” or “business 
support” services as required by the employer).  For the CRO who capitulated to 
commercial interests, the hope was merely that nothing embarrassing will 
happen to the bank during their tenure.  In any event, following the market 
shocks of 2007-8, according to several respondents, as many as one in three 
CROs found themselves seeking new employment.  Whether these were victims 
or perpetrators of manipulative risk reports may never be known. 
 
In the present research no CRO has described taking up their appointment with 
an initial strategy of capitulation.  Most, however, do describe a process of 
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gradually or suddenly discovering an alternative reality of (non)compliance, 
starting soon after their arrival in role, after which they found themselves forced 
to reconsider their options for adapting to this reality.  If strongly signalled by 
front office – or, as will be seen in chapter 7, others in the organization – that 
they could not beat the system, they might elect to survive by accepting this and 
adapting their own behavioural responses to this commercial reality.  C4 recalled 
a sensation of “sliding down an ethical slope” after finding a systemic risk 
reporting problem which was  
“clear to me [but] no-one felt much like challenging it, with 
bonuses coming.  You‟re basically being bought.  So you say to 
yourself: „There may have been something going on there but I 
don‟t think that was a real driving thing, I‟m just part of this 
process, there‟ll always be someone else who must know what 
he‟s talking about if I don‟t‟.”   (C4) 
 
In this case, the CRO invoked a form of denial also observed in some 
Boardrooms during the latest banking crisis, and a notable factor in earlier crises 
such as the Barings crash of 1995: The belief – or more correctly, hope – was 
that someone else in the room had a better technical understanding of the risk 
which was engulfing them.  In a CRO, as in a Board of Directors, this is in 
practice an abdication of responsibility.  The last word in this subsection should 
go to respondent C5 who agreed, with several other respondents, to a follow-up 
interview late in 2008, as and after the market crashed, accepting that this was 
“exercising 20-20 hindsight”: 
 
“With assertiveness, as CRO you‟re rather caught between a rock 
and a hard place.  Several CROs [after the crash] say if only they 
could have seen what was ahead in the market place they would 
have been a lot more assertive with senior people in their 
businesses.  I‟d say yes, CROs have failed in that we just weren‟t 
as assertive as we should have been.”  (C5) 
 
6.3.5  Invoking senior management support 
Failure to secure a positive response to information requests from traders 
ultimately might require the CRO to appeal to higher authorities for support.  
This would not ordinarily be seen to be a very significant step; the CRO might 
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reasonably expect senior management support for some routine demands.  Some 
positive experiences are noted here to illustrate that this course of action need not 
be exceptional, either as a strategy or in the results which it delivers.  However, 
as there was also a significant potential for other (unexpected and unwanted)  
results, these other outcomes are reviewed separately in Chapter 7. 
 
Any invoking by the CRO of other authority had the potential to be interpreted 
by traders as a loss of authority by the CRO, so requests for support were 
carefully considered and executed.  Three positive experiences here make the 
point that this option could be successfully pursued, although a fourth 
respondent, C15, also points to a “sting in the tail” which is further explored in 
the next chapter. 
 
C22, first, advocated taking “rational argument” as far as possible with traders to 
get a response, but if that failed, not to hesitate to  
“use the Board level to say „look, when the head of wholesale 
banking says you‟ve got to do it, you‟ve got to do it‟.” (C22) 
 
As a former trader, with the added authority that that experience conferred, C25 
might have been expected to have less reason than other CROs to call on senior 
support.  Yet he was a strong advocate for using this tactic, which he (with some 
others) referred to as „air cover‟, as a way of forcing traders to acknowledge their 
reporting responsibilities.  His chosen form of „air cover‟ was to arrange a 
carefully timed and targeted call from the bank‟s Chief Executive to the head of 
the trading desk which had caused the problem, to deliver the message that 
“risk governance matters [to this bank] and there‟s a major goal to 
keep the business within capital constraints.  I know what reaction 
I‟ll get. I can call up an „air strike‟ and it‟s devastating.”    (C25) 
 
C8 approached another Board member, the Managing Director of the bank‟s 
trading division, to get authority to bring in external auditors for an independent 
report on risk-taking, after visiting the front office to find that 
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“…people refused to co-operate.  We were trying to get the 
traders to look at a daily compliance indicator but it was turning 
into some big, you know „exercise‟ for them, „too much 
information, log off this, sign off that‟.  So then they all pushed 
back and the heads of desks said „we‟re going to walk out if you 
force us to do this‟.  I then had to take it up a level, we had to get 
the external auditors in, which caused even more of a riot.  The 
auditors had to work with us [the Risk team] to agree what we 
should have in place.   But to get there I‟d had to go above all the 
heads of [trading] desks and get the head of business to stamp on 
them and say „you‟re doing it or you‟re out‟.  So they just shut up 
and got on with it afterwards.”  (C8) 
 
C3 adopted another alternative strategic view, that a good CRO should 
remember not to have the role defined for them by others as “pure compliance”, 
since this limits the possible points of contact with the Board.  A serious 
infraction might not be simply a matter for a head of business but could enable 
the CRO to make a direct approach to the bank‟s senior in-house lawyer (the 
Head of the Legal Department, also known as Corporate General Counsel).  As 
C3 summarised this strategy:    
 “[One] shouldn‟t make the mistake of defining all problems as 
regulatory.  Fraud is just fraud.”   (C3) 
 
Respondents including C15 noted that invoking any form of higher support, 
whether from the Board or externally, was a “high stakes game” or “nuclear 
option”.  He meant by this that if the resulting intervention goes wrong – or even 
is less than fully successful in securing compliance – this can turn out to have 
been a tactic which has a bad impact on the CRO‟s career.  As C15 said, pre-
planning was essential, as was personal knowledge of the Chief Executive, to 
pre-assess the likely response to a call:  
 
“If you do need to step around those product people, it‟s crucial 
that you have access to the CEO, and if he doesn‟t want to listen, 
that you have absolute clear access to into the Risk and Audit 
committee, or whatever the Board calls it.  Though the danger is 
that‟s seen as the „nuclear option‟ – it does destroy relationships 
that you have within the business, so how often can you use that?”





6.3.6  Invoking external support 
As seen in Chapter 5, a further factor dissuading the CRO from calling the FSA 
for support is anxiety that the regulator itself may not respond positively – or 
even competently or predictably – to being called in.  As C4 saw it, with 
hindsight after the market crash: 
“As a CRO you‟re never sure of what sort of support you‟re going 
to get from the FSA.  Theoretically you have all sorts of whistle-
blowing powers but you may just be hanging yourself [by making 
a report], by going right out on a limb, all the time thinking 
„What‟s the FSA going to do?  I‟ll never get another job in the 
City again, they‟re going to hang me out, oh and by the way the 
chances of them actually doing anything to solve the problem are 
tending to zero anyway‟.”     (C4) 
  
The same respondent suggested that the front office‟s reaction to being 
threatened with FSA intervention had also changed since the crash, in two ways:  
Traders were more aware that the CRO may threaten to call the FSA; but traders 
were also more fatalistic about what might happen next.  As C4 explained, whilst 
the threat of FSA action could get everyone‟s attention, among some of the more 
cynical traders the response might be, in effect, a petulant „so what?‟: 
 
“One of the things the crisis changed is for the CRO now to be 
able to say, if you don‟t do this, now I‟m going to the police, to 
the FSA, so now front-office people are sitting up and going, 
whoa fine okay, let‟s not do that.  But then again many [traders] 
got into such a bad state [in 2008], so they‟re just saying, „Well 
what are you going to tell them?  What‟s the worst that could 
happen?  It can‟t get any worse‟.”    (C4) 
  
Both of these situations suggest that such a course of action could easily 
undermine the CRO‟s already fragile authority within the bank and would be not 
just counterproductive to short-term compliance but also probably career-
threatening.   
 
C15 was more optimistic, suggesting that early engagement with the regulator 
could be a way to anticipate and defuse problems, although he was also a realist 
in recognising that this approach has consequences for a CRO‟s personal 




“Early disclosure makes for a better relationship with the FSA overall, 
but it makes life quite uncomfortable; you take quite a lot of heat 
internally for adopting that approach.”   (C15) 
 
 
As with calls to the Board, the secret of evoking an effective FSA intervention 
was regarded as how good a relationship the CRO had taken the trouble to 
establish with the regulator beforehand.  This was, in turn, partly a factor of how 
far the bank collectively encouraged a good working relationship with the FSA 
in the first place, as C5 said: 
 
“How much traction the CRO function has within the firm says a 
lot about the relationship between regulator and regulated.  
[Whilst] a proper, serious, big firm will have proper engagement 
with risk at business level…  a small-to-middle, or „not serious‟ 
firm may well just dump anything that comes out of the FSA on 
some compliance officer, or they‟ll use [Risk office] as a filter, or 
just a dumping ground.”      (C5) 
 
As C18 pointed out, one quick way to appraise “how seriously a bank takes its 
compliance obligations” is to check how much budget the bank allocates to the 
CRO‟s team as a proportion of its business overheads.  C18 recalled attending a 
budgeting meeting to discuss whether to fund a fraud-prevention system, where 
the finance department was “saying „we are prepared to give just this much 
resource to your activity”, even if the CRO‟s proposal had the potential to  
“screen out all sorts of bad guys” (C18).  The clear implication is that the 
Finance team might allow the CRO to do only as much as was “good for 
business” (C18) – meaning, not disruptive to existing trading activity. 
 
6.4  Is internal co-operation effective? 
The preceding sections provide clear evidence of various forms of breakdown in 
co-operation and compliance between the front office and the CRO.  Faced with 
traders‟ non-compliance, as has been seen, the CRO might resort to repeated 
questioning or invoking various forms of support to deal with specific incidents.  
This raises a further question of how the CRO might manage in the longer term; 
that is, in making sense of a role which might entail a daily struggle to resolve 
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continuing conflict between the duty to public reporting and the private motives 
of profit and career survival.  If trader non-cooperation was a common 
occurrence, how could the CRO respond to this challenge in a sustainable 
manner, to maintain authority and credibility?  
 
As front-line agents of public responsibility within an often hostile corporate 
environment, respondents said that they employed a range of coping strategies 
designed to maintain at least a little functional efficacy in role and to offer some 
comfort to personal morale.   
 
“Some of the most successful people in a commercial 
environment will operate on deniability lines.”   (C18) 
 
The term “coping mechanisms” (Lipsky 1980) may describe a set of general 
responses used to overcome lack of resources and controls, unclear aims, and 
organizational tensions.  Respondent REG1 offered a view of the process in 
action, recalling a “cynical” CRO colleague‟s approach to assessing which 
factors informed the organization‟s decisions on ethical reporting: 
 
“One CRO who had a dilemma had to report a problem to the 
CFO but he saw that he only had one shot at getting it right, if he 
got it wrong he‟d immediately be fired because the CFO was his 
messenger to the Board.  But do you know, he was less concerned 
about being fired so much as getting the message across.  
Although theoretically as the CRO he had the ability to bang the 
desk and go in and talk to the FSA, and go to the Board 
immediately and say there‟s a problem, he knew that actually he 
would be undermined and not supported.”     (REG1) 
 
Faced with such obstacles – as Lipsky had predicted – the risk officer might turn 
to one of three types of coping practice:  creation of routines and stereotypes (a 
time-saving form of practical heuristics); redefinition of the job or task, to make 
resources seem better able to address the objectives; and selective description of 
clients, with the emphasis on any characteristics which the officers had 




Reflecting on these, other organization-level coping responses included invoking 
of routine or stereotype reporting (Power‟s [2006] “audit rituals”) to suppress 
concerns.  A supportive element, across entire businesses, was the prevailing 
“blind faith” (C12) in pre-selected econometric risk models.  C7 described sales 
managers‟ use of a risk matrix as    
“a „comfort blanket‟ for the Board, sort of them just looking at 
nice reports and saying, OK, so by default then there can‟t be a 
problem in that area so let‟s move on to the next agenda item.”   
    (C7) 
 
Respondents offered many examples of organizational coping in the context of 
Board decision-making and corporate governance.  One normative response was 
local redefinition (reframing – sometimes with the regulator‟s collusion) of 
“what the regulator really wanted” (as predicted by Yapp and Fairman [2005] 
and Kaplan [2008]).  C18 regarded the regulator as knowingly engaging in this 
activity as well: 
 
“I would like to believe there are pure motives for regulation, like 
that you want fairness in the market, you think people ought to 
come with clean hands and behave appropriately.  But I realise 
that may be considered a somewhat naïve view.  I know on the 
regulator‟s side that they might sometimes have developed their 
own set of internal rules to stave off government interference in 
how they did their business.  There‟s political input in that 
process.”     (C18) 
 
C34 reported it as more an instrumental activity by product developers: 
 
“Controls were developed with a view to satisfying the regulator‟s 
evidence requirements rather than addressing actual elements of 
risk.”  
   (C34)  
 
The reframing of a regulator‟s demands is part of the collective act of cognition 
produced in the informal (as opposed to formal) organization.  The informal 
organization pools its constituents‟ many private interpretations and cognitions 
of risk (reminiscent of Beck‟s [1999] “risk society”).  As the informal 
organization redefined the reporting task, for its own benefit, though often not 
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for the CRO‟s, ethical concerns could be excluded.  Some CROs, such as C21, 
were frankly pragmatic about their part in this:  
 
“Absolutely I‟m here to reconcile compliance needs with 
marketing  needs.”    (C21) 
 
Respondents offered many examples of misalignment between the motives of 
policymakers and bankers.  SM1 suggested that the weighty compliance reports 
that he was statutorily required to produce were evidence that regulatory policy 
was out of touch with reality: 
 
“There‟s a fundamental inability [by the regulator] to recognise 
that a 700 page compliance report is useless, in practice.”   (SM1) 
 
Having reviewed traders‟ interactions with CROs, the following section will 
reflect on findings, to highlight the influence of organizational culture in shaping 
the CRO‟s behaviour. 
 
 
6.5  Reflection on findings: response strategies 
available to CROs 
Where Chapter 5 established that certain “games” of response to the regulator are 
widely noted, Chapter 6 has considered whether traders are a significant source 
of pressure for the organization to engage in creative coping response to 
demands for risk reporting.  It does not appear to matter to traders whether the 
compliance demands originate with the CRO or externally.  This calls into 
question a tenet of Ayres and Braithwaite‟s enforced self-regulation model, that 
there is a distinction between “insiders” and “outsiders” in the control process.  
The unsound assumption is that, as an apparent “insider”, the CRO will be given 
good access to trading information.  As has been seen, in practice the line 
between “inside” and “outside” should more realistically be drawn between the 
front office and everyone else (including, that is, back office and regulator).  
Whether a bank‟s Directors are inside or outside the line is a significant factor, to 




Respondents‟ stories point to the existence of a strong though informal 
organizational culture within which the CRO is required to operate.  The 
evidence indicates that CROs are induced by this culture to modify their 
behaviour, and hence performance of their job, to subsume their personal 
preferences to the dominant organizational approach to business (“the way we do 
things around here”).  Facing routine challenges to their authority, CROs may 
opt to resist, debate with, or acquiesce to this prevailing culture. 
 
The structural implications of the tensions within the CRO role emerge as a key 
finding.  In particular, failure of the expected function of the CRO as an “honest 
intermediary” between the firm and the regulator encourages a questioning of 
structural weaknesses, which result from designed-in conflicts of interest, such 
as between the CRO‟s public-office function and its private-employer funding.  
The regulator‟s expectations that the CRO would exert formal power in the 
organization are confounded by the CRO‟s lack of any real traction over 
colleagues‟ behaviour.  
 
The issue of perceived and actual power also invites further empirical 
exploration of the regulatees‟ flexible notions of compliance, or creative 
compliance, including coping and even gaming responses. 
 
Broadly, three responses are available to the CRO when faced with intransigent 
(and more powerful) front-office interests.  The first is to cling firmly to one‟s 
public-service principles and challenge the situation as found.  The second is to 
press for change but without confrontation, which in practice means seeking 
incremental improvements, negotiating one step at a time.  The third response is 
to capitulate; that is, to abandon any attempt to change the compliance culture, 
hoping that no major infractions occur on one‟s own watch, and perhaps 
consoled by the thought that one‟s term of office is limited and will be over soon 
enough.    
 
Through these interviews, it now appears that many bankers conceive 
compliance not as a binary choice (that is, to comply, or not to comply) but more 
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as a linear scale ranging from full compliance to full defiance (or simply fraud).  
A base of 35 respondents cannot offer meaningful calibration of such a “scale of 
compliance intent”.  However, future research, with greater resources, may later 
come to develop the scale to a point where the attitudes of regulatees may be 
indexed precisely.  A prototype of the scale is offered in Chapter 8, to assist 
focus on the issue of whether bankers respond adversely to a regulator increasing 
demands for reporting – as other regulated groups have been found to do.  As 
pressure for compliance increases, are bank staff more likely to respond by 
coping?  Will coping be found to include subverting various reporting systems? 
 
Because the most profound impact is on the senior individual expected to “cope” 
on behalf of the organization, the final chapter of empirical review will consider 
CROs‟ private attempts to deal with the consequences, in the form of personal 




CHAPTER 7:  CROs’ RELATIONSHIPS WITH BOARDS OF 
DIRECTORS 
“So my Finance Director said to me – as I was then Head of Risk 
Management – „What‟s  all this talk about needing a CRO?  Who 
is our CRO?‟ Then he pointed to me and I pointed to him!”  
       (C1) 
 
7.1  Introduction 
Chapters 5 and 6 investigated CROs‟ interactions with the FSA and with traders.  
As has been seen, the regulator may make misplaced assumptions about the 
extent to which a bank may be expected, in practice, to comply with demands for 
risk reporting.  Further, within the bank, traders‟ unresponsiveness is a source of 
tension for CROs attempting to report on risk, although this factor alone appears 
insufficient to explain why CROs are unable to fulfil their reporting 
responsibilities.   
 
Were CROs not receiving senior colleagues‟ support when attempting to 
exercise authority over traders, even though they might reasonably expect the 
Board to provide this?  Whether the Board gave the CRO support, or withheld it, 
would change the complexion of the CRO role very significantly.  Withheld 
Board support might be expected to isolate the Risk function within the 
organization.  Chapter 7 will therefore investigate whether perceived Board 
support was a significant factor in the CROs‟ experience of their role.   
 
In now considering CRO interactions with the Board, the research in this chapter 
also explores further respondents‟ private strategies for surviving in a senior 




7.2  How CRO-Board interaction was supposed to work 
 
7.2.1  The CRO responsibility as formally designated 
Most CROs had a job title which included the word “Director” but, of those 
interviewed, only two had seats on the Executive Board of their employer bank. 
Although their precise position in the Board hierarchy thus varied, every CRO 
had some access to the Board as a function of the role itself.  The role as 
understood from FSA guidance – though not a precise specification – included 
being able to review, comment on, and if necessary challenge decisions on risk at 
a strategic level (see Chapter 2). 
 
Moderating this, respondents mentioned a range of common expectations, in 
practice, on the part of their employer banks. The broad task of overseeing risk at 
corporate level might be subdivided according to the particular bank‟s trading 
activities but would usually include the core functions of: collating – that is, 
integrating risk reports from across various business lines; regular headline 
reporting on key trading risks (credit and market risk) to the Board, and 
answering their questions on these; compliance with public risk reporting 
requirements, and acting as the lead point of contact for the regulator and 
auditors; originating and publishing a risk policy setting out the corporate 
approach to managing risk, and monitoring how this is working.  
 
7.2.2  Expected interaction with the Board 
One might reasonably expect the Executive Board to adopt a more sophisticated, 
enterprise-wide view of risk than the traders, and so to be more positive in 
interactions with the CRO.  A CRO seeking to achieve greater traction over 
unresponsive traders might therefore reasonably expect to look to the Board for 
support. Indeed, the CRO might be expected to look to the Board for help in 
devising a strategic solution to the structural tension between public-facing duty 
to report on risk and the employer-funded impulse to suppress inconvenient 




Practical access was a related issue, since respondents varied in their levels of 
direct access to the Board.  Apart from two Executive Board member CROs, 
most other respondents attended some, but not all, Board meetings.  A 
commonly described arrangement was for the CRO to communicate with the 
Board via the Finance Director (CFO) and to be called to attend specified Board 
meetings in order to propose a strategic approach to some risk-related concern, 
such as the impact of new regulatory controls, or the risk attaching to a newly 
developed product or market.  In this regard, C7 saw the CRO as adding value to 
the Board debate by reminding colleagues to look beyond whichever risk metrics 
they have been applying to current products; the Board‟s function being to look 
past the models and deploy 
“…just sound business sense.  You know, taking a step back and 
looking at your real risks in the business, saying do we feel that 
the risks we‟re running are sensible to take in the current 
economic environment?”  (C7) 
 
A normal function for the CRO was thus seen as to answer the Board‟s 
requirement to present a good, credible impression of corporate risk control for 
the benefit of interested parties. These parties are often described as 
„stakeholders‟, and for the Board‟s purposes are primarily taken to mean 
shareholders. Respondents also noted that their Boards acknowledged – albeit as 
secondary incentives – the interest of customers and employees; social and 
environmental impacts; and the regulator. 
 
7.2.3  The Board‟s expectations of the CRO 
Respondents recognised that their formal mandate of public reporting was 
moderated by their employer Board‟s commercial outlook. Where traders saw 
risk in terms of the market risk attaching to the sales they make, the Board was 
seen by respondents as primarily concerned with protecting business value.  In 
practice, Boards were reported to interpret this duty as protecting the bank‟s 
share price, if publicly quoted, as well as always preserving working capital and 
the cost of funding this.  C15 suggested that the Board had a plainly pragmatic 
understanding of a CRO‟s place at the table, which was to maintain a level of 
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risk-awareness necessary to support the bank‟s good name, or in the language of 
risk governance, to keep ahead of “reputation risk”: 
 
“In most Risk Directors‟ objectives implicitly or explicitly there is 
some kind of „no surprises‟ policy, meaning make sure [the 
Board] know anything that‟s likely to hit the newspapers.  …The 
biggest element of [Board] discussions is reputation risk, how 
likely is it for the FSA or somebody to take action, is it on their 
radar, something they‟ve been talking about in speeches, 
publishing documents with this scenario?”  (C15) 
 
This Board was seen as mandating the CRO to maintain, perhaps at all costs, 
public reporting that all was well with the bank‟s formal addressing of regulated 
risk. As C15 explained, there was a clear implication here that it could be 
tempting to “present well” on risk regardless of any trading problems; a good 
Board might though recognise this and consciously challenge this tendency.  C15 
recalled admiring his newly-appointed CEO as a strong leader in this respect, 
“very good at articulating strategy, doing things in line with it”; a man who 
rejected managers who tried to “do the things you‟d rather be doing than what 
you‟re told to do!” (C15). 
 
C5 reported a variant of this, in the form of a Board which sought to engage 
constructively in a wider debate about acceptable risk.  As his Board saw it:  
 
“we should ask what do we mean by, for example, regulatory risk 
[which] is about not being treated in the way that you thought you 
would be, or regulation changing in a way that you could not 
reasonably expect.  Not just something that you don‟t happen to 
like, more the kind of level where suddenly, you know, bang, 
something hits you out of the left field on what we‟d always 
thought was a reasonable way of behaving, and government 
suddenly costing you billions of pounds for that.”         (C5) 
 
This research asked CROs how, as individuals, they interpreted their role in 
managing risk, including private considerations of weighing up risks to the bank 
against the risk to one‟s job tenure.  This line of investigation considered 
whether CROs might be knowingly engaging in a form of double-standard in 
risk reporting, reminiscent of Cohen and Laing‟s (1971) “game of no game”.  
The issue is central to understanding how CROs interpret their responsibilities as 
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senior managers, and to assessing whether the role has any ability to exert 
influence (C18‟s “real power”) within the organization.  It is worth noting at the 
outset that every respondent accepts that there is a difference between the 
concept and the execution of risk reports; as C2 sums this up: 
 
“There‟s an expectation that you‟ll assert that you are fully 
compliant with all the laws and regulations, which of course is 
completely unrealistic.”          (C2)   
 
Recognising that the “unrealistic” nature of risk reporting was widely perceived, 
this chapter now moves to consider what actually happened to CROs who sought 
Board support.  
 
7.3  A range of Board responses to CRO requests for 
support  
7.3.1  Listening to an alternative view, and acting on it 
In line with the job function as described, most repondents recalled an optimistic 
start to their CRO appointment. At the outset they looked forward positively to 
their first Board encounter, seeing it as an opportunity to engage in constructive 
criticism and suggest initiatives for strategic change to improve risk reporting. 
Where the Board was found to be supportive, some CROs described having their 
alternative view listened to and acted upon. C25 offered a useful contrast 
between his experiences of engaged and disengaged Boards: 
 
“The difference between the bank where I am now and where I 
used to be is that here, risk governance matters.  At the other 
place it wasn‟t seen as mattering.”   (C25) 
 
C19 had a distinctive experience, enjoying enhanced status because his 
credentials as a former CFO earned the respect of his new CEO: 
 
“Because I‟d come into the role through being a CFO, I had a 
very supportive Chief Executive; I think that [CEO support] is 





C7 pointed out that, as long as the CRO approaches the task with diplomacy, the 
Board may welcome new approaches to risk if these offer greater clarity of 
understanding. In C7‟s experience, this meant using the new job as a platform to 
challenge a Board that he found to have been too dependent on econometric 
reports as a “comfort blanket”: 
 
“Board members [used to] just look at nice reports and saying, 
OK, so by default then there can‟t be a problem in that area so 
let‟s move on to the next agenda item.  Now I can help them look 
beyond fancy-looking charts and be willing to rock the boat.  It‟s 
about shouting loud enough to be sufficiently heard in the 
organization.”  (C7) 
 
Several respondents reported encouraging experiences of interaction with their 
Boards. C15 found it helpful, before going into it, to conceive the Boardroom as 
a “benign debating chamber”, removed from the pressures of the trading floor, 
which is  
“good because you have someone other than „front office‟ people 
in the room. You  can force discussions down to a fairly simplistic 
level, ask some awkward questions.”    (C15) 
 
As one of the earliest CROs appointed in a UK bank, and veteran of an earlier 
risk governance structure which used a credit (sub)committee of his Board, C5 
was able to appeal to his Board to challenge collectively any optimistic proposals 
from product developers: 
 
“If somebody did come up with a whizzo new product or 
whatever, we were very collegiate about the whole thing, very 
much using the credit committee, which anyway consisted of 
pretty well the whole executive committee and me as CRO 
chairing it. A collegiate approach (to vetting new products) is 
massively more effective.”  (C5) 
 
One reportedly successful strategy for a new CRO engaging the Board was to 
present oneself as a source of education about risk. With risk concepts 
continuously evolving in the marketplace, the CRO could be well placed to 
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present themselves as interpreter of new technical language and concepts, 
rendering them into material which could inform a strategic commercial view. 
C15 did this, using the “benign debating chamber” to hold an 
“ important … discussion at senior level, above the level of the 
people who are doing their own thing.”  (C15) 
 
He added that the Board trusted him despite admitting that they did not at first 
understand the problem, and regarded himself as “lucky” to have been handed “a 
fairly blank piece of paper”: 
 
“When I came in, „holistic‟ risk management was hopeless. Good 
individual risk silos, with thinking in their own areas, but [I had 
to] bring it all together and put it into a common language that 
you could then have a senior management debate with.” (C15) 
 
Other CROs reported finding the Board supportive for unexpected reasons. C18 
described a “strategy of super-compliance”, or “asserting a claim to virtue”. This 
produced a large quantity of positive reporting on risk, although not for the best 
of reasons;  it was more a matter of a boardroom “game of quality-versus-
quantity” (C18). 
 
These positive encounters are, however, less common than reports of more 
energetic debate and even open conflict. At times, many respondents‟ Boards 
were reported to be considerably less receptive to criticism of any kind, and to 
express this resistance in a variety of ways. The following sections review 
experiences of encountering less than full support from the Board. 
 
7.3.2  Board-level resistance to CRO initiatives  
The Board could resist or reject interaction with the CRO in various ways. The 
least challenging of these for the CRO was simply to be ignored or sidelined.  
This could happen  either in person, or systemically because the Board could 
regard the CRO function as subordinate to more important concerns.  For 
example, C24 was surprised to find that his CEO regarded risk reports as 




“It‟s insane really but our CEO was an actuary who didn‟t like to 
look too hard at the risk data I produced. “   (C24) 
 
Speaking in late 2007, C7 summed up the position of his own and many other‟s 
Boards at that point, that the CRO represented an unwelcome regulatory “face at 
the table”. His  Board‟s reaction was that regulation in general, and compliance 
efforts in particular were 
“just a bit of a nuisance, [it was] „let‟s get them off our backs and 
get back to earning big commissions on what it is we actually 
do‟.”  (C7) 
 
A similar experience of the Board actively discouraging the CRO from any 
dissent soon after his appointment to the role was reported by C20. This CRO 
attended his first Executive Committee meeting only to be taken out into the 
corridor and reprimanded by another Board member following the apparently 
unacceptable act of 
“asking whether or not I should raise challenges of which the 
executives were not comfortable”  (C20) 
 
C20 interpreted this as a clear signal that the Board did not welcome an 
intervention from its new CRO, even though his enquiry related to a harmless 
point of order. To ask merely about the possibility of questioning an uncertain 
risk issue was hardly a direct confrontation, but this was vigorously rejected, 
nevertheless.  Worse was to follow (see 7.3.4). 
Some respondents observed that their Board‟s lack of engagement was a factor 
contributing to later commercial failure. Again speaking before the onset of the 
credit crunch, product specialist SM1 recounted his alarm on hearing his Board 




“It was very embarrassing.  There were two very senior members 
from the investment banking side who didn‟t understand [this 
derivative product]. They didn‟t understand the very thing that 
was bringing the bank down, not a clue.  And I‟m thinking, you‟d 
expect the CEO of Ford to know what a car was, maybe not to 
build one but at least to have some understanding of how it works, 
what it‟s about.  There needs to be a balance between the deep-
technical-expert thing and the management thing, but there‟s been 
a lack of [that] blend recently.”  (SM1) 
 
All interviewees referred to, at some point, the culture of their employer bank 
encouraging or suppressing dissent. Most found that open dissent during Board 
discussion of commercial decisions is unwelcome; even at Director level,  
challenge may only be presented in the form of incremental, constructive points 
of criticism. C32 offered a narrative explanation of how an organization may 
create, accept and finally impose on newcomers a culture of coping based on 
“making alternative sense” (as in Weick‟s “sense-making”).  In C32‟s 
experience, two factors operated to favour sense-making: first, that co-employees 
across the industry acted to support organizational norms, finding that this 
behaviour reinforces a common sense of purpose, identity or “tribe”; second, that 
the reward system appeared to validate this approach: 
“After a while people just get conditioned. Like ignoring the fire 
alarm when it goes off. So it‟s „everyone else is doing it, I know it 
could be a problem but everyone else is doing it so it must be all 
right‟. Not so much that everyone says it‟s okay, it‟s because 
everyone is doing it you just think ‟oh well this is obviously 
normal behaviour, this must be all right because XYZ MegaBank 
are doing it and they really know what they‟re talking about. If 
everyone else is in it, we‟ve got to be in it. And anyway I‟ll miss 
out on my bonus if I don‟t.”      (C32) 
 
It is significant that this respondent acknowledged that his private concern 
existed (“I know it could be a problem”) but fallaciously rationalised it away on 
the grounds that non-compliance is acceptable if “everyone else is doing it” – an 
example of Vaughan‟s (1997) “normalization of deviance”. The final rationale 
he observed, and arguably the most telling one, is that the culture of his 




The organization‟s culture also influences how its decision structures are created. 
The next subsection will consider respondents‟ experiences of these.  
 
7.3.3  Organized obstacles? 
Some respondents discussed how their Board appeared to design organizational 
structures and processes as if to limit the remit of the CRO function, to minimise 
its impact on the business. Thus some Directors were reported as colluding in 
keeping the CRO away from direct involvement in, for example, risk-assessing 
new products under development; or even from full reporting of risk. This 
approach naturally diminished the executive stature of the CRO and the 
significance of the role.  
 
When organized in this way, the CRO function was deliberately removed from 
executive decision-making and was thus seen by some Directors to exist only as 
a compliance “rubber-stamp”, accepting the risk for products that are already 
being marketed. Typical of this situation is C7‟s experience, including the 
phrases his colleagues used to describe his part in the interaction: 
 
“In all the enthusiasm to take things to market, compliance is 
often seen as a sort of „business prevention mechanism‟.  Some 
dominant personalities, maybe on the Board or in the product 
development area, may try to just „win one over‟ on you… 
They‟ll try and make out that you‟re preventing the business 
from, you know, increasing profitability.”  (C7) 
 
C7 also recalled being asked to present management information positively – 
that is, to arrange or even manipulate it if need be to “support the position [they] 
wanted to be in in the first place”. He concluded that his Board was in effect 
asking the CRO to condone an optimism bias. Similarly, C12 recalled 
challenging his Board directly about a lack of dialogue or reporting between risk 
and trading functions; what happened next is again seen as typical of the 
“organized-out” CRO experience: 
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“My report… to the Board said that some sections of the Risk 
operation didn‟t function as they should.  Like, yes there was a 
CRO function, but none of the traders had to report to it.  So, I did 
the presentation, the Board asked their questions and then there 
was some name-calling!”    (C12) 
 
One variant on this, reported by C19, was a Board which had gone through the 
formalities of creating a CRO role but then seemed uncertain what to do with the 
new appointee when he arrived: 
“Arriving as a CRO, even as a career accountant and CFO [of a 
smaller company] before, I found the function wasn‟t exactly 
embraced.  It was more like grafting on an organ that they half-
expected to be rejected, because „the CRO will always be Mr No‟.  
They saw risk management as something foisted on them by the 
regulators.”          (C19) 
 
These accounts correspond with points made about access to traders during 
product development (see chapter 6). There is a clear similarity between the 
organizational technique of restricting access to product developers, and the 
design of a Board process that places the CRO at the end of the time-line for new 
product approvals. The effect of both organizational designs is to remove the 
CRO from effective authority over the level of risk designed into a new product. 
Consistent with this is an organizational approach which makes the CRO 
function a receiving agent for awkward or intractable risk issues. A perceived 
function of the CRO role at Board level was to be the first person held to the 
account in the event of a failure of product or of a risk control: 
“If something does go wrong, one of the first people in the firing 
line at the Board table is the CRO.”         (C15) 
 
This was perceived to be the consequence of when real events interrupted sense-
making which had previously prevailed.  In a similar vein, even the most 
seasoned CROs were constantly anxious about being ambushed by the 
emergence of previously undisclosed information:  
 
“On legal risk obviously there‟s always a fear as a risk officer that 
disclosure is full enough, you know, that a legal opinion was 




If one intended function of the CRO role (at least by the regulator) was to enable 
an in-house challenge to automatic approvals for new product risks, in C15‟s 
experience this function was not effective. He found, given a new product which 
was practically “ready to go” but not yet shown to him for approval, that this 
Board had an overriding faith in econometrics, together with an unwillingness to 
listen to his “intuitive concerns”. It was a Board-level organizational 
“reluctance to admit things.. if [the product] has a risk model in 
place, you‟ve invested millions of pounds in this, so therefore it‟s 
„I‟m going to use it no matter what, even if it‟s telling me 
something that feels intuitively not quite right‟.”  (C15) 
 
He “found it ironic” when one product subsequently failed and, as CRO, he was 
then held responsible by the Board for not intervening earlier and more 
forcefully: 
“The Board said „why didn‟t you tell us something was 
wrong?‟”(C15) 
 
This experience is consistent with other respondents who described the role as 
created by the organization as a dumping-point for “difficult” risk issues. C19 
and C20 both pointed out that the effectiveness of any challenge to the Board on 
a “difficult” issue depended on how well they could manage to anticipate the 
level of support they would get from above. 
 
C20‟s experience indicated that even a direct reporting line to the Board could 
introduce an  organizational challenge, in another form. Attempting to push back 
when the Executive Board disagreed with his proposals for reform of risk 
reporting, C20 realised that he had been denied access to a potentially vital group 
of senior supporters. This was, as he said, rather a case of “be careful what you 
wish for”; by arranging for him to sit only with the Executive Board, the 
organization had cut him off from appealing to the Non-Executives – those part-
time Board Directors whose role is (again, in theory) is to challenge risk 
governance decisions made by the Executives. C20 recalled discovering, too late 
to save himself, that 
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“I did not have a direct reporting line to the Non-Executive 
[Directors]. I reported to the Executives, which in practice means 
that you put yourself at risk as soon as you raise challenges to 
them.”      (C20) 
 
7.3.4  Force of personality and affect 
When C12 referred to “name-calling” as a feature of Board meetings he 
attended, he identified with a recurrent finding, conflict between strong 
personalities in senior management. As chapters 5 and 6 have established, the 
restraining role of the CRO is naturally in tension with the ambitions of sales-
side employees. Add to this a commonly noted difference in personality type, 
which the organization rewards – that sales-side staff are given bonus incentives 
to take risks, whilst back-office people are paid fixed salaries to be  cautious – 
and it may be predicted that confrontations will occur.  
 
Less predictable is whether such confrontations might be expected to continue, 
let alone arise, in the Boardroom. The Board should offer a forum for rational 
and thoughtful debate about strategic risk issues: naturally it is of interest to the 
present research to see whether respondents experienced this to be the case in 
reality.   
 
One of the most feared, and commonly recalled, CRO experiences was the 
interpersonal conflict started – apparently deliberately – by a Head of 
Department (such as Trading).  Some respondents interpreted this as a strategy to 
deflect attention away from the presence of a non-compliant system or 
behaviour
28
.  C15 found sales-side colleagues “assertive” in avoiding 
engagement with his questions about new products. 
 
Descriptions of the reality of the Boardroom often included a component of 
affect (that is, emotion) in decision-making, which came as a surprise.  This 
component might typically take one of two forms. First, optimism bias 
associated with successful pursuit of profit during a rising market.  This form of 
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 This is noted by Cohen (2001) as a form of gaming strategy used by the guilty to deflect 




collective euphoria is of course already familiar economists and has even seen 
some attempts at econometric rationalisation, such as Mackay‟s (1841) „greater 
fool‟ hypothesis.  A common experience was for a CRO to find their “reasonable 
concerns” (C15) being swept aside in order to expedite marketing of a new 
product.  Also common, but a darker side of affect, was to encounter a 
colleague‟s display of anger or aggression in place of rational argument.  This 
typically occurred when a CRO attempted to confront the head of a commercial 
department.  
 
Although an extreme experience of affective response – with a life-changing 
outcome – the rationale of the following episode for C20 is clear: 
“There was a product team running away with itself and I was attempting 
to intervene.  People had been given sales targets for switching customers 
from deposit accounts to corporate bonds.  The customers who were 
switching didn‟t understand that this meant they were actually now 
taking a capital risk, they just thought they were getting a higher yield in 
a new deposit account.  For me, it was like going behind enemy lines, 
that‟s the best way to describe it.  So I went and put myself in the front 
office, observed the frontline staff doing the disclosure.  And I watched 
the client, their eyes going round and round in circles, they didn‟t 
understand it – so yes, you could give people a bit of paper with the 
written disclosure on it but they still didn‟t understand it.  But next thing, 
the person who was running that operation was given a title of group 
director of risk, i.e. over my head as a risk officer at the business level, 
despite their having no experience of risk management.  And just to make 
the point, they then leant across the Board table and pointed at me and 
said „I‟m warning you, don‟t make a fucking enemy out of me‟.  Oh yes, 
and then I was fired.”     (C20) 
 
This illustrates the extent to which a forceful sales-side individual may influence 
management process – and even, in this case, apparently subvert the risk control 
framework.  All respondents acknowledged in some form, though with less 
extreme examples, that a prime driver of the Board‟s collective response would 
often be the individual on the senior management team who had the most 
forceful personality.  Whilst one might intuitively expect this person to be the 
highest-ranked Director, such as the Chairman or Chief Executive, CROs 
recounted that in practice the “loudest voice” was usually found to belong to the 
director who had the most direct interaction with financial markets – that is, the 
head of front office, responsible for trading, sales, and/or marketing.  As C12 
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said of his Head of Trading:  
 
“I mean it was always him, the minute you went in there, [the 
business] was his fiefdom.  Of course, but I mean we all knew 
that!”      (C12) 
 
The commercial origins of this arrangement have already been explored in the 
historical notes in chapter 2.  It now appears that in the Boardroom in many 
banks, the greatest respect was accorded to those who brought cash into the 
business. Over generations of the business, and certainly entrenched by the time 
of the present research, the trader-Directors had come to realise that they enjoyed 
an informal but generally accepted primacy.  Faced with a possible obstacle in 
the form of a CRO raising an objection in the Boardroom, a head of trading 
would make it plain that commercial priorities were absolute, and expect this 
view to be supported. As a new arrival, the CRO‟s objections would be 
discounted; C12 found that his head of trading “would tolerate no questions of 
any kind”. 
 
C12‟s account is notable as an experience at the extreme end of “creative 
compliance” in derivatives mis-selling before the 2008 crash, with a head of 
trading confronting his Board without fear of consequence. Although C12 
described a vivid scene, his conclusion was nevertheless a common one among 
respondents:  that faced with a “mad genius” (C12) who happens also to be 
making enormous profits for the bank, the Board is unwilling, or even helpless, 
to question what is happening:  
 
“He ran bedlam there, everyone knew what he was like… I mean 
he basically behaved like a maniac but people had no idea how to 
stop him.”    (C12) 
 
This is not to say that such a situation was normally promoted by trading floor 
interests.  Although heads of trading are singled out by respondents as particular, 
even systemic, objects of fear and distrust, within the aggressive culture of 
financial markets it was not only the fee-generative managers who were capable 




“Very often if you have a dominant CEO, everyone is pretty well 
frightened to say anything.”     (C27) 
 
This does not mean that other Directors, such as the Finance Director (CFO), 
were seen as without influence: indeed, many respondents cited the CFO as their 
most important ally in the Boardroom. However, a resistant CEO would be 
unlikely to support a CRO who questioned the Board‟s established stance on 
acceptable risk-taking. The presence of a “dominant” CEO, says C14, could 
mean that 
“it‟s like, anyone that says „hang on a minute‟ is immediately put 
in a straightjacket and thrown away.”    (C14) 
 
It is appropriate, following the last two examples, to note that respondents often 
recounted personality clashes in terms of emotion and even madness. It is 
striking that conflicts between senior managers are frequently narrated in terms 
of “forceful” or “mad” individuals coercing the support of the other, “calm” or 
“rational” senior managers, both in and out of the Boardroom. This polarising of 
“mad” versus other parties is partly attributable to a simple delight in the act of 
telling the story, a common cultural experience among City workers, as noted in 
Chapter 4. It may also indicate the prevalence of an underlying anxiety which 
informs how CROs make sense of their circumstances – that sales people, in 
particular, are simply “different” and cannot be managed by rational argument.  
On receiving contradictory information, or irrational appeals to ignore ethical 
considerations, the CRO might feel the need simultaneously to deny their 
influence as “mad” and yet to have to comply with their wishes, apparently for 
fear of personal reprisals.  
 
One might expect the Board, which should be a forum for thoughtful discussion 
and rational debate, to offer some protection from such assertive and personal 
forms of interaction.  However, for some respondents, rather than offering 
shelter, the bank Boardroom was a space where these confrontations were 




“It‟s very easy for the trading side to „pull rank‟ on you at the 
Board table.  The guys that run the derivatives books came up 
with huge and complex models because really only they can 
understand it, they said.  So now my question (back to them) is, 
do you really understand it?  Because that‟s the question that a 
risk function has to ask.  And that‟s where you get very 
confrontational.”    (C7) 
 
After a year‟s employment with the bank, C4 was still expecting support from 
the Finance Director (CFO). Instead, he attended the Board meeting only to find 
the “not pleasant” experience of an expected ally turned directly against him. He 
was startled to find himself under personal “attack.. simply for not being in the 
top performance quartile” (C4). It took, he said, “some courage” to regain his 
composure and counter-argue:  
 
“It‟s not pleasant when someone‟s attacking you simply for not 
being in the top performance quartile.  It takes some courage to 
say, „actually at this point in the markets we wouldn‟t be 
expecting above a 10% return because our cycle is not the same 
as our competitors‟‟.  I had the CFO tear me apart for that, though 
I held on and said „you‟ve got to be more realistic about it, the 
only way to change that would just be reckless, what are you 
going to do, fire me?‟  And then a couple of weeks later I got a 
call from the CEO, very short call, he just said „we‟ve fired the 
CFO‟, nothing else!”   (C4) 
 
Although alarming, C4‟s evidence also suggests that a tense interaction with the 
Board may yet produce a supportive outcome – even if, in this case, the support 
did not come from the expected direction.  C4 personally concluded that a CRO 
entering the Boardroom should not expect to find their position and judgement 
supported by the CFO. In his personal analysis of what had happened, C4 
concluded that the Finance department would always ultimately seek to align 
itself with the “sales side”, since Finance is the source of the cash which the 
sales people need to fund trading. In this incident, the CFO appeared to have 
identified the CRO as a back-office stereotype, assumed to be commercially 
subordinate to Finance.   
 
Another CFO encounter, reported by C27, supports this.  In this incident, the 
CFO made it clear that Finance department was primarily interested in making 
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cash available to the business; new approaches to risk management were only 
useful to the CFO if they supported this aim:  
 
“The Finance Director picked up my presentation [for a new credit risk 
system] and flicked through it and said „I'm not really interested in this 
level of detail. All I am concerned with is that we get approval so I can 
lower regulatory capital. Let me make myself absolutely clear, if your 
system doesn't allow me to go to the regulator and show him why we 
should have lower capital then I'll throw the fucking thing out the 
window.”      (C27) 
 
As these experiences indicate, especially for those CROs without direct Board 
access, and so reliant on their CFO as their channel of communication to the 
Board, there was little encouragement that their concerns would get a hearing.  
The expectation was that one might just as easily be “undermined and not 
supported”, and quite possibly “fired in consequence” (all phrases C24). Faced 
with such obstacles, CROs might be expected to consider various methods of 
pushing back and reasserting their own point of view.  This expectation is now 
considered. 
 
7.4  Overcoming practical limitations on exercising 
power and authority 
7.4.1  The need to develop strategies for exerting authority, 
and for survival 
Taking into account tensions with the FSA, and resistance from the traders and 
the Board, it appears that all CROs have, at some point, an experience of 
discovering that they do not have the power or assumed authority that they 
expected to have.  With no generally accepted level of authority for CROs within 
banks, respondents described having to earn respect on an individual basis.  
Whilst there was broad familiarity with the CRO job title, personal experiences 
indicated that they were expected to achieve authority and recognition by force 
of personality, or by some other acceptable demonstration of technical prowess.  
As C27 put this:  
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“How much authority you‟re perceived to have is a function of 
how you approach the (CRO) job.”   (C27) 
 
This begs a question of what strategy of behaviour the CRO might adopt to earn 
respect for authority.  Every CRO had a view on this, although the practical 
suggestions varied from one commercial setting to another.  Some common 
themes are presented in this section. 
 
Many CROs adopted a strategic approach of demonstrating, by word and action, 
a willingness to “fit in” with others‟ conception of what the business of banking 
is about.  This might mean intervening to help to complete a commercial deal.  
Routinely, it could mean offering practical support for product marketing 
activity, which might include contract structuring, risk-testing, legal and 
regulatory approvals.  Many regarded such involvement as divided between 
“real” and “symbolic” activities.  The latter might include performative “rubber 
stamping” of products which the marketers had already approved for sale.  The 
key was to demonstrate enthusiasm for commercial activity: 
 
“If you behave as if you‟re there just to count the beans, perhaps 
you‟re not going to do yourself any favours.  If you show you‟re 
there to add value in terms of new product design, maybe you‟re 
accorded greater respect.”         (C17) 
 
Again, the use of conditionals here - “perhaps” and “maybe” - does not imply 
confidence in the outcome of this coping strategy. 
 
Nevertheless, the CRO would expect improved engagement from colleagues 
following a strategy of presenting themselves as integral to the enterprise 
management team (as opposed to a back-office, cost-generating interloper).  
CROs concluded that they could be an acceptable presence among sales-side 
bankers for as long as they might be identified as an individual with interests in 
commercial, fee-earning activity, rather than a bureaucrat.  
 
In this regard, two respondents were notable as having become CROs by way of 
commercial experience – that is, from within the ranks of traders.  Their resulting 
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“insider” knowledge was described as a distinctive asset and a source of 
authority: 
 
“The best CROs would have to be like me, with a background in 
trading, so they‟re not people who are unaware of the tricks the 
traders play.”         (C25)  
 
These “tricks” were reported as taking various forms, but most commonly 
involved the sales-side filtering of information.  C12 discovered that his reports 
were edited between his writing them and their appearing in the Boardroom: 
 
“My report was going to be circulated (in full) but when it came 
to the Board meeting it appeared on the table as an executive 
summary.  So I did the full  presentation!”    (C12) 
 
Having adhered to his principles, C12 was rewarded with a lively Boardroom 
debate but was also “called some [rude] names” by the Director whose editing he 
had dared to challenge.   
 
Just as documents might be re-presented in this way, so too the CRO might find 
their role described differently when it was being communicated by heads of 
trading to their own staff on the trading floor.  For example, C12‟s head of 
trading told front office staff that although there now was a CRO function, “none 
of the traders had to report to it”; this sabotaged any chance of getting traders‟ 
attention, let alone their co-operation or compliance.  
 
For the CRO whose attempts at positive culture change towards risk-awareness 
had failed, there came a time to decide on the best way forward. Facing daily the 
apparent possibility of provoking violent, career-threatening disagreement with a 
simple compliance request, CROs considered various strategies for career survial 
and daily coping. Their perceived overriding need was to be seen as an 
acceptable, and preferably useful, member of the management team: 
 
“There are trade-offs about creating self-respect in the role, 
making sure that people take you seriously as an independent 
voice.  You‟ve got to have something to bring to the table over 




The consensus emerged that a CRO had, in effect, three options, which will now 
be explored.  
 
7.4.2  Examples of survival strategies 
The first strategy a CRO might try was to mediate their way out of a conflict.  By 
being polite and non-confrontational, the CRO might maintain personal integrity 
and succeed in presenting compliance demands in alternative, softer terms. 
Personal confidence could be expressed in forms other than an aggressive, direct 
challenge to a head of business; some saw the benefit of promoting a longer-term 
view of risk-taking, to move co-Directors‟ expectations beyond immediate 
results.  The effective CRO saw themselves as knowing how and when to assert 
authority without having to force the appearance of doing so. This could be 
presented as a personal “philosophy of risk” (C20), as in:  
 
“Now I don‟t really have a very high personal risk appetite but I 
do have the confidence to manage the risks.  Risk is a vital part of 
humanity, you know, onwards and upwards.”  (C20) 
 
It may alternatively be disguised as the low-key pursuit of elusive audit facts,  
“just going in and checking for „unknowns‟, just testing where 
you think there may be a problem, just going in wherever you 
think there seems to be a „something‟.”  (C15) 
 
It was accepted that “doing nothing” was not an option, as this might readily be 
seen as condoning others‟ bad behaviour:  
 
“It‟s more than just having the confidence to ask a difficult 
question.  Sometimes just by being there and not asking, you have 
been captured by the process, and now you‟re part of the problem 
and not the solution.”               (C4) 
 
 
An essential survival skill for this first, mediative, strategy was therefore to 
develop diplomacy and alternative languages to the conventional, confrontational 
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dialogue of demand and refusal which traders were accustomed to use as part of 
“pushing the deal”: 
 
“When you‟re faced with a front office or marketing arm that‟s 
trying to do something, saying no is about the most difficult thing 
you can say.  So you learn to say no differently.  It‟s the way you 
say no that counts.  Never actually say no.  Say „when these four 
rather reasonable conditions are met, and if you still want to do it 
at that time, then I can see no reason why we couldn‟t proceed‟.”   
   (C19) 
 
CROs who developed interpersonal skills beyond the mere need to secure an 
audit return recognised the practical difference between the letter of a regulation 
and implementing rules in practice. In this respect they internalised a „street-
level‟ pragmatism already familiar to overstretched regulatory agencies around 
the world.   
 
The second strategic option was to take the same initial approach as the first, but 
to allow a compromise on its principle by being prepared to negotiate away 
certain demands in return for at least partial compliance: 
 
“I‟d like to believe that CROs have come in not to, to put it 
crudely, tell lies to the regulator.  There‟s a big difference 
between the Board saying „sort us out so we‟re OK, you can talk 
to the FSA‟ or giving it to you more like an ultimatum, sort of 
„we‟ll only do item 6 of your recommendations‟ – in which case 
your only choice really is „do I leave now?‟.” (C5) 
 
The third strategic response was essentially to accept that one had been captured 
by the process and to try to maintain as much dignity as possible.  Such “going 
with the flow” (C11) clearly indicated to others in the Boardroom a certain 
flexibility of approach to ethical concerns.  This approach carried the highest risk 
of both formal sanctions and heightened stress and was therefore only a coping 
strategy in the sense that the coping consisted of a surrender of personal 
responsibility in the face of a perceived greater force.  This form of cognitive 
coping could entail disassociating oneself from consequences.  In this respect it 
recalls criminal evasions of guilt (Sykes and Matza, 1959) which attempt to 
separate a non-compliant act from its ultimate effects on customers.  CROs 
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accepted that there could be a betrayal of role here but some saw merit in 
“waiting it out on the basis that you may get away with it if nothing bad happens 
on your watch” (C20).   
 
Some justified this final strategy of non-engagement on the basis that it merely 
supported a business ethic of “the way we do things around here”: 
  
“See no evil, hear no evil, you know, everything‟s fine that looks 
OK.  Why?  Because that‟s what business wants to hear.”   (C18) 
 
Sustained denial of responsibilty might be seen as justifying itself by repetition 
or in terms of instrumental conditioning, or even ultimately as a „Game Of No 
Game‟ (as noted by Cohen and Laing). In this game of cognitive reframing, any 
attempt to refer to the existence of a business uncertainty, or of a fault in risk 
modelling, or of a colleague‟s behaviour as unacceptable, would lead to the 
complainant being ejected from „the game‟, meaning the job.  One CRO who 
adopted this approach recognised its ethical emptiness: 
 
“You just keep on providing everyone with what they expect… In 
fact, it‟s more than that:  You not only deny the something you‟ve 
done, but you‟ve got to hide your denial.”    (C12) 
 
Others rationalised capitulation as a realistic response to the overwhelming 
complexity of products, and the task of controlling them; that is, that systemic 
problems had now outgrown the capacity of CROs to comprehend, let alone 
intervene to manage, them: 
   
“There are many flavours of CRO but more than ever now I see 
the sort who sort of, were good at the start but the problem now is 
just too big for them.”      (C4) 
 
 
7.5  Conclusion 
Although regulatory theory suggests that power and control are issues often 
prescribed by formal status, the current research points to CROs having to 
attempt to exercise power by making a reflexive assessment of the power 
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available to them.  They gauged and interpreted available power according to the 
responses they received from colleagues after attempting to exercise it.  Such 
behaviour might be interpreted as a practical act of sense-making (Weick, 1993).  
It was an empirical means of establishing how much power they might have 
available, as defined by the perceived “traction” they might have over some 
challenges, as indicated by colleagues‟ supportive or dismissive responses to 
proposals.   
 
For many respondents the defining practical experience was of a particular 
moment, early in office, at which a senior manager, typically a head of a trading 
division, would mount an aggressive challenge to the CRO‟s authority.  How 
you responded to the challenge would set the tone for future dealings with other 
senior management, possibly getting “very confrontational” (C7). 
 
The outcome of such a confrontation in each case would be decided by how the 
Board reacted:  either providing or withdrawing support for the CRO‟s assertive 
position.  Board support, or the absence of such support, would not always be 
immediately apparent, and in some cases only became known by proxy, as for 
example when the CRO saw traders continuing to ignore an earlier warning. 
 
Speaking before the market shock of 2008, one respondent had suggested that 
without an upgrading of role, scope, status and reward, the CRO office would 
fail to fulfil any real function, let alone all the expectations placed upon it by 
public opinion and regulators.  In reality, it was evident to most respondents that, 
following a short period of goodwill on arrival in office, they would be expected 
to fall in line with commercial expectations of the role.  
 
A CRO might respond by attempting to build strategic alliances with Board 
members, although these might backfire.  Most CROs recognised that it could be 
a career-ending move to mount an unsupported challenge on the Board‟s 
authority.  Few were granted sufficient senior access or authority to do this.  
Some CROs overcame this by coopting a middle-management colleague from 




“After I managed to get a senior product engineer on side, it 
reduced the level of push-back, because we could talk the 
(traders‟) language.” (C15) 
 
The experiences recounted in chapters 5 – 7 offer new insights into the reality 
facing a CRO.  CROs‟ ways of rationalising conflicting demands have been 
explored, making sense of what the job requires when senior managers‟ 
instructions seem to be compromised by self-interest.  Some responses appear to 
have been predictable within existing models of risk perception:  For example, a 
CRO‟s decision whether to report an anomaly may be affected by a powerful 
dread of personal consequence.   
 
At a personal level, a consistent picture emerges that the newly-appointed CRO 
is typically confident of their ability to make positive changes in the 
organization, engendering a new culture of compliance.  This is then commonly 
found to have been an optimistic illusion.  The contrast between early good 
intentions and later pragmatic adjustment may be summarised by contrasting a 
respondent‟s views of the “before and after” outlook, as C7 did: 
 
(On appointment): “The CRO role should be about the ability to 
look beyond fancy-looking charts and be willing to rock the boat.  
It‟s about shouting loud enough to be sufficiently heard in the 
organization.” (C7) 
 
(Subsequently): “A CRO may just back off when there‟s a major 
risk or issue for the business, then their position is totally 
weakened, they‟re just totally ineffective in that role.  I‟d say yes, 
CROs have failed in that we just weren‟t as assertive as we should 
have been.” (C7) 
 
The experienced reality is that informal groups, steered by forceful traders and 
commercial Directors, subvert the formal best intentions embodied in the 
regulatory framework and the CRO role itself. Some time after arriving, each 
CRO experiences a moment at which the extent of others‟ coping compliance 
becomes evident to them. This coping may vary between a positive approach, 
with some constructive engagement with the regulator, to,  more often, a 
redefining of the CRO role as primarily responsible for minimising regulatory 
capital.  CROs‟ initial motives of ethical intervention, faced with inflexible (if 
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informal) profit motives in the organization, degenerate into an agenda for 
pragmatism. Day to day this plays out as a game of self-preservation and 
avoidance of open conflict. 
 
The final chapter will take a broader view of empirical findings to discern 
patterns which confirm, or differ from, earlier theoretical predictions; and the 





CHAPTER 8:  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
“Wanting to do the right thing is not the same as doing the  
right thing” 
 (Nielsen, 2011) 
 
 
8.1  Introduction 
The research interview findings in Chapters 5 – 7 build up a vivid picture of the 
encounters between risk managers and commercial bankers.  This encounter may 
be characterised as a collision of two cultures: On one side stands the CRO, who 
personifies a hierarchical audit process; on the other are individualistic traders 
who hurl abuse at anyone who interrupts their selling.  Reflecting on these 
cultural opposites, this final chapter will review findings to discuss the extent to 
which, as heads of banks‟ risk management, CROs succeeded in their function of 
challenging excessive risk-taking; or whether they were drawn into accepting 
and even legitimising a prevailing culture of creative compliance. 
 
As observed, there were three routes by which the CRO might be drawn in to the 
sales-side culture:  through interactions with the FSA‟s case officers, with the 
bank‟s sales staff, or with the Board.  Having examined evidence of CROs‟ 
interactions with each of these groups in turn, they are now considered together 
in addressing the broad question:  To what extent did the risk management 
function challenge organizational conduct as found?   
 
The research topic initially identified the possible existence of coping in banks 
responding to the regulator‟s demands for risk reporting; considered whether, if 
found, such responses would be analogous with coping responses noted in other 
sectors; and sought to characterise CROs‟ coping with related risk reporting.  
Issues are identified in three related areas, which are now discussed in this 
chapter: The nature of the regulatory regime; the nature of organizations; and 





Moving on from the starting-point of the research findings, this chapter will 
finally consider how new understanding of the CRO role suggests ways of 
making the role more effective, or possibly of replacing it with a better 
alternative. 
  
As noted in Methodology in Chapter 4, one unusual and unforeseen aspect of the 
present research has been its timing, which by chance was contemporary with 
major turbulence in financial markets.  Although the presence of a financial 
crisis was not factored into the research design, which took place substantially 
during 2006 – early 2007, the nature of the crisis, following the failure of risk 
and regulatory controls to prevent a collapse in liquidity, is clearly a topic of 
direct interest to the present research respondents. 
 
It is evident, though discomforting to acknowledge, that the primary research 
work ultimately derived considerable (and unpredicted) benefit from taking place 
during the event of a global banking crisis.  The advent of dramatic events in 
financial markets inevitably coloured the personal perceptions held by 
respondents during the latter stages of the research (2008-9).  This does not alter 
their resonance, nor the consistency of the picture which emerges: it is also 
appropriate here to re-state that the aim of the research was not to calibrate 
coping but merely to establish its existence among CROs and to explore its 
possible manifestations.  Concurrent events in the financial markets might be 
expected to have produce skewed – and typically, embittered – accounts from 
CROs whose experience of any tensions in the role might be especially acute at 
the time.  To such concerns, this researcher would indicate the consistency of 
findings which nevertheless emerged; and that a sample of 35 (out of a possible 
70) respondents gives ample internal triangulation to the findings.   
 
After interviewing approximately half of known UK bank CROs, whilst some 
openly expressed bitterness at their predicament – and, in fairness, others 
displayed varying degrees of schadenfreude at their colleagues‟ fate – these are 
inflexions of tone which do not contradict the consistently reported behaviour 
which emerged.  Although the market crisis was beginning to create job losses in 
banks during 2008, immediate pressure on CRO employment was not found to 
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be a factor at the time of the interviews:  Only two respondents self-identified as 
being on the point of leaving their (CRO) jobs: one (C20) was interviewed 
shortly after being ejected from his job, as his dramatic account of the 
proceedings makes clear; one (C19) moved a week after the interview, and 
displayed no resentment about this, as moving to a CRO role in another, non-
banking financial service provider.  It would be wrong to infer a pattern of job 
insecurity from these two isolated cases, although on a longer hindsight view, 
CROs‟ positions have become more vulnerable since – by 2012, at least 10 of the 
2008-9 respondents are known to have moved to a new role, and not all of these 
voluntarily. 
 
To dismiss the present (possibly unpalatable) research findings as merely the 
product of the “market turbulence” of the time would be to ignore CROs‟ 
underlying concerns about the prevailing asymmetries in banks‟ risk reporting 
systems, which the present research had identified as an issue before the crisis 
struck.  The problem pre-existing at the time of the crisis, though confirmed by 
respondents as amplified by it, was that CROs were given nominal power, but 
without the practical authority necessary to exercise it to introduce more 
responsible risk reporting practices. 
 
To recapitulate: A bank CRO may be seen as the single employee most 
responsible for reconciling conflicting concepts of the function of risk 
management: on the one hand, public protection, on the other, private profit 
opportunity.  The CRO simultaneously has to maximise return on risk for the 
employing firm and also alert the regulator to excessive risk-taking.  In practice, 
as reported by CROs, these responsibilities are often irreconcilable; the more so 
when incentives are skewed to dissuade public risk reporting.  Placed in a new 
role with no pre-existing processes or methods, the CRO might be predicted to 
devise their own methods of dealing with this conflict.  Caught between demands 
for compliance and self-seeking commercial interests, how else might the CRO 





8.2  Constraints imposed on the CRO from three 
directions  
It is apparent that banks and the FSA placed an unbearable weight of expectation 
on the CRO role by, in effect, mapping the function of risk reporting onto the 
person of the CRO.  Whilst the creation of this senior role implied considerable 
power and authority, the reality as experienced by CROs was that the role was 
subject to strong constraints.  Some of these constraints were predictable – such 
as a natural resentment of a “newcomer” discipline among more established 
commercial practices.  Others were less foreseeable; such as the Board denying 
support, or the practical impossibility of asking the FSA for help. 
 
How far a CRO could succeed in achieving their role depended on how they 
responded to constraints imposed by the three most proximal groups of actors, as 
researched: the regulator‟s case officers, the bank‟s sales staff, and the bank‟s 
Board of Directors.  This section considers the relationship with each group, to 
draw headline conclusions as to the value of the research. 
8.2.1 Constraints in interactions with the regulator; efficacy of 
the system of regulation 
The first interacting group was the regulator‟s (FSA) case officers – that is, the 
regulatory agency staff whose task was to come in to banks to discuss and 
evaluate risk controls.  Case officers often relied upon bank staff to produce the 
data they needed, and to explain how products work. 
 
Regulatory theory argues that a system of enforced self-regulation allows a 
poorly resourced regulator to capitalise on regulated organizations‟ internal 
governance mechanisms and so to control risk more efficiently; this system can 
resolve problems of information asymmetry and regulatory inflexibility.  Any 
failures of co-operation, again in theory, may be remedied by enforcement 
action.  Yet, as the present study indicates, in practice enforced self-regulation 
fails to control excessive risk-taking by bankers.  The evidence offers a number 




First, incentives in the banking sector are not aligned to support regulatory 
demands and expectations.  Rather, banks‟ reward structures contain a 
significant skew:  Traders‟ risk-taking is rewarded with short-term bonuses, 
whilst back-office risk managers receive only fixed salaries for long-term watch-
keeping.  The net impact is a dominant commercial pressure, producing creative 
compliance in various forms.  As seen in Chapters 5 and 6, these forms include:  
manipulating reported numbers; “stage-managing” the regulator‟s visiting staff; 
exploiting regulatory staffs‟ inexperience and lack of technical knowledge; and 
waiting for the “revolving door” to remove troublesome enquiries.  Such 
activities cannot be conducive to building a constructive relationship between 
regulator and regulatee. 
 
The FSA‟s case officers meanwhile were typically regarded as struggling to 
understand technicalities, and having too little time to make thorough 
inspections.  Bankers often observed them to be short-term appointees in their 
role, and content to use pro-forma auditing as a substitute for proper enquiry into 
anomalies.  Any of these factors might dissuade the CRO from approaching the 
FSA for support with an enquiry into a point of concern.  FSA representatives‟ 
perceived lack of understanding also discouraged CROs from raising  genuine 
concerns.  For every CRO who was willing to volunteer concerns to the FSA, 
another would advise withholding information to limit their exposure to 
perceived regulatory risk.   
 
Even when the CRO might need to work with the FSA, as when wanting to seek 
the regulator‟s guidance on a new point of concern, the relationship was seen as 
unreliable.  Rather than exercising discretion, the FSA officer was seen as likely 
to run away with the evidence of wrongdoing, only to return later threatening to 
use it as the starting-point for an enforcement action.  This expectation by CROs 
turned the FSA from a potentially welcome ally into a hazardous point of 
contact.  To add to the hazard, any CRO who approached the FSA might be 
regarded by senior colleagues as admitting defeat in the role, or as betraying their 
loyalty to the bank – in either case a career-ending move.  Given these 
constraints it is not surprising to find that many CROs did not regard the FSA as 
a desirable or approachable ally in the task of preparing public risk reporting.  
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Over time, ways of avoiding contact with the FSA could, and did, extend to 
include the selective use of risk models and source data.  
 
Despite these concerns, routine and pre-emptive gathering of information by the 
FSA was accepted, though rationalised as a friction cost of business, and with 
resentment at the wasteful duplication of effort involved in filing multiple reports 
of transactions. 
 
While it would be wrong to infer that a CRO is always actively complicit in 
subverting the regulator‟s requests for information, in many banks minimally 
informing or “handling” (stage-managing) the case officer were regarded as 
normal ways to handle such a request.  Historically the regulator underestimated 
the influence of informal organizational culture in determining how a bank 
responds to attempts to impose new risk controls; CROs by contrast intuitively 
understood that senior management sets “the tone… that translates into decision-
making” (C9).  If the FSA represents well-intentioned “rules as drafted”, the 
CRO is far closer to the realities of “what‟s going to happen” (C27). 
 
As a summary point, self-governance patently fails when the regulated sector 
perceives itself to have more power than its regulator.  Banks may suggest 
excuses and rationales for non-compliant behaviour (such as exceptional 
productivity, or high employment, or allegedly superior business acumen).  
Ultimately, though, they are more or less careless of consequences, secure in the 
knowledge that the government very much needs their revenue contribution, and 
that their business will in any case outlast any current government. 
 
8.2.2 Constraints in interactions with traders 
The second interacting group is the organization, as represented by its most 
commercially energetic members, the sales staff.  An organizational perspective 
helps to reveal what happens in firms whose traders‟ primary objective is to 
make money almost regardless of other forms of cost.  This premise often 
appeared to be impossible to challenge, especially from a new role such as the 




CROs who arrived in office expecting to be able to secure the co-operation of 
traders to compile risk reports were disappointed.  The common experience was 
that one could summon traders (usually after some resistance) but not expect to 
hold their attention or to gain solid support for any initiative which did not 
involve making money.  Risk management is usually defined and structured as a 
cost centre activity in the bank, employing staff on modest salaries.  Trading, 
meanwhile, is recorded as a profit-generative activity, detached from its 
overheads, and paying out large bonuses to sales staff.  There was thus no 
apparent cultural or pragmatic incentive for traders to concern themselves with 
the risk office.  The effect of these differing approaches to risk and reward, 
between two departments within the organization, was to set up traders and 
CROs in opposition to each other.  CROs‟ attempts at rational challenge to sales-
side informal behaviour often failed simply because established ways of working 
were so deeply entrenched.  
 
CROs at least succeeded in seeing through the illusion (or delusion) of sales 
reporting:  that the respect accorded to high-grossing sales staff was based on 
“headline figures” – meaning sales only, not including any overheads or even 
direct costs of sales.  Remarkably, the biggest factor that traders could ignore 
was cost of capital (that is, the cost of keeping the business in enough funds to be 
able to carry out trading activities).  For the CRO, this systemic skew with regard 
to profit and loss created a harsh and plainly unreasonable consequence: daily 
pressure from the front office to make “discretionary” adjustments to reported 
risk figures.   
 
Manipulating risk reports so as to lower the regulatory capital figure can, and 
does, increase real risk to the public – but at the same time can make a CRO 
popular with sales-side staff.  In the event, few CROs are willing to stand alone 
to challenge this embedded risk culture.  Their reluctance is understandable when 
one observes first-hand the characteristic contrast of personality types: traders, 
bullish and intuitive, who aggressively reject a CRO‟s “intrusion”; CROs, 
rational and civil, will not respond in kind to a personal provocation.  More than 
this, banks are structured in such a way that risk management is divided:  Traders 
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are installed to make money; risk officers are there to protect it.  To traders, this 
arrangement is an active deterrent to accepting as legitimate the CRO‟s claims to 
their attention.   
 
As well as the different reward systems already noted, CROs also faced more 
literal, physical barriers: For example, risk managers‟ back offices could be 
physically remote the trading floor, or even in another building entirely; and risk 
staff could even be denied access to trading floors.  Such organized obstacles to 
good practice reflect an underlying culture in which loyalties are clearly seen to 
be allocated to one of two informal groups, typically framed in terms of front 
office or back office.  The front office “way we do things” is reinforced by 
trading team heads who prefer to recruit assertive salespeople.  Back-office 
loyalty meanwhile is to the function of reporting, with processes seen as more 
significant than commercial outcomes.  Traders‟ simple aggression challenges 
the more passive back-office personality types to disagree, and tends to win.  In 
cultural terms, trading activity imposes a hierarchy of expectation which 
demands, and receives, preference in allocation of resources and rewards.  CROs 
suffer under one other powerful disincentive: that an attempt to exercise true 
authority by challenging traders‟ conduct might lead to losing one‟s job.  An 
analogy comes to mind: the CRO entering the trading floor is like the lone 
sheriff in a lawless Wild West town, surrounded by misbehaving cowboys, 
pleading with them to change, but hopelessly outnumbered and so an object of 
derision.  
 
In summary, although the CRO role had nominal authority over traders, in 
practice the CRO‟s power was constrained by an organizational culture which 
protected the interests of traders above all other functions.  To exert influence , a 
CRO needed senior allies:  Directors‟ support, or lack of it, could be a decisive 
factor.  The influence of Director relationships is now considered.  
 
8.2.3  Constraints in interactions with Directors 
The third constraining group is the Board of Directors, to whom CROs might 
expect to be able to turn for support in advancing plans for risk governance.  To 
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the surprise of many CROs, senior managers were often found to represent sales 
interests, if anything more vigorously than the traders.  The absolute dominance 
of a culture of profit-seeking, in the Boardroom as on the trading floor, meant 
that a CRO‟s plans for greater transparency in making risk-based decisions could 
be dismissed as irrelevant.   This culture has, if anything, hardened in recent 
years as many banks have completed a transition from traditional activities 
(simple deposit-taking and lending) into complex products and playing the 
markets with borrowed or virtual money.     
 
Against this background, the authority of the CRO was open to question at Board 
level because the CRO role itself was a novelty, not yet having acquired a clearly 
defined status.  This lack of definition provided an excuse for Boards to sideline 
risk management, for example by having the CRO report to the Board only 
through another Director‟s office.  The Boardroom interests of Finance Directors 
and CROs, again which might be expected to coincide, were sometimes directly 
contradictory.  In an apparent self-contradiction, Boards who had established a 
CRO role as a technical “tamer” of exuberant risk-taking, were content to stand 
by as CROs‟ functional norms were subverted – whether by coercion, threat, or 
outright fear for survival. 
 
Thus, whilst one might expect a bank Board to support its own appointed CRO‟s 
requests for action, this expectation was not fulfilled in practice.  The nominal 
power of a CRO, as Board-level or Risk Committee executive, appears 
compromised in several ways.  For example: procedures for rating risk in new 
products sometimes included CRO approval only as a final formality after 
commercial Directors others have already decided in favour; a CRO present at a 
senior management meeting might be discounted as a “technocrat”, or taken out 
into the corridor and told not to ask asking awkward questions; CROs‟ 
objections generally might be dismissed on the grounds that back office people 
cannot be expected to understand the organization‟s core purpose of  pursuing 
profit (“what we do here”).  
 
Considering these factors all together, the CRO could be in an uncomfortable 
position organizationally.  Structures of authority and incentives were so 
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asymmetrical – that is, stacked against the CRO  – that any chance of a CRO 
generating “creative tension” or a “challenge function” as a strategy for problem-
solving was in practice replaced by tensions of a destructive kind.  Without 
unequivocal support from the Board, the CRO role lost its claim to authority in 
the organization, restricting the CRO‟s scope for action and reducing personal 
efficiency as an agent of risk governance. 
 
Facing this, what was a CRO to do?  The following subsection reflects on how 
CROs responded to these constraints, and the wider effects of these responses.  
 
8.2.4  Responses to constraints 
Facing constraints in these three essential working relationships, CROs 
conceived that they faced a three-way choice:  To challenge abuses directly, at 
the risk of sudden loss of one‟s job; to engage gently with any abusers in an 
effort to persuade them to adopt more appropriate risk definitions and practices; 
or to try merely to survive one‟s fixed term in office, all the while hoping that no 
major control failure would expose this as a “sell-out” to trading interests.   
 
A CRO who pursued the direct challenge strategy might expect to forfeit their 
job (as did C20).  Most described pursuing variants of the second and third 
strategies; these were both conceived as “sense-making” alternatives, since the 
CRO was preoccupied by constantly having to assess which parts of the risk 
management task would be regarded by colleagues as most important.  A 
surprise for many, in terms of job function, was to find that their colleagues most 
valued them for their time spent creating figures for regulatory capital, including 
if need be manipulating input data to achieve this. 
 
Throughout banks, self-restraint tends to weaken when the rewards for success 
are seen to outweigh penalties for failure.  For CROs this meant realigning their 
own risk perception so as to support banks‟ view of risk as opportunity.  
Decisions required amoral weighing up of career impact versus probity (not 
“should I do this?” but “will I be prosecuted?”).  For many CROs – and many 
bankers – it was appealing to serve the term of their contract, characterising 
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themselves as foot soldiers who must survive in surroundings which were 
simultaneously both hostile and rich with opportunities.    
 
In summary, the balance of power was tipped against the role of CRO, who 
faced informal yet entrenched interests.  At least in the early days of the CRO 
function, colleagues‟ “silo” approach to risk management was often found to 
militate against the creation of a single business-wide view of risk.  In the worst 
cases found, the CRO function was reduced to ritual approval of decisions 
already made elsewhere by product developers and salespeople. 
 
The present research has sought to build on understanding of how regulated 
organizations respond to regulators‟ demands for compliance by asking UK bank 
CROs to give personal, informal accounts of their experiences.  Although their 
job titles and the nature of traded products differ, it might be expected that 
bankers would display similar coping characteristics to business managers 
already studied in other sectors.  Accordingly, the next section compares real 
experiences with academic predictions, reflecting on where the findings concur 
or differ.  
 
8.3  Empirical findings and the literature 
This section will reflect on how well the literature predicted what was actually 
found, considering the three analytical perspectives identified in Chapter 3: 
theory of regulation, of organization, and of risk perception. 
 
8.3.1  Expected and unexpected factors: regulatory 
This research has considered how banks process compliance demands; that is, 
how they interpret or transform demands and make a practical response.  Despite 
a shortage of primary accounts of this phenomenon in the banking sector, theory 
suggested that bankers, in common with other commercial actors studied, might 
reinterpret compliance demands in certain predictable ways, such as calculating 




Respondents acknowledged that such options existed but not that colleagues 
would engage in them.  In practice, negotiation with the regulator was reported 
as less common than plain obstruction.  Interpreting this phenomenon in 
Vaughan‟s (1999) terms: where deviance (in this case coping or creative 
compliance) has become the norm, regulatees do not see any need to engage in 
strategies to justify their rule-breaking. 
 
Although theory of enforced self-regulation draws on reasonable arguments, 
notably the benefits to the regulator of leveraging regulatees‟ own risk 
governance, the problematics of banks cast doubt on whether enforced self-
regulation may ever work in this sector.  Structural tensions inherent in enforced 
self-regulation are seen to have been tested to an unprecedented extent in the 
banking sector, where volumes of data are massive; supervised products are 
abstract, virtual, complex and often opaquely defined; and public reporting 
officers such as CROs (and by implication auditors) who oversee the commercial 
side of the control system are rewarded and respected far less than sales-side 
colleagues.  Traders sell, rewarded by potentially large bonus payments and with 
little regard for cost or the long-term, as they do not intend to stay long.  CROs 
meanwhile receive only salaries to restrain the risk-takers, and may be expected 
to stay for long enough to have to manage the bank‟s way through traders‟ past 
indiscretions. 
 
Regulators, and indeed banks‟ own risk staff, appear to have have failed to 
foresee how vigorously commercially-motivated people will reject attempts to – 
as they see it – prevent them from getting on with their business.  (Section 8.4 
will consider the implications of this for improving future control of risk in 
banks, via improved understanding of how behaviour, risk and regulation 
interact.) 
 
Enforced self-regulation is too weak to challenge an economically dominant 
sector.  “Regulatory capture” meanwhile seems inadequate to describe the depth 
of banks‟ contempt for their regulator. Like other organizational managers, 
bankers may be expected to resist regulatory controls, but banks‟ resistance is of 
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a higher order: Not only are accidental gaps of regulatory definition exploited; 
the legitimacy of the regulator is itself suspect.   
 
Even use of tougher enforcement might not have improved matters in 2008. 
Problems stemmed not only from banks over-relying on econometric risk models 
but from supervisors who could not get close to the systemic root of the problem:  
That traders could take excessive risks, unconcerned by borrowing costs or long-
term business sustainability.  With a short-term view of both of markets and of 
their own employment, traders felt invulnerable; longer-term loyal staff in the 
back office could always be relied upon to clear up any mess. 
 
Whilst self-assured regulatees are predicted to resist controls, and indulge in 
creative compliance
29, something more nuanced is happening in banks.  Bankers‟ 
responses to compliance demands are not conceived as a binary choice (to 
comply or not to comply) but as points on a more diffuse “scale of intent to 
comply”.  Senior bankers‟ behaviour is shaped by an extreme variant of 
regulatory capture: if there is no significant concern about the regulator, it hardly 
seems worth devising rational strategies to resist; easier just to cope, with the 
help of a tame risk officer to take everyone through the formalities of audit and 
reporting.  
 
8.3.2 Expected and unexpected factors: organizational 
Theory of organization suggests that banks will experience tensions between 
formal organizational protocols and informal group responses to external 
demands.  As noted above, banks might also be expected to claim compliance 
regardless of whether any actual organizational behaviour warrants that claim.  
The tension that this creates in the organization might be expected to be familiar 
to a CRO; and this proved to be so.  CROs see, and indeed participate in, a 
fracture between public claims of good governance and private, informal 
knowledge of compromise.  Also as expected, CROs were well-placed to witness 
                                                 
29
 as established in sector studies of food production (Yapp and Fairman, 2004), healthcare 
(Bevan and Hood, 2005; Kodate and Dodds, 2009), pharmaceuticals (McGoey, 2007) and 
chemical production (Etienne, 2010) 
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inconsistency between their firms‟ formal, designated structures and the way that 
informal groups within them behave.   
 
As with regulatory capture theory above, the literature raised expectations that 
bankers might resort to performative responses to cope with the regulator‟s 
unwanted disruption of normal business.  A public show of reporting compliance 
might be a convincing distraction from the reality that no management systems 
or behaviours had actually changed; this research expected to find such factors 
influencing CROs‟ behaviour.  In the event, the present research found banks‟ 
behaviour to be shaped partly by performativity, leading for example to the 
production of plausible (but manipulated) regulatory risk reports.  However, 
other factors had influence:  
 
First, that respondents saw colleagues expressing a strong optimism bias, vesting 
great confidence (pre-2008) in the potential of derivative products to “engineer 
away” downside risk.  This attitude made traders exceptionally resistant to 
conventional approaches to risk governance, presenting a particular hazard 
within a system of self-certifying risk control (such as enforced self-regulation).   
 
Second – and a dominant factor informing the CRO relationship with the Board 
of an aggressively noncompliant or “bad” bank – bankers seemed to care little 
about the consequences of noncompliance, based on a notion that banks are 
“bigger than governments”. 
 
Each of these factors increases public exposure to risk, and fragility in the 
banking sector.  Yet banks‟ response to public concerns prior to 2008 included 
creating the CRO role – which may itself be seen as a performative act, designed 
to display good intentions of better managing risk.  As the research affirms, bank 
Boards regarded their creation of the new senior management role of CRO partly 
as an appropriate response to regulatory demands for public reporting of risk, but 
also as a person on whom all responsibility for internal risk controls could be 
“parked”.  In practice, the two functions of public risk reporting and internal 
control were often found to conflict.  For example, competitive pressure drives 
banks to push products and services into the market as quickly as possible; while 
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compliance risk management prefers to take more time to size up possible 
hazards arising from the product.   
 
CROs themselves conceded that the creation of the CRO role was performative; 
they accept that it can involve performative duties.  In the worst cases the CRO 
role quickly degenerated into a function for supporting profit-making, whilst 
reframing any duties which conflicted with this.  Many banks‟ optimism bias 
was such that in effect they ceased to be governed by systemic risk controls; they 
may even be regarded as ungovernable.  Far from managing risk, for many 
CROs the role consisted of struggling to manage irreconcilable demands.  
 
At the outset of this research it was anticipated that the regulator might 
reasonably expect CROs, out of self-interest, to support enforced self-regulation.  
Instead, enforced self-regulation was found in practice to have the unintended 
effect of placing CROs in a conflicted, even untenable, position. UK bank CROs 
were expected to represent, and internalise, the regulator‟s concerns whilst being 
paid by the employer firm to deflect any risk reporting burden which might 
detract from profit.   
 
CROs reflected that their function turned out to be less defined and more 
complex than anticipated or officially prescribed, requiring sense-making in 
order to decide between various loyalties and priorities.  As empirically found, 
the lines between reporting for the public good and for internal profit were 
indistinct, masking a more complex relationship between CROs and rules.   
 
Some theorists of organization propose that employees‟ innate motivation is the 
determining factor here (as identified in Chapter 6).  Certainly respondents 
recognised that a problem lay in different notions of risk between public sector 
policymakers and private sector traders; bankers‟ risk was more commonly 
conceived as as “focus on commercial outcomes” (C18) than hazard prevention. 
 
This connects with the question of how the CRO may privately reconcile the 
differing notions of risk within the organization; the following subsection will 
consider this and related aspects of sense-making. 
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8.3.4  Expected and unexpected factors: risk perception and 
sense-making    
The final analytical perspective, risk perception, concerns how personal 
cognition of risk influences decision-making under uncertainty.  The literature of 
of risk perception identifies cognitive factors which might have been expected to 
predict the behaviour of CROs and their organizations.  These factors range from 
the brain‟s physical management of cognitive process, to behavioural 
psychology of decision-making under uncertainty, with related considerations 
such as affect and sense-making.  Here one might confidently expect the 
personal experience of the CRO, as the bank employee explicitly identified with 
a grasp of risk information, to add to scholarly understanding.   
 
CROs do engage in sense-making, much as Weick (1995) predicts in managers 
who must make decisions based on unreliable or contradictory information.  As 
identified in Chapter 7, for CROs difficulties begin with the role itself, with its 
built-in tension between public reporting and commercial profit-making.  This 
tension is exacerbated where the quality of risk data available varies, and where 
colleagues are willing to filter and manipulate data, with constant pressure to 
“massage” reports of regulatory capital.  Facing all this, a CRO may decide to 
mount a personal challenge to systemic problems, or more commonly may seek 
to make sense by looking for ways to adjust definitions of risk and expectations 
of the role.   
 
Respondents have rationalised sense-making in the course of telling their 
experiences: even as they understood the limits to their authority, they tried to 
find an alternative and more palatable way of framing the problem of 
compromised controls.  Sense-making solutions included creating any risk 
management initiative – no matter how simple – which might be popularly seen 
to work; and creating risk new report formats which had no practical influence 
over front-line risk-taking.  Sense-making did not (and does not) entail making 
substantive change; rather, the CRO comes to live as a “coping agent”, supported 
in this adopted role by the approval of commercial colleagues. 
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At the individual level, then, uncertainties of fact or allegiance, and/or simple 
fear for self-preservation lead some risk officers to engage in sense-making.  
This produces private compromises which allow the individual to justify (at least 
to themselves) remaining in a role.  The dominant version of sense-making 
which emerges here is the CRO strategy of a rationalised giving-in to 
commercial interests, on the grounds that this is what the employer expects.  
Such sense-making by “knowing and not knowing” may be interpreted as either 
occupying a parallel cognitive state (after Cohen, 2001) – or less charitably as a 
cynical walking away from one‟s responsibilities.    
 
CROs essentially have three strategic options for role definition, two of which 
may lead on to sense-making.  They may challenge strongly on principle, 
confronting those whom they see to be abusing the risk reporting system; this 
approach does not admit alternative interpretations.  The sense-making 
alternatives are: First, to try a more subtle approach to effecting change, seeking 
incremental steps to encourage appropriate behaviour, such as working to teach 
commercial staff about the wider significance of business risk, but allowing that 
there will be some renegotiation as to “what really matters”, both with colleagues 
and to oneself.  Second, they may go straight to a sense-making mode of 
engagement by simply capitulating to the prevailing profit-seeking culture, 
perceiving this to be an irresistible force.  Rationalising such a move to oneself 
would certainly require some adjustments in personal risk cognition.  
 
At a level below these strategies of sense-making there are many everyday forms 
of coping activity.  These are so varied that they are discussed in a separate 
subsection below (8.3.6).   Remaining at a strategic level meanwhile, the next 
subsection proposes a method of conceiving “intent to comply”, newly 




8.3.5  Explaining the variety of banks‟ differing attitudes to 
compliance: a scalar approach 
This section will propose how banks‟ compliance intentions may now be better 
identified and characterised. 
 
Although much comment has here concerned findings which imply high levels 
of noncompliance across the banking sector, this must be moderated by noting 
that respondents had been encouraged to discuss control failures.  It should not 
be concluded from these discussions that banks are systemically corrupt.  It is 
however appropriate to try to distinguish between the cultures of risk prevailing 
in banks with a range of distinct commercial attitudes.  Respondents hinted at 
this by using the (informal) terms “good bank” and “bad bank”.  Most CROs 
suggested some version of the notion that good conduct is the aspirational norm 
(other than on banks‟ trading floors): “the vast majority of City people are… 
trying to do a decent and honourable job” (SM1).  So: The good bank may be 
seen as the virtuous ideal, pursuing compliance; whilst the bad bank is 
caricatured as shamelessly opportunistic and non-compliant.  These might be 
labelled respectively as compliant and defiant, and seen to stand at opposite ends 
of an ethical scale.  Several respondents also suggested the value of recognising 
a third type of conduct of business, between the extremes of compliance and 
defiance: the “out-of-depth” or “muddling through” bank; this term is used to 
describe those institutions, often recently amalgamated, which attempted to trade 
complex financial instruments without properly comprehending the risks 
involved. 
 
The continuing instance of major control failures at time of writing
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 indicates 
that banks continue to face serious problems in restraining the conduct of risk-
taking salespeople.  The pragmatic approach of the past, that occasional lapses 
are to be expected and that banks should continue trading and only stop when 
forced to by the regulator, is no longer politically acceptable.  Yet the industry 
has still to find a better systemic answer (see section 8.5).  
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 For example: JP Morgan reveals shock $2bn trading loss, BBC News, 11th May 2012; Barclays fined over rate-fixing, BBC News 
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The market shock of 2007-8 also challenged the practical value of advocating 
reasonableness, or rational response, in regulation.  Pre-2008, warnings that 
businesses tend to exploit soft regulation had lost ground to arguments that an 
equitable approach to supervision is better for all concerned.  By the time of the 
2008 crisis, all actors appeared to have accepted the premise that, provided firms 
signalled that they were co-operating, the regulator should not rush to intervene 
aggressively.  Consistent with this rationale, a common industry response to the 
banking crisis is that it has been more a failure of execution than of concept.  For 
CROs, this commonly meant accepting that their employment incentives were 
too closely linked to reducing costs of compliance – usually meaning, in 
practice, the largest cost item directly under their control, as noted earlier:  
regulatory capital.  Respondents‟ experiences suggested a need to revise the 
regulator‟s official concept of compliance:  The rest of this section addresses that 
need, proposing to develop one representation of that concept, as first raised in 
Chapter 3. 
 
Bankers are found to be similar to managers in other sectors, in being willing to 
conceive compliance as scalar, rather than binary.  This suggests that control 
agencies might themselves usefully re-conceive compliance, moving away from 
the idea of it as a binary choice (that is, that “you either comply or don‟t”).  
Rather, compliance should be regarded as scalar, ranging along a line between 
“full compliance” and “full defiance”.  This in turn implies a large opportunity – 
beyond the resources of the present study – for regulators to research and 
redefine what “compliance” means for practical purposes.  Meanwhile, the 
perceptions initially collected here offer a simple interim view, that compliance 
is negotiable depending on cultural context; and particularly so within an 
industry which holds its principal regulator in low esteem.  These perceptions 
may help as a starting-point towards developing in future a more precise „scale 
of compliance‟ beyond the notional model here suggested. 
 
An early notional scale of compliance proposed by Morgan and Soin (1999) has 
suggested that the poles of the scale consist of progressive (“good compliance is 
good business”) and defensive (“pragmatic adjustment”).  As here suggested, the 
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scale can be extended further to recognise extremes of both compliance and 
defiance, in the forms of super-cautious „angels‟ and determined deviants, 
respectively (see Figure 8.1).   
 
This scale of “compliance intentionality” is an initial attempt to capture on the 
page how CROs might characterise their own varying attitudes to compliance.  
Three sets of characteristic labels for behaviour represent the three different 
rationales (or sense-makings) offered by CROs depending upon who is asking 
for the explanation:  the regulator, work colleagues, or their own private sense of 
what constitutes an ethically correct course of action.  The scale ranges from left 
to right.  At either end of the scale lie, as one might expect, the poles of full 
compliance and full defiance
31
.  At the left hand end is the scrupulously ethical 
practitioner who aspires to, and may come close to achieving, full compliance – 
although as nearly all respondents noted, some degree of interpretation is always 
inherent in compliance.  At the right hand end, typically insulated by a “bad 
bank” culture of regulatory game-playing, sits the risk manager who has sold his 
soul for profit (or less colourfully, capitulated to business interests).  A CRO at 
the right hand end of the scale is interested in helping traders to sell, and is not 
troubled by the need for reporting transparency.   
 
With recent extreme experience of coping, CROs have proved to be a useful 
source of conceptual framing to populate this model.  Subsequent research – 
beyond present resources – could further develop this model to increase its 
explanatory power.  Whilst the two ends of the scale are intuitively obvious, it is 
the coping range between the two extremes that most concerns the present study.  
As respondents confirm, the role of CRO is inherently interpretative.  For 
example, it can be easier for a novice CRO to excuse misreporting by blaming 
occasional lapses of process; harder, certainly for an experienced CRO, to ignore 
or excuse repeated downward revisions of reported risks by means of redefining 
terms or cherry-picking test results. 
 
                                                 
31
 The three horizontal layers represent compliance states as conceived or labelled by (from top to 
bottom) the regulator, the individual, and colleagues within the informal organization.   
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Figure 8.1:  Coping, within a range of responses to regulation (compliance 
intentionality)    
          Error-intolerant         Tolerating   Misconduct  
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to regulator, or 
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(Model:  Author‟s own synthesis from present research interviews, also with acknowledgement to 
Becker H,; Bevan and Hood; Leidner; Yapp and Fairman; Vaughan; McGoey; Sykes and Matza) 
 
The present empirical findings support the direction of other studies which 
problematise the binary distinction between „compliance‟ vs „non-compliance‟ 
(e.g. Kinnaird, 2005; Fairman and Yapp, 2006).  Unprompted, many CROs 
already conceived organizational compliance with regulatory demands not as a 
simple binary outcome (compliant or non-compliant) but as continuously 
varying.  An individual‟s perception of their own compliance may thus lie at a 
point somewhere along a scale.   
 
Descriptive terms used in the scale were derived by combining and structuring 
present research responses together with published findings of coping responses 
in other sector studies: in particular, Bevan and Hood (2005), Yapp and Fairman  
(2004), Vaughan (1997), and McGoey (2007).  The resulting notional scale does 
not represent a numerical index (although it implies potential for future research 
to calibrate such an index).  The model may, in time, assist wider research in the 
field by providing a basis for comparing compliance-coping behaviour within 
and between various regulated sectors. 
 
This also allows for visualising how a “priming” effect occurs when the 




with the theoretical prediction made by Ayres and Braithwaite [1992], and 
empirical studies in other regulated sectors
32
):  Where regulatees perceive 
clumsiness in the design or enforcement of regulation, they are more likely to 
feel induced towards non-compliance.   
 
Bankers‟ compliance intentionality is also influenced by the same organizational 
factors that Kodate (2009) noted shaping rule-breaking among hospital doctors.  
Bankers similarly deny deliberate resistance to regulatory controls, claiming here 
that it non-compliance is more about having “different priorities, you know, 
„better things to do than that‟” (C22).  Some preconditions identified by Kodate 
are also familiar to bank CROs, such as:  powerful informal groups (“club 
culture”); ambiguously drafted rules, which are creatively reinterpreted; and 
suppression of critical feedback.  Kodate predicts that self-regulating compliance 
will work in an organization only when there are transparent reporting 
procedures, integrated with other forms of risk management.  By such means, 
differences of professional understanding are not allowed to become an excuse 
for ignoring practical lessons (as when reviewing errors). 
   
8.3.6  The nature of coping responses 
Substantive compliance requires significant commitment of banks‟ resources, 
which few are willing to meet without resistance.  It has emerged that banks give 
disproportionate effort to satisfying the regulator‟s demands for information at a 
surface level.  Compliance demands may be coped with by means of a narrow 
focus on correct paperwork – “box-ticking” – which delivers apparent 
compliance without the trouble of actually assessing risk.  Lacking the resources 
or senior management support to produce full compliance, or a financial 
incentive to care about macroeconomic goods, a CRO may be tempted to 
overlook their implied public duty of care – that is, to engage in risk governance 
for the good of financial markets and of the host nation‟s economy. 
  
                                                 
32
 for example in the fields of healthcare (Bevan and Hood, 2005), food production (Yapp and 
Fairman, 2005), pharmaceuticals (McGoey, 2007), public administration (Torriti, 2007) and tax 
accounting (Picciotto, 2008). 
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A notable unintended (coping) consequence of self-regulation was for banks‟ 
risk offices to succumb to the “Goodhart effect”, recalibrating risk according to 
an artificially narrow measure.  The narrow measure most often mentioned was 
regulatory capital.  As an artificially constructed figure designed to satisfy 
regulatory demands and not coming from the management accounts of the 
business, it does not explain dynamic trading risks.  Such business activities are, 
of course, recognised in the management accounts where they inform the 
Board‟s view of business risk (including the true, economic capital, valuation).  
Yet much of the CRO‟s time is occupied with producing a favourable – that is, 
as low as possible – regulatory capital figure.  This is institutionalised coping, 
having no net benefit to risk management; in fact, by simply releasing additional 
funds for traders to take risks with, this activity may be seen as increasing the 
bank‟s fragility.  
 
Coping is conceived by CROs in several ways:  First, as a normative or expected 
as an amoral calculation (after Pearce and Toombs, 1990).  Second, as sense-
making (Weick, 1993) – that is, privately interpreting how the market really 
works.  Finally, as preparation to exercise collective deniability in the event of a 
transgression (McGoey, 2007).  An alternative conception of coping might have 
been for compliance activity in general to be seen as taking place in some form 
of separate cognitive compartment from the core business function of making 
money.  This notion of cognitive disengagement is variously referred to as a 
“parallel universe” (Gapper and Denton, 1996), “other state of mind” (Cohen, 
2001), or “fantasy” of control (Clarke, 1999).  However, this explanation was not 
offered by, or apparent among, respondents. 
 
One other theoretical justification for coping is also not found:  Cohen (2001) 
notes that powerful leaders may detach themselves cognitively from their own 
published reporting documents, dismissing as “insignificant” mere “marks made 
on paper”.  If so, consistent with established models of deviant rationality 
(Vaughan, 1999; Sykes and Matza, 1957) one might also have expected 





, for example, or economic need
34
.  In practice, they did not:  
Instead, rather than seeing any need to rationalise noncompliance, a more 
common characterisation of this behaviour was a self-assured certainty that a 
robust response to a regulator is “just the way we do things around here” 
(Spitzer, 2009). 
 
While as corporate organizations banks have many features in common with 
other corporates – and so susceptibilities to rule-gaming by informal groups – it 
is clear that in many significant respects the culture and activities of banking set 
financial businesses in a class apart. The extreme nature of bank CROs‟ coping 
is not fully explained by the literature.  Coping activities apparently unique to 
bank CROs include manipulation of financial risk input data; creative reduction 
of reported regulatory capital; and support for econometric risk models based on 
the ability of these to offer apparent regulatory compliance for a new product, 
rather than actual customer protection.  Also at the extreme end of coping 
strategies are the Board‟s creation of the CRO role as “flak catcher”; and the 
private sense-making of a CRO who chooses to survive in office by capitulating 
to commercial interests. 
 
If survival strategies are the negative or defensive aspect of coping, CROs do 
also recount more positive framing of coping as career management.  A 
necessary precondition for survival in office is to recognise, and accept, the 
cultural divide between traders and risk managers.  This is so axiomatic that it is 
often mentioned as a self-deprecating “aside” comment, such as that salespeople 
“do find compliance (activity and people) broadly irritating” (C16).    
 
This paragraph identifies briefly a range of personal (coping) responses enacted 
by CROs to process conflicts in their deployment of risk information.  A CRO 
might disown their presence in the process, overlooking a known risk in a 
“Nelson‟s eye” game.  They might support traders‟ assertions that everything 
was all right, on the basis of “the way we do things around here”, or that a 
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 That is, that a commercially creative organization ought to resist any external intervention 
which threatens this creativity; a (false) rationale Cohen calls the “morally appropriate” argument  
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contention often repeated takes on the appearance of a truth.  To prevent being 
marginalised themselves, they might sideline other staff who dissented from an 
approval of a risk.  As discussed at length above, they might engage in creative 
reporting including “work-arounds” to produce a suitably upbeat report on a 
corporate commitment such as regulatory capital.  They might succumb to 
instrumental conditioning, agreeing fatalistically with others that compliance is 
insignificant because either prosecution is unlikely, or it would be troublesome 
to force others to do something non-profitmaking.  Finally, they might 
themselves seek reassurance in the knowledge that the “revolving door” will 
soon take them out of the difficult situation; the point being to survive through a 
three-year term of appointment without any embarrassing control lapses 
occurring on one‟s watch. 
 
To conclude on coping:  The finding that CROs engage in coping leads back to 
the original contention of this research: that some regulatees might be found to 
have flexible notions of compliance.  With sufficient numbers of individuals, 
sufficiently engaged in similar coping strategies, creative compliance might 
begin to operate at the level of the organization.  Coping was found to be a 
systemic tendency in those banks which would “shift towards playing the system 
if the regulator seems to be intervening too much” (C27).  It may be inferred that 
well-intended financial risk control initiatives may be expected to fail when 
traders are allowed to dismiss them as “interruptions to business” (C10), or when 
Boards rationalise that “the more the intervention, the more [we should] shut 
down engagement with the regulator” (C27).   
 
Whilst the existence and nature of coping among CROs is a distinctive finding of 





8.4  Conclusions 
8.4.1  Addressing the problems found 
Primary research substantially confirmed an expectation from the literature that 
risk office good intentions will crumble when placed within a skewed system.  
The bank CRO faced a system loaded against their public reporting 
responsibility, where risk-taking was more incentivised than risk management 
and where the interests of informal sales-side groups had long dictated 
behavioural norms.  Traders were able to reframe aggressive risk-taking in forms 
which were more locally palatable – diluted by favourable econometric models, 
materiality thresholds in aggregate balance sheets, and a pervasive culture that 
risk containment was strictly the preserve of the back office. 
 
The first conclusion is therefore pessimistic:  Enforced self-regulation is an 
unsuitable control system for banks, because they are not internally governable.  
Rather, banks are governed through financial market forces and in practice judge 
their own ultimate success narrowly by how much money they can make.  When 
it comes to business decision-making, power within a bank does not flow from 
respect accorded to formal job titles; rather, it is culturally awarded to the most 
forceful managers, often meaning the most forceful personalities and those who 
achieve the highest gross sales.   
 
Regarding banks‟ external contacts with regulatory agencies, far from seeking to 
contain the regulator by negotiating control bargains or trade-offs, sales-side 
bankers seem to be untroubled by the regulator‟s presence.  Reassured by their 
own institutions‟ collective economic dominance, they feel free to behave like 
the proverbial “bad boy” at a fee-paying school, who knows that his rich parents 
will bail him out of any trouble.  To force this analogy a little further, bankers‟ 





There are significant concerns about how far any agents of public risk control are 
simply ignored.  Analogous research in other regulated sectors suggested that 
self-assured managers may regard defiance as a normal option when responding 
to the regulator; it did not sufficiently predict the high level of indifference found 
in the banking sector.  This level of abuse – or disengagement – suggests the 
need for a fundamental rethink of regulatory approach to the deployment of case 
officers, for example requiring them to make more direct observation of 
behaviour on the sales side of the business. 
 
CROs‟ experiences challenge a regulatory assumption that rational decision-
making is normal in working life.  For the regulator to expect the CRO, as a 
single officer of the business, to stand against all the asymmetries ranged against 
them is wishful.  It may also be disingenuous, if the CRO role is known to be in 
practice a coping agent – or more colloquially as a “fig leaf” for probity in risk 
management.  As the plainest example of affective factors at work, a CRO‟s 
decision whether to report an anomaly may be influenced by a dread of personal 
consequence (such as being labelled a whistleblower, prospective loss of job, and 
then perhaps to be unemployable as a known troublemaker). 
 
8.4.2  Implications of the research for improving CRO 
effectiveness  
Without an upgrading of role, scope, status and reward, the office of CRO runs 
the risk of failing to fulfil any real function, let alone meeting all the expectations 
placed upon it by public opinion and regulators.  Conclusions are now offered as 
to the efficacy of the CRO. 
 
By their own admission, many CROs were indeed installed as a coping 
(deflection) strategy by banks‟ Directors, making sense of compliance demands 
by deploying responses that “looked right”.  This was not necessarily with any 
devious intent but was under an overriding imperative to continue marketing 
products.  CROs‟ practical value was less in arguing against any specific 
regulation than in preventing adverse effects – especially regulatory costs – to 
the business.  Risk management too often is organizationally placed as an early 
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shaper of decisions; it is irrelevantly positioned as the last stage in a decision-
making process, or even a “box-tick” after a decision has been taken. 
 
As to having (or attempting to create) any influence (C18‟s “real power”), few 
CROs initially recognise how the organization has limited their authority, with 
most discovering only over time that they lacked influence in office.  
Nevertheless there is recent optimism for a stronger future role, with risk 
governance and Financial Conduct draft principles now emerging from a general 
regulatory review.  Statutory strengthening of the role of the CRO, and of Non-
Executive Directors, will be welcome to protect them when challenging Board 
decisions.  Any new powers prescribed by statute will still have to be proven to 
work in practice: for now, CROs lacking Board support will still have to canvass 
for allies if they want to achieve substantive progress in risk governance.   
 
Risk officers must also look beyond econometric risk modelling to solve 
problems of control.  Past over-reliance on quantised risk-modelling tended to 
misdirect risk supervision on several levels:  at a high level, by falsely conflating 
multiple processes, whilst at a transaction level, ignoring macroeconomic trends.  
Models failed to generate either a “big picture” warning of crisis or a useable 
temporal prediction of imminent change in market sentiment.   
 
On a related point of reforming culture, the next generation of risk controls needs 
to direct supervisors‟ attention more closely to the behavioural origins of non-
compliance, rather than relying on econometrics.  Future efforts might usefully 
be directed towards observation and analysis of elements which create 
distortions in risk control; these elements are behavioural rather than financial.  
They include aggressive risk-taking conduct; coercion to manipulate reports; and 
denial of opportunities to question decision processes.  New controls should also 
identify as significant the types of misconduct which CROs have highlighted 
here, such as: senior traders who treat bank resources as their personal fiefdom; a 
self-replicating culture of hiring aggressors and firing anyone who dissents; and 
short-termist initiatives which extract immediate cash from the business at the 




Similarly, notions of regulatory capture should be revised to accommodate 
banks‟ extreme practice of it.  The position of CRO may have been created as a 
proxy for the conscience of the organization, but for some CROs this meant 
becoming part of an organization entirely conditioned to exploiting advantage 
over the regulator.  “Capture” is an inadequate term to describe what was 
occurring, or the  behaviour underlying it.  The theory of capture entailing 
“payoffs” is rendered irrelevant where bankers see cooperation as unnecessary 
and where an inconvenient national regulator may be aggressively challenged by 
relocating into a new jurisdiction (regulatory arbitrage).  Banks‟ option to 
relocate or “jurisdiction-hop” presents an unusually strong challenge, which is 
not, of course, a strategy available to many other regulated businesses, such as 
utility providers, which must remain physically attached their customers in a 
defined geographical area.   
 
Earlier models of partial compliance showed practitioners engaging in reframing 
risk definitions to fit extant regulation; an ex-post activity.  Banks, by contrast, 
have been seen to be able to exert strong leverage over the regulator on an ex-
ante basis, since the regulator‟s own understanding has relied heavily upon 
practitioners‟ explanations of what is happening – adding cognitive capture to 
the exploitative factors.  This is firstly a result of selling of complex and opaque 
products which were often created to arbitrage tax or regulatory capital regimes, 
and secondly, with a lack of respect or reward for the function of risk 
management.  These two issues have had a direct impact upon the authority and 
effectiveness of the CRO.  The first (opacity) problem could be solved by 
mandating far greater transparency in reporting, backed by fully independent 
audit.  The second (respect and reward) problem is a cultural issue which needs 
to be addressed systemically by compelling bankers into greater engagement 
with risk management; a market-based solution for this would of course be 
preferable to a regulatory enforcement. 
 
Lack of popular mobilisation against financial wrongdoers has also allowed for 
significant control failures.  The banking sector‟s defensive reliance on old 
assumptions about the inherent value of its work now require more vigorous 
public challenge.  Since deregulation in the 1980s, banks have moved far beyond 
243 
 
their original function of deposit-taking and lending, and notably into speculative 
trading on their own account.  Outside times of financial crisis, public attention 
drifts away from corporate wrongdoers, focusing more naturally on violent street 
crime, and there is greater apathy about regulatory agencies‟ rate of prosecuting 
corporate offenders.  Whilst the 2008 crisis has naturally sharpened public focus 
in the short term, over the long term a lack of sustained and mobilised public 
concern threatens to allow banks to revert to “business as usual”, with diffuse 
accountability for traders‟ risk-taking. 
 
CROs do not emerge well from this aspect of the debate.  Before the 2008 crisis 
broke, respondents broadly perceived that all parties concerned with regulating, 
or being regulated, should try to refrain from publicly criticising the FSA‟s light-
touch approach to supervision, as long as the market remained buoyant.  This 
form of sense-making (or even denial) strategy, sometimes known as a “game of 
no game” (Cohen, 2001), fails to confront the lessons of major market shocks, of 
the type experienced from 2008 onwards.  To disengage from active risk 
management on the basis that the regulator “knows best” is disingenuous, if not 
dishonest as a rationale for avoiding public responsibility.  
 
Connecting all of these aspects of developing efficacy is the question of how to 
give risk control real authority.  If the role of CRO is to have the true authority to 
influence and change bankers‟ behaviour, this will require not only statutory 
authority but also a mandate directly to observe behaviour and prosecute 
misconduct.  Without these powers, the CRO role may come to be – or continue 
to be – regarded as an interesting but ephemeral experiment in establishing the 
practical limits of authority and self-reporting of risk.  If popular opinion 
concludes that this experiment is failing, an alternative approach might be to 
abolish the CRO role and replace it with a new, statutorily backed, independent 
risk auditor.  The scoping of such a role might be the most useful starting-point 




8.5  Increasing scholarly understanding: future research 
directions 
Amid all the media noise about the 2008 financial crisis, popular culture has 
offered several fictional dramatised accounts of the “crash”.  It bears noting 
alongside the various accounts of the crisis in fictional form, that the research 
here offered is distinctive for presenting the real words of senior people in banks, 
whose success and future tenure was being judged every day. 
 
As bankers do indeed conceive compliance as scalar rather than binary, the 
resulting „scale of compliance intent‟ is a relevant starting-point when defining 
the problems of controlling bankers‟ risk-taking.  It does, though, require further 
development and calibration to be of practical use for the regulator.  If the scalar 
model can now be refined, taking forward present findings, this may come to 
offer a more nuanced understanding of coping as a game of compliance 
knowingly played by a highly sophisticated group of risk takers and risk 
managers. 
 
With some econometric tools discredited, or at least conceptually challenged, 
future research efforts should address the development of alternative controls 
based on observed behaviours.  The present research has provided some further 
understanding of how the risk function in banks is modulated in response to 
pressure from informal groups. Social pressure has here been seen to have as 
great an impact as technical and financial factors; the influence of informal 
groups is a feature of the landscape for banks and so should feature on the 
regulator‟s radar.  On this same track, further research could usefully challenge 
the “rationality assumption” that leads policymakers to ignore intuitive and 
affective factors that shape behaviour in regulated groups.  It is, in short, 
irrational to regulate financial markets as if they are rational.  Just as traders are 
used to making deals based on an intuitive thought process, so too regulators 
need to learn to observe and engage with this mode of activity:  research should 
look to develop regulatory efficacy by continuing to improve scholarly 




On a related topic, there is potential public policy value in investigating ways to 
get bankers better to internalise an understanding of long-term risk factors.  
Banks have been seen to be insufficiently engaged with a collective 
responsibility of making global financial markets more robust, rather than more 
fragile.  This might be addressed by studying the systemic benefits of fully 
transparent risk reporting between traders, verified by independent audit.  In any 
event, the present research suggests that any further reform of sector regulation 
might best be guided by a knowledge of the practical experiences of senior risk 
managers rather than dogmatic pursuit of a purely systems-based approach. 
   
It is hard to have any optimism that banks will better anticipate and so avoid 
further crises in future.  The history of banks‟ engagement with regulation to 
date suggests that, following a flurry of reframing of controls in the aftermath of 
each crisis, they will then revert to type, meaning pursuit of profit above all other 
considerations.  We may then expect banks to continue to give public support to 
regulatory initiatives whilst privately devising ways to best limit the impact of 
these.  This long-running story of “beyond capture” is not a simple matter of 
outright defiance or even of selective interpretation (cognitive capture and 
reframing).   It represents a more complex new presentation of knowledge of risk 
not as science but as a synthesis of models and practices, with considerable 
scope for negotiating agreement as to whether a given approach to framing risk 
is robust or even relevant at all.   
 
At least certain known vulnerabilities of organizations are here reaffirmed: 
Banks do resemble other regulated sectors when they devise rationales for 
avoiding compliance costs and look for peer validation of creative compliance. 
The informal organization may be seen as a form of collective risk-aware 
agency, within which individuals are constantly reassessing their own position 
on a scale of compliance. These positions range across collective denial 
(„groupthink‟), to private sense-making, to rejection of control responsibility 
following a contested claim to loyalty. 
 
Facing day-to-day challenges to their mandate to control risk, a risk officer 
cannot be expected to function effectively.  It is also systemically unsustainable 
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to force a CRO to resolve designed-in conflicts of demand by means of private 
sense-making.   Future research might address the deficit of understanding with a 
detailed study of what may be termed the “super-capture” phenomenon, to 
produce a new taxonomy, since “capture” seems insufficient to explain what 
banks do to regulators. Better practical understanding of capture could help to 
avert future failures of regulatory control.   
 
At the same time as developing a new taxonomy of capture, research might also 
usefully examine the related topic of whether banking merits continued treatment 
as a special case for regulation.  Banking is, of course, a commercial activity 
fundamentally unlike other regulated activities, combining massive transactions, 
abstract products, corporate portability, and direct impact on the global economy.  
However, this should not mean that banks should have a licence to set their own 
rules of acceptable conduct.  Recent market shocks have generated large volumes 
of commentary on the failings of financial and regulatory analysis and of process 
management.  What has been missing, and future research must pursue, is a new 
effort to factor in the significance of behaviour.  With better understanding of 
behavioural outcomes – of “what actually happens” – the regulator may begin to 
achieve greater control over bankers‟ tendencies to excessive risk-taking. 
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ANNEX 1:  QUESTION PROTOCOLS 
 
 
- Is regulation (which affects you) aiming for tenable goals?  Are its targets 
effective?  Is it seen as relevant, as “making sense” in the context of your work? 
- Do the regulator‟s interventions invite less-than-wholehearted support in 
response? 
 
- (Could one describe it as a game?)   
..and if so: 
- Who are the active players?   What are the rules? 
- What is the aim?  What rationales do participants (regulated, and possibly 
regulators) offer for gaming?  (e.g. simple deception?  To avoid having to 
modify behaviour?) 
 
Does the regime inadvertently encourage a shift from “honest trying” to 
“opportunistic” response to compliance35?  Might the regulator be complicit in 
the game?  How? 
- What risk communications / artifacts are involved?  (formal/informal: e.g. pro-
forma compliance reports; minuted meetings; unminuted discussions) 
 
Delphi approach: 
- Other respondents have said that………….. .  Would you agree with that 
analogy / observation / the point of that anecdote? 
   
PROMPTS TO STIMULATE RECOUNTED EXPERIENCES 
  
“I‟m interested to know about your personal reaction to regulation and how you 
reconcile any differences between your views and the requirements of this 
organization.   Could we start by your telling me about a time when you or 
someone you know found compliance demands frustrating?” 
 
(If compliance-side):  
“Would it be fair to say that there is a difference in outlook between compliance 
people and marketing people in a financial service organization?  Can you tell 
me about a time when you, or a compliance person you know, came into conflict 
with people from outside the compliance team?” 
 
(If management / marketing / product-side): 
“Would it be fair to say that there is a difference in outlook between compliance 
people and other managers in a financial service organization?  Can you tell me 
about a time when you, or someone you know, came into conflict with internal 
or external compliance people?” 
 
                                                 
35
 From Bevan and Hood‟s (2005) categories 
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 FURTHER PROBE LINES – for use if time allows 
 
 “Are there differences of outlook between compliance managers and product 
managers?  What are these? 
Is there a gap between the performance you report and what actually happens? 
Can a compliance report ever capture real performance? 
What are the hot topics in regulation in this sector right now? 
Are there any recent regulatory interventions which stand out?  [Which, why?] 
What would you ask the FSA, if you could ask them anything anonymously?) 
 
SCALING OF PERCEPTIONS – potential „scoring‟ exercise 
 
“I‟d be interested in what you think of some propositions” [pass one at a time]: 
“To what extent (scale 1 – 5) would you agree with it, privately?” 
“To what extent (scale 1 – 5) would you agree publicly as a representative of 
your employer organization?” 
“Could you tell me about an example of when this was true for you / your 
organization?” 
 
1. Efforts to regulate are motivated by political embarrassment – seeking either to 
avoid it or recover from it. 
 
2. Lower-level managers process work by modifying their roles, reducing the gap 
between available resources and system objectives. Coping strategies are 




3. Regulation by target-setting assumes that targets change people‟s behaviour; 





4. Regulating is a “Nelson‟s eye” game played by government; those at the centre 
would rather not look for evidence of gaming or measurement problems, as 




                                                 
36
 Adapted from Kernick (2004)  
37
 Adapted from Bevan and Hood (2005) 
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ANNEX 2: ETHICAL DISCLOSURE TO RESPONDENTS: 





Re: Risk Management research 
 
The King‟s College London runs various projects looking at the efficacy of risk 
management principles as applied to the design of regulation.  As part of a study 
of effective risk regulation in financial services, I would welcome your views as 
an experienced practitioner. 
 
The study is exploring perceptions of risk and control across the sector.  As part 
of this, to help gain a better understanding of concerns across various 
institutions, I would like to arrange an interview with you.  This would last no 
more than 45 minutes and would if possible be recorded.  I will be asking 
general questions about the perceived relevance of regulatory controls on risk, 
your organization‟s response, and any current focuses of concern. 
 
I would be grateful if you could let me have a few possible dates in ………….so 
that we can arrange an interview.  Please do not hesitate to contact me if you 





King‟s Centre for Risk Management 
King‟s College London 
 
PROJECT SUMMARY 
Staffing:  Roger Miles, supervised by Dr Brooke Rogers. 
Duration:  Project runs from 2006 - 10; original research during 2007 – 09. 
Intended outcomes:   
- Insight into potential for better regulation in UK commercial markets (consonant with 
KCRM‟s continuing work in risk-related policy in Whitehall and Brussels). 
- A research dissertation; conference briefings; potentially, published papers.   
- Summary findings sent to participants; personal debriefing also available. 
Aim:  To offer a fresh approach to understanding: 
- how UK financial service providers accommodate the need for regulation, comparing 
regulatory intent with what actually happens;  
- how providers interact with regulators; and 
- differences between compliance reports and enacted practices.  
ABOUT US 
The King‟s Centre for Risk Management is a centre of excellence in research and consulting on 
risk, regulation and policy issues.  Its staff and graduates work in government, industry and 
NGOs, researching and advising on policy, assessment, management, regulatory design, 
governance, and communication in relation to risk. 
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The devising, by bank-employed mathematicians, of financial 
products reliant on statistical probability models.  Flaws in 
risk assumptions on which these products relied were exposed 
when the 2008 financial crisis hit (for example, that property 
prices will not fall).  Associated products include: precipice 
bonds; credit derivatives (including the resale of “sub-prime” 
debt); interest rate hedges; hedge funds; split-capital trusts; 
and index futures. 
Affective responses Responses based on subjective perception and emotion rather 
than generated by any rational-analytic process (see Slovic 
and Lichtenstein XX) 
Arbitrage trading Exploiting (trading on) price differences between different 
forms of the same asset.  For example: 
- the difference in price quoted for the same asset (e.g. a 
company‟s shares) in two different national markets; or 
- the difference between a share (direct investment) and a 
derivative (secondary investment) for the same asset.  
See index arbitrage 
BBA British Bankers‟ Association (UK financial sector interest 
group representing all licensed deposit-taking businesses, 
ranging from high street “clearing” banks to global 
investment banks).  Produces banks‟ self-regulatory codes of 
conduct and a range of market-enabling instruments such as 
the LIBOR base-rate index and various Master Agreements.  
Bond A note of a debt, issued by a borrower to a lender.  The 
borrower will typically pay the lender a fixed regular sum of 
interest over a set period until an agreed date when the bond is 
to be repaid (redeemed). 
Capital adequacy, 
capital adequacy 
standard / ratio 
As defined by regulation (e.g. the Basel II Accords):  The 
fraction of a bank‟s overall business value which the bank 
must hold ready on its own account (in liquid form) in order 
to be able to pay off its immediate market obligations.  See 
also regulatory and economic capital.  The standard takes the 
form of a prescribed limit on the ratio of a bank‟s own 
business value (capital) against the value of its contracts 
currently in the markets. 
Compliance Compliance can be understood as behaviour conforming to 
the expectations communicated by regulators to regulated 
actors; the regulatee‟s choice of one of the acceptable options 
available for the performance of a particular task (Etienne).  
Contagion / financial  
contagion 
The tendency of one market or nation to respond adversely to 
neighbouring events. Contagion is said to be occurring when 
anxious traders in one nation‟s financial markets adjust their 
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prices pre-emptively as a (psychological) response to events 
in another nation‟s markets, where there is no rational (e.g. 
contracted) reason to do so.  This leads to distortion in market 
prices, sometimes harming economies in other regions even 
when these regions‟ own local circumstances are different.  
“Boom and panic in one country seem to induce boom and 
panic in others, often through purely psychological channels” 
(Kindleberger, 1978, p.119). 
The term is most commonly applied to market panics 
(“catching a cold”) but other affective modes of behaviour are 
also recognised to produce distortions: “animal spirits” 
(Shiller), “irrational exuberance” (Greenspan), “euphoria” 
(Adam Smith) or “overtrading” (Minsky).  The exuberance of 
the much of the 1990s/early 2000s was a form of contagion 
originating in debt-propelled US markets. 
The term appears to have been first applied during the Asian 
market crisis of 1997, when a credit crunch among Japanese 
banks triggered business failures across the region.  From 
summer 2008 commentators have used the term to anticipate 
transmission of damage from America‟s sub-prime mortgage 
crisis into other countries‟ markets.  As noted by Mackay and 
Kindleberger, borne out by many historic market “bubbles”, 
once mass-market investors‟ behaviour begins to reflect a 
perceived (though not yet real) risk, speculative trading turns 
a crash into a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
control model A model designed to test, monitor and control banking risk 
co-optation (see also 
regulatory capture) 
Part of a process of regulatory capture.  A regulated interest 
(or industry) may exert sufficient political and/or economic 
power to dictate the regulatory agenda.  Powerful interests 
may co-opt (seek to make “control bargains” with) regulatory 
agents as a prelude to marginalising them.  (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1995)  
coping; coping 
responses (to e.g. 
regulatory compliance 
demands / enforcement 
interventions) 
A response to situations characterized by uncertainty  (Latack 
1986); may take the form of deflecting the problem itself 
(problem-focussed coping) or the personal anxiety that 
problem effects causes (emotion-focused coping) (O‟Neill 
and Zeichner 1985).  Coping responses relevant to the present 
study include informal modes of compliance; that is, 
interpreting newly-imposed rules in ways which favour 
practitioners‟ continuation of existing behaviours.   
The term “coping” is deterministically adopted in the present 
study to include, but not specifically to infer, a spectrum of 
possible behavioural responses to intervention, including 
wilful ignorance, negotiative gaming or subversive gaming.    
Creative compliance Manipulation of the law [or regulation] to turn it, no matter 
what the intentions of legislators or enforcers, to the surface 
of the regulated actor‟s own interests and so to avoid 
unwanted control  (McBarnet and Whelan, 1991, P848) 
Decision theory The academic modelling of how humans exercise judgement 
under uncertain conditions; factors include the neurology and 
psychology of risk cognition. 
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Defiance In regulatory theory, the opposite of compliance: Refusal by a 
regulated practitioner (or group) to change behaviour in 
response to the regulator‟s demands.  Sometimes disguised by 
completion of a regulatory report (e.g. filling in a form) rather 
than of the task reported on. 
Econometrics, 
econometric Analysis 
Highly formalised tools, derived from mathematical 
modelling of probability, used to calculate risk in financial 
products.  Tools have included Value-At-Risk modeling, 
Monte Carlo testing/simulation, and stress testing. 
Economic capital See regulatory capital 
emotion-focused 
coping 




Supervisor-controlled regulation, in which the bodies under 
regulation are themselves expected to produce the data reports 
the regulator requires to maintain control 
enforcement 
interventions 
Action taken by the regulator‟s staff against a regulated actor 
or group, often publicised, to ensure that the regulate 
conforms to expected behaviour 
FSA The Financial Services Authority; principal regulator for the 
conduct of financial services business in the UK.  (The 
evolution and present role of the FSA is set out in Chapter 2 
of the dissertation.)  
Gaming (compliance) Practitioners‟ exploitation of the “indeterminacy of rules” 
(Braithwaite, 2002) to (re)interpret them in a way that 
strongly favours the practitioner‟s needs, such as freedom to 
market a new product.   
Hedge fund Although widely and loosely used, this term tends to describe 
a fund management vehicle which will typically have the 
characteristics of:   
- being active in multiple jurisdictions (but not necessarily 
regulated in any of them);  
- having a high risk appetite, and therefore not being 
available to “retail”-level investors;  
- trading on opportunities for arbitrage; and  
- highly leveraged (see below).   
A typical hedge fund might play the “long/short equity 
strategy” of buying long equities that are expected to increase 
in value and selling short equities that are expected to 
decrease in value.  Their leveraging (not holding the whole 
value of the main investment, but borrowing against this value 
in order to exploit value at the margins) commonly means that 
hedge fund activity carries a high risk of contagion (hedge-
fund shocks tend to generate anxiety among traders in other 
markets, depressing market prices more widely). 
Index arbitrage, 
arbitrage trading 
An investment strategy:  Exploiting price discrepancies 
between an asset and a derivative (an index future) on the 
same asset.  Trading example:  Selling a stock futures index 
which “looks overpriced”, whilst buying the underlying stock. 
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Insider trades / insider 
trading 
The “market abuse” of passing on privileged price-sensitive 
information, for gain, before its publication in the markets.  
Lack of success in prosecutions for the specific offence of 
insider dealing (only 11 individuals convicted in the FSA‟s 
first ten years, 1997 – 2006) has led to a more recent increase 
in prosecutions under the UK‟s Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (s 397); the new Act granted a wider reach 
for prosecutors by generically banning any “statement, 
promise or forecast that is designed to induce someone else to 
buy or sell shares if the person making the statement either 
knows it to be misleading, false or deceptive in a material 
particular or is reckless as to whether it may be”.  
instrumental 
conditioning 
The human tendency to acquire from empirical experience the 
belief that bad behaviour does not have consequences.  For 
the purposes of the present study, the growing belief that 
control systems may be safely ignored if enforcement action 
never follows non-compliance (Gonzales and Sawicka, 2003) 
Liquid assets, liquidity A liquid asset is something of value which a business holds 
and which can be traded immediately.  Liquidity is the 
measure of how quickly and cheaply an asset or contract can 
be converted into cash. Cash, as the most freely exchangeable 
asset, has the greatest liquidity.  A bank may have many, 
apparently valuable, assets in the form of paper contracts (e.g. 
mortgages) but if it cannot market these in exchange for cash 
it will be unable to trade for long – as Northern Rock 
discovered. 
Liquidity risk The likelihood of not being able to get hold of the cash 
required to settle a contract.  The operational factor that 
destroyed Northern Rock, after its cash supply in the credit 
market dried up suddenly and completely in August 2007.  
local interpretations (Usually) honest attempts to apply broadly-drawn rules to the 
narrow context of an individual or group‟s own business unit 
Market shock An event that disrupts normal functioning of markets, 
typically by undermining assumptions which the market had 
relied upon, and typically triggering a collapse in asset prices.  
Examples:  Earthquakes (Kobe, 1993; Tokyo, 2011); 
interbank credit freeze (2008); regulator‟s suspension of a 
major institution (Lehman, 2008); big-ticket rogue traders 
(Leeson, Kerviel). 
Minimal compliance Relegating of the activities of the compliance officer or 
supervisor to secondary status, for example by excluding 
them from areas such as trading rooms where full compliance 
is expected by the regulator. 
Mis-selling As the FSA‟s own definition (FSA/PN/052/2003) remarks, 
“arguably, mis-selling is not a regulatory concept at all” but 
merely a popular term for “unsuitable or detrimental” product 
sales by a financial adviser to a consumer.  This is further 
defined as selling which contradicts the practitioner‟s general 
FSA-prescribed obligations to act with integrity, care and 
diligence, to communicate clearly and treat customers fairly.  
The FSA has notably intervened on behalf of customers “mis-
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sold” certain pensions and mortgage schemes. 
Monte Carlo analysis A highly formalised tool for risk calculation, used in 
econometric analysis; essentially, a simulation of “spinning 
the roulette wheel” (launching trading) of a financial product 
to see how it will perform.  On the face of it, a fair way to 
assess risk; in practice, wide open to manipulative reporting 
(for example multiple running of simulations, followed by 
selective reporting of only the most favourable test results).      
Moral hazard Market risk which arises after an external agency (e.g. a 
central bank or regulator) has intervened to support a 
practitioner organization which had taken on imprudent risks 
in the market.  Such intervention undermines the regulator‟s 
claims to be “maintaining orderly markets”, as it may appear 
to encourage other practitioners to take on greater risks (since 
the regulator may now be expected to rescue any failing 
practitioner).  Such an intervention also forces the regulator to 
defend the awkward premise that a practitioner may be given 
preferential treatment after a failure of regulatory oversight.  
(See Annex 4, Northern Rock case notes: The Bank of 
England‟s funding for Northern Rock after its business model 
failed). 
Negotiable space Belief that regulation is open to interpretations which favour 
the practitioner.  In this view, coping is seen not as subversive 
but as realistic or pragmatic:  as one CRO has put it, creation 
of “negotiable space” is in the interests of regulator and 
regulated. 
Newtonian assumption The rationalist premise that regulated actors “know what‟s 
good for them” and so may be expected to self-correct deviant 
behaviour as soon as new regulations are introduced 
normalization of 
deviance 
Phrase used by Vaughan (1996) to describe institutions‟ 
excusing of rule-breaking as “just the way we do things 
around here”, or even encouragement of “gaming” of control 
systems (see also Bevan and Hood, 2005). 
Northern Rock British mortgage bank which suffered a catastrophic loss of 
depositor confidence (a “run”) following failure of its funding 
model to generate sufficient cash from short-term money 
trades (qv) to fund its customer obligations during summer 
2007.  (See case notes, Annex 4). 
Offshoring contracting for risks across or beyond national boundaries, to 
escape the jurisdiction of nation-state regulators; a perverse 
consequence of tightening regulation in any one jurisdiction is 
that it may weaken control because practitioners will offshore 
any affected products 
Operational risk A catch-all term used to describe any risks not directly 
ascribed to credit or market factors.  Operational risk is the 
potential cost arising, directly or indirectly, from inadequate 
or failed internal controls or from external events.  Such risks 
might include regulatory intervention, incompetence, fraud, 
inappropriate risk modelling (see Annex 4 case entries on 
LTCM and Northern Rock), and systems failures. 
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Performative response In plain terms, going through the motions of complying (or 
creating the appearance of compliance), but not actually 
changing underlying behaviour 
problem-focussed 
coping 
Coping which regulates stressful person-environment 
interactions (O‟Neill and Zeichner 1985) 
Prospect theory Proposes that a rational actor makes a decision based on its 
“expected outcome value”.  This value is a product of 
subjective probability multiplied by a psychological 
weighting (empirically identified by Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992) which reflects the human tendency to overestimate low 
probabilities and underestimate high ones.   
Prudential (regulatory 
policy) 
A policy (and in practice, standard) set by the regulator for 
appropriate risk-taking.  Many of the FSA‟s current control 
specifications are set out in a manual entitled The Prudential 
Sourcebook.   
pyramid of 
enforcement 
Principal that the greater the risk taken, the tougher the 
enforcement action that a regulatory agency may choose to 
take against its perpetrator in the event of wrongdoing. (Ayres 
and Braithwaite, 1992)  
Rational non-
compliance 
“Whenever a standard is set, some firms will decide that the 
costs of compliance are greater than the costs of 
noncompliance (probability of detection multiplied by the 
costs if detected).  As standards are made more stringent, the 
costs of compliance increase steeply while the costs of 
noncompliance remain more or less constant.  Hence, as 
standards become more stringent, the performance of firms 
that comply improves, but additional firms choose to risk 
penalties for noncompliance…  thus… further tightening of a 
standard may lower overall performance.”  
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992, p107, based on Viscusi and 
Zeckhauser‟s 1979 research findings) 
Regulatory arbitrage Also known as “jurisdiction-hopping”: the practice of 
relocating one‟s corporate headquarters (and hence regulated 
reporting) into a jurisdiction which offers the lightest 
compliance burden (or disclosure requirements). 
Regulatory capital and 
economic capital 
Regulatory capital is a monetary amount (or percentage of 
business value), prescribed by the regulator, which a bank 
must hold ready to pay its immediate market obligations.  
Economic capital is a more commercially discretionary 
amount which a business may choose to keep available to 
fund its own continuing market development.    
regulatory capture When a politically and/or economically powerful regulated 
group is able to use this power to dictate the regulatory 
agenda 
Regulatory risk The commercial cost, or probable cost, engendered by 
compliance or otherwise with regulation; the commercial 
impact of compliance with regulation itself 
Regulatory theory essentially concerns how rules may framed so as to influence 
behaviour and secure support for the rules (compliance).   
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Response effects Ways in which researched respondents adapt their behaviour 
or responses because they are aware of the researcher‟s 
presence (e.g. answering with “what the questioner wanted to 
hear”, as distinct from what the respondent actually perceives 
or believes).  May call into question research validity where 
responses are other than might be expected.  Noted as a factor 
possibly compromising findings in the Hawthorne studies 
(Mayo, 1949). 
Risk A broadly applied and defined term, occurring as a key 
concept, albeit with various professional inflexions, in 
literatures of public health and safety, clinical medicine, 
financial product engineering, civil engineering, insurance 
underwriting and actuarial work – none of which is the focus 
of the present study 
Risk communication The way that risk is communicated between stakeholders, 
particularly between CRO and other internal members of the 
organization and between CRO and regulatory supervisor 
risk control stories  
Risk metrics Methods of formal measurement of risk; see also 
econometrics 
Risk Reports In banking, conventionally accepted in the form of summary 
trading activity stress tests 
Run (as in: run on a 
bank; bank run) 
To maintain a business, banks rely on their depositors leaving 
money on account;  money deposited is lent on to borrowers, 
generating interest payments.  If depositors lose confidence 
that the bank is a safe place to leave their money, and demand 
their deposit back, the bank may not be able to produce the 
cash necessary to repay them (because the money deposited 
may be “out at work”).  When depositors become anxious and 
decide to withdraw their funds en masse, the cash shortfall 
becomes self-fulfilling:  A sudden mass demand for cash can 
render a bank insolvent, although ironically it is this “run” 
which will have created exactly the outcome which the 
depositors feared. 
scale of compliance 
model  
A model of compliant behaviour designed to question the 
validity of the binary indicator (which suggests that regulated 
practitioners are are either compliant or non-compliant).  This 
model proposes degrees of “compliance intentionality” which 
may vary according to external circumstances and individual 
affect.  
Securitization Converting the value of assets held (corporate equipment, 
property, mortgages) into paper contracts which can be traded 
on the financial markets, as shares are.  For example,  a 
mortgage bank‟s “securitized debt” could be the consolidated 
total value of its mortgage loans, re-denominated into a large 
number of smaller-value tradeable contracts and sold into the 
bond market. 
Self regulated market 
risk 
assumption regards over-reliance on indicator systems and 
implicitly the devaluing of personal and empirical experience 
of risk-taking.  This may be described as the “models 
assumption”.  In the UK banking sector, it refers to 
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regulators‟ belief – or hope – that control systems are 
effective as long as they are well-populated by market-derived 
risk models.   
Sense-making A term from organizational behavioural science, pioneered by 
Karl Weick (1995, etc.), following a theory by Starbuck and 
Milliken (1988).  Faced with unclear or complex information 
or instructions, “incongruous events that violate perceptual 
frameworks”, people will resolve the tension by constructing 
their own interpretations.  “Perceptions and actions [then] 
validate one another”, with the whole organization adjusting 
its own “fit” with reality and its environment.   
Shadow banking A term coined by the US Federal Reserve in 2010 for 
products which trade outside the licensed jurisdiction of 
banking – including hedge funds (see separate entry).  May 
account for a market worth more than the value of the entire 
licenced market.  
Short-term money 
markets 
A market, local to each major financial centre, in which 
financial institutions can trade large volumes of short-term 
debt and securities at preferential (“money market”) local 
rates of interest available only to participating institutions. 
Solvency Ability to pay debts when they fall due for payment; hence 
also, a technical measure of the extent to which an 
organization has this ability (the “solvency ratio”).  If a 
company becomes “insolvent”, it owes more than it owns -  so 
will not be able to pay its debts, and must be shut down. 
Stocks Generic name for securities; that is, certificates for shares 
representing part ownership of a business, or a part share of a 
loan to a business. 
strategic ignorance To gain comfort from redefining certain threats as less 
immediate, either at a cognitive level (as with hindsight bias 
[Fischhoff, 1982]) or by rearranging their information systems 
so as to suppress discomforting data (McGoey‟s [2007] 
Stress Testing Highly formalised risk calculation tools used in econometric 
analysis 
Sub-prime Mortgage lending to borrowers who have had past credit 
problems (payment delays, defaults or bankruptcy).  Offers a 
higher risk/return ratio (the borrowers are more likely to 
default, but as a result they can be charges higher rates of 
interest).  A volatile market, as the potential for greater profits 
is at odds with low-income borrowers‟ high vulnerability to 
any rise in interest rates. 
Systemic stability (Technical definitions vary between various nations‟ central 
banks.  However, as a generic definition:) 
- Tolerable probability of failure of any individual financial 
institution; and 
- Tolerable losses in the event of any institution failing; and 
- A tolerably low level, and evenly distributed nature, of 
interconnected trading activity between institutions, so 
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Tafel van Elf 
A tool for policy developers and drafters to conduct ex ante 
testing of proposed legislation, offering a rating of expected 
compliance extrapolated from measures of “the objective 
and/or subjective perception of a specific rule by a specific 
target group”.  Developed for the Dutch Government by Prof. 
Dick Ruimschotel (Erasmus University).  An interactive 
version of the tool includes data management, checklists for 
legislators and a "motives-for-compliance test", producing a 
Compliance Estimate.  A 60-item legislator checklist gives 
policymakers a first impression of the extent to which 
proposed legislation may be expected to be complied with;  
this is followed by detailed tests for feasibility and 
enforceability.  The motives-for-compliance test offers 
enforcement agencies an indication of the motives of the 
target group for complying with a rule, identifying the rule's 
weak and strong points for according to the target group and 
giving early warning of problem areas.  Finally a Compliance 
Estimate highlights types of persons most likely to be 
compliant or non-compliant.  
Source:  Dutch Government: Justitie (Ministry of Justice) at:  
http://www.it11.nl/it11/login.jsp?page=2 
Tripartite supervision The system of UK banking regulatory agency created by 
Gordon Brown (when Treasury minister).  Three bodies 
shared responsibility for oversight of banking:  HM Treasury, 
the Bank of England, and the Financial Services Authority.  
Each had lead responsibility for different aspects of banking 
practice.  A government review of the perceived failings of 
this system in June 2008 is reported to have the effect of 
increasing the Bank of England‟s authority and removing 
some elements of agency from the FSA. 
Value-At-Risk 
modeling 
Risk model which assumes for the purposes of regulation that 
a product‟s risk may be fully determined by the underlying 
value of its contract at a particular moment in time (such as 
the day of an annual audit).  One of the highly formalised, and 
hence highly manipulable, risk calculation tools used in 
econometric analysis. 
Virtualised products Financial products such as certain forms of derivatives, 
purchased on trust more than as a result of financial analysis. 
Wraps, wrap platforms Web-based portfolio administration services allowing 
financial advisers (and sometimes unadvised investors) to 
view and administer a portfolio of investments. 
 
 
Sources:  Oxford Dictionary of Banking; The Economist Guide to the City; 




ANNEX 4: SUMMARY TIME-LINE AND CASE NOTES: 
RECENT (ILLUSTRATIVE) MARKET SHOCKS 
AFFECTING PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF REGULATORY 
CONTROL IN THE UK 
 
4A: SUMMARY TIMELINE – case details in 4B following 
1978 – 1996 – Insider trading frauds by 
“names” at Lloyds of London 
(insurance market) 
1984 – Midland Bank / Crocker 
takeover 
1984 – Johnson Matthey fails 
1986 – Morgan Grenfell, Ansbacher 
and Cazenove: Guinness/Distillers bid 
fraud 
1988 – Barlow Clowes investor fraud 
1989 – Hammersmith and Fulham 
Council massive losses on derivatives 
1990 – British and Commonwealth 
acquires a fraudulent broking business  
1991 – Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International revealed as a bank for 
criminals 
1992 – Maxwell Communications 
defrauds its pension fund 
1993 – European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development 
corruption 
1994 – Pensions misselling revealed in 
349 firms: £12bn compensation paid 
out 
1994 – 2002 Rogue trader s destroy 
Kidder Peabody, Barings , Daiwa, 
Sumitomo, Allied Irish  banks 
1995 – Barings Bank falls to a rogue 
trader  
1996 – Morgan Grenfell Asset 
Management: worthless product 
marketed by fund manager discovered 
to be insane 
1998 – Credit Suisse First Boston 
discovers “Flaming Ferraris” corrupt 
trader team 
1998 – Long Term Capital Management 
hedge fund fails 
1999 – Equitable Life bankrupted by its 
own product promises 
2000 – NatWest Capital Markets trade 
risk reporting fraud destroys its parent 
company 
2001 – Marconi‟s capital wiped out by 
Board-level failure of risk governance  
2002 – Split-capital Investment Trusts 
revealed to be a front for insider trading 
2003 – High risk “Precipice Bonds” 
mis-sold to retail investors 
2005 – Credit Suisse First Boston 
bank‟s compliance officer revealed as 
major fraudster 
2007 – Northern Rock bank collapse 
2008 – Societe Generale seeks to blame 
£3.7bn loss on a single rogue trader 
2008 – Collapses of Bear Stearns, 
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch banks 
and American International Group 
insurance (US), HBOS and Alliance & 
Leicester banks and Bradford and 
Bingley building society (UK), Anglo 
Irish and Allied Irish banks (Eire), 
Glitnir, Kaupthing and Landesbanki 
(Ireland), Roskilde and (Denmark) and 
others,  following overselling of 
mortgage-related contracts 
(“subprime”).  UK high street banks 
nationalised. 
2008 – Collapse of Royal Bank of 
Scotland following acquisition of 
failing ABN AMRO bank 
2008 – Bernie Madoff‟s investment 
house revealed as largest-ever pyramid 
selling (Ponzi) scheme  
2010 – Greek banks and national 
economy fail after over-borrowing 
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Annex 4B:    
MARKET SHOCKS AFFECTING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN 
REGULATION 
Summary case notes on incidents and consequences 
 
1984: Midland Bank (Crocker Bank takeover): A UK bank acquired a US bank 
subsequently hit by a Latin American debt crisis. £1billion was lost, and Midland was taken 
over, possibly technically insolvent. 
 
1984: Johnson Matthey: A bullion dealer expanded into commercial loans, which failed. 
The Bank of England‟s attempts to arrange a “lifeboat” rescue by commercial banks was 
rejected by them. The Bank of England was accused of negligence. In response, the Banking 
Act 1987 expanded the Bank of England's  supervisory remit. 
 
1986:  Morgan Grenfell (and advisers Ansbacher, Cazenove): Guinness takeover bid for 
Distillers: The Guinness corporation participated in an illegal scheme to artificially inflate its 
own share price and thereby make its bid for Distillers, a rival, more attractive, indemnifying 
the buyers against any loss. Ernest Saunders, the chief executive of Guinness, was jailed for 
five years. Another businessman and a trader were jailed for theft and false accounting, and a 
financier fined £4m.  The trial of executives of merchant bankers Ansbacher and Morgan 
Grenfell collapsed, and charges against an executive of Cazenove, the broker, were dropped. 
 
1988: Barlow Clowes: A bogus fund manager stole £150m savings from elderly investors 
after marketing a “too good to be true” investment promise.  HM Government admitted 
regulatory maladministration (via DTI) and paid net compensation of £74 million. 
 
1989: Hammersmith & Fulham Council: A local authority treasurer trying to boost funds 
by playing the derivatives market lost £500m of ratepayers‟ money. 78 other local authorities 
were then found to be exposed to similar market risks.  House of Lords ruled that all the 
transactions were void (because the treasurers had acted ultra vires – outside their 
professional remit), leaving the advisor banks to pay off £750m on more than 1000 annulled 
contracts.  (A similar incident occurred when Orange County, California, bankrupted itself 
following a $1.6billion bad trade in derivatives.) 
 
1990: British & Commonwealth Holdings (and advisers BZW):  Financial holding 
company acquired a money broker without fully noticing “irregular accounting practices” 
which compromised its value.  The deal‟s advisers BZW paid £116m compensation for 
failing to exercise “due diligence”. 
 
1991: Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI): A London-headquartered Shia 
Muslim bank exported its massive trading losses ($849m) off UK balance sheet into offshore 
subsidiaries. Creative accounting, theft of deposits, and money laundering for various global 
drug barons, arms traders and kleptocratic regimes added up to what was reported at the time 
to be the biggest bank fraud in history. An offer to launder money for an undercover US 
Federal Agent in Miami led to prosecution and foreclosure on 150,000 depositors.  25% of all 
money deposited had disappeared ($2 billion).  Analysts noted that BCCI  “demonstrated 
how criminally-minded international bankers could outwit regulators and accountants with 
national remits”.  A spur to the setting up of the global Financial Action Task Force, a group 
of central and commercial banks and the governments of the world‟s leading economies 
acting to combat money laundering. 
 
1992 – Maxwell Communications Corp. (and advisers Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Goldman 
Sachs): City “buccaneer” Robert Maxwell funded grandiose  acquisitions by forging profit 
figures, stealing from his employees‟ pension funds, and continually moving cash around 
between accounts to conceal its extent and origins.  All this was revealed when he died, 
probably as a suicide.  Advisers were said to have had “had their vision clouded by fat fees” 
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and the auditors, accused of having “lost the plot”, paid a £67m settlement and £3.4m fine.  
Defrauded pensioners‟ anger was compounded by professional fees of £30m paid to advisers 
on the receivership – pronounced “shameful” by the High Court judge in the case. 
 
1993 – European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: The EU and US funded a 
new bank designed to assist new eastern European countries‟ transition to market economies.  
Audit revealed that three years after its foundation (in 1990) it had spent twice as much 
money on housing itself (£200m) as on the loans it was supposed to be making – including a 
massive marble-lined London headquarters.  Directors were ousted and business has since 
continued more normally. 
 
1994 – Pensions mis-selling by Prudential, Royal & Sun Alliance, and 347 other firms: In 
1988, wanting to encourage people to save for their old age, the Government had intervened 
to open up a market for personal pensions.  Many commission-driven pension sellers 
regarded this as an opportunity to persuade people to leave perfectly adequate employer 
schemes and convert to their private schemes.  The “clear-up” continued more than 10 years 
later, with 349 pension provider businesses disciplined by the FSA, £11million in fines and 
£12billion in compensation payments. 
 
1995 – Barings Bank and Barings Securities:  The Board of this venerable, medium-sized 
London bank employed a trader they believed to be gifted to set up a new derivatives trading 
operation in Singapore.  The trader, Nick Leeson, was unqualified to deal in options and a 
gambling addict.  He booked losses of £342million  to a concealed “error account”, while 
reporting fictitious profits of £40 million.  Barings awarded him large cash bonuses and 
continued to support his “amazing” performance by providing £500m – more than half the 
value of the bank itself – in margin payments (in effect, stake money).  After the Kobe 
earthquake in January 1995 demolished his bets on Japanese market recovery, Leeson took a 
“double-or-quits” gamble for $7bn and fled; the bank duly collapsed.   The Bank of England 
was keen for the commercial banks to rescue Barings (to avoid BofE‟s moral hazard in 
bailing it out itself) but the banks refused to help – a significant turning-point in relations 
with the regulator.  Barings‟ directors were criticised for being “absurdly amateurish and 
complacent” and for the “total collapse of management control” in supporting Leeson‟s 
activities.  The Barings collapse is widely regarded as the point at which the Bank of England 
forfeited the right to supervise banking, and a catalyst for the creation of the FSA on the 
arrival of a new Labour government in 1997. 
 
1994 – 2002 Rogue traders at Kidder Peabody ($350m), Daiwa ($1.1bn), Sumitomo ($3bn), 
Allied Irish Banks ($750m):  Over nearly a decade a series of highly motivated rule-breakers 
created record losses on individual trading activity.  They may be seen as either criminal 
opportunists or perverse-consequence victims of the banks‟ “star trader” system, which 
during those years rewarded extreme risk-taking.  A significant regulatory outcome was the 
introduction of supervision based on Value at Risk (VaR) modelling and regulation 
(including FSA) which expressly makes a virtue of intervening in proportion to the risk being 
taken. 
 
1978 – 1996 Lloyds of London insider trading by “Names” (“baby syndicates”): Formerly 
run as a form of private members‟ club for people wanting to gamble on insured risks, 
Lloyd‟s began to face lawsuits over liability for large losses and in 1982 an Act of Parliament 
attempted to impose modern corporate governance.  But in 1982 one underwriter implicated 
in a $55m fraud was acquitted and another who carelessly lost £130m was sued for stealing 
funds from his backers (the “Names”).  On taking up office in 1983, Lloyd‟s first CEO 
uncovered rampant insider trading, with preferential trades among senior members of the 
market siphoning off £100m of investors‟ funds annually.  Yet the market continued to 
expand, bringing in commercial (as opposed to private-investor) funding until 1987, when a 
series of massive liabilities and £8billion in catastrophe losses laid bare the market-makers‟ 
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“incompetence and indifference”.  The Names sued, receiving a £3.2billion settlement, and 
Lloyd‟s was forced to reconstitute with full corporate governance. 
 
1996 – Morgan Grenfell Asset Management (unit trusts): A highly-regarded fund manager 
and mathematical genius succumbed simultaneously to temptation and to serious mental 
illness.  Shortly after winning a “Fund Manager of the Year” award, Peter Young made a 
series of unlicensed investments in minor high-tech companies and inflated the values of 
these investments in MGAM‟s accounts.  The stocks were in fact worthless. Despite a £2m 
fine from the regulator, a £10m public prosecution of MGAM collapsed, with Young judged 
unfit (through insanity) to stand trial and three other managers acquitted on technicalities. 
 
1998 – Credit Suisse First Boston:  “Flaming Ferraris” trader team: A flamboyant group of 
young equity traders specialising in index arbitrage (a form of computer-driven speculation) 
hired a publicist to try to boost their claims to a performance bonus.  Buoyed up by the 
resulting media coverage, one of the traders, MP‟s son James Archer, made insider trades 
from a mobile phone in an attempt to “ramp” his personal performance with his employer.   
The Swedish company whose shares he traded detected the fraud.  The Swedish regulator 
fined CSFB; the UK regulator suspended Archer, and two managers who failed to supervise 
him, for life. 
 
1998 – Long Term Capital Management: This hedge fund made arbitrage trades with a 
very high level of gearing ($4bn of actual capital sustaining $200bn of investments).  Its 
ingenious trading model at first yielded spectacular profits, and investors piled into the fund 
with exemplary “optimism bias” (the “irrational exuberance” noted by the US central bank 
chief Alan Greenspan).  However, LTCM had a large exposure to the growth of “developing 
markets”, notably including Russia.  The fund suddenly fell $2.1bn short of the capital 
required to fund its margin calls after Russia‟s shock devaluation of the rouble and 
suspension of international debt repayments in August 1998.  LTCM‟s highly academic 
trading model, supervised by a prominent Board of Management, failed to take account of 
certain potential real-world changes in the fundamental value correlations between markets 
(such as a currency devaluation).  With capital inadequate to cover its market obligations, 
LTCM collapsed, generating $200bn “contagion” losses. 
 
1999 – Equitable Life and its guaranteed annuities: During the high-inflation, high-interest-
rate markets of the 1970s and 1980s, the UK‟s second-largest provider of pensions and life 
assurance had set up products which guaranteed around a 12% annual payout on investments 
to 90,000 of its 1million customers, many of whom were high-earning individuals.  When in 
the 1990s markets subsided into low inflation and interest rates, Equitable found it could no 
longer afford to pay the “guaranteed” returns to these customers and asked its lawyers to seek 
a release from its guarantees.  Customers sued for breach of contract and the courts agreed.  
Equitable suspended new business, cut its payouts to non-guarantee customers, and was sold, 
in a complex rescue package entailing £0.5billion of written-off liabilities, to Halifax bank. 
 
2000 – NatWest Capital Markets: unreported losses following mispriced trades in options:  
Repeated warnings from internal and external auditors about lack of controls on reporting of 
trades had passed unheeded for three years.  Meanwhile a £90.5million “black hole” stood, 
undisclosed or possibly even unnoticed, on the trading book after two traders overstated 
valuations of their dealings in order to conceal the loss.  NatWest‟s other dealers were forced 
to forfeit their bonuses (£8million+) to make good the loss; the FSA imposed £420,000 in 
fines and suspended the traders involved; the control failure cost several senior executives 
their jobs; and the parent company (NatWest) was sold following a hostile takeover bid. 
 
2001 – Marconi failure of risk governance: One of the world‟s largest electronics businesses, 
the former General Electric Company destroyed its own capital value, which collapsed from 
£35billion to £1billion in a single year, by acquiring a string of technology companies the 
year the dotcom/ telecomms technology market bubble burst.  Following a timidly announced 
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profits warning, shareholders evicted the Board but then had little choice but to support a 
rescue package which reduced share value still further; share price fell from a historic high of 
£12.50 to just 4 pence.  The collapse of Marconi was a significant motivator of calls for more 
transparent corporate risk reporting in the 2000s. 
 
2002 – Split-capital investment trusts:  Sold since the 1960s, these products had promised 
investors either high income and or strong capital growth, according to their needs and 
preferences.  50,000 private investors had bought them by the time nearly half of all split-cap 
funds ran into difficulties as a result of overgearing (unsustainable borrowing to fund 
purchases).  The FSA‟s biggest investigation to date revealed that 17% of the value of split 
caps was accounted for by fund managers who had been supporting each others‟ fund values 
by trading among themselves. 
 
2003 – “Precipice bonds” mis-selling: Lloyds TSB fined: The FSA fined Lloyds TSB a 
record £1.9million and extracted £98million in customer compensation for the bank‟s mis-
selling of bonds which guaranteed 10% return only for as long as markets could support this 
return (thereafter the interest payable would “fall off a cliff” – hence the bonds‟ nickname).   
The FSA used the occasion of the fine to announce a new intention to drive out any 
“persistent malfunctioning of the market” through mis-selling. 
 
2005 – Credit Suisse First Boston: fraud by compliance officer:  Asif “The Walrus” Butt, a 
compliance officer, was jailed following a series of share trades made by old school friends, 
whom he had tipped off shortly before market announcements.  The reported loss was 
£265,000 but it was believed that Butt had made as much as £2m for himself at investors‟ 
expense.  The trial judge highlighted the “severe damage” done to investors‟ confidence in 
systems of oversight. 
 
2007 – Northern Rock: This UK mortgage bank had pursued a growth strategy which relied 
for more than 77% of its funding on short-term debt issued in the capital markets, rather than 
on customer deposits.  On 9
th
 August 2007, this funding source evaporated as the US “sub-
prime” mortgage market crashed.  British customer anxiety was heightened by a well-known 
shortfall in  protection for deposits – at the time, only deposits up to £31,700 were 
guaranteed.  Following disclosure on 7
th
 September by BBC News
38
 that “a high street bank” 
was in trouble,  the Bank of England publicly stepped in to save Northern Rock as “lender of 
last resort”, and HM Treasury offered an emergency deposit  guarantee.  This action 
contradicted the BofE‟s stated principle of avoiding moral hazard, although it claimed that 
the “penalty rate” of its emergency funding offset this. The banking industry‟s advocacy 
group, the BBA, in a rare acknowledgement of the power of news media to amplify panic, 
urged the media and the public to “calm down”.    
   Similarly to the Barings case,(1995), all 12 of the European banks initially approached to 
buy out Northern Rock declined.  In succeeding months the Government was criticized for 
allowing some commercial rescue offers to lapse, increasing the risk that the Rock could only 
be rescued through nationalisation,  a politically embarrassing option for HM Treasury and 
                                                 
38
  
The BBC‟s decision to support the its business editor, Robert Peston, in publicising Northern Rock‟s 
covert approach to the Bank of England, was itself controversial; some bankers accused the BBC of inducing 
panic.  BBC head of news Peter Horrocks justified the leaking of the story thus:  “Announcing to an unsuspecting 
public that a major high street name appeared to be in trouble obviously ran the risk of causing depositors to panic 
and withdraw their funds. …We broke this dramatic news in a responsible fashion, explain[ing] the causes of the 
crisis in a way that audiences unfamiliar with financial markets would understand. But is it the BBC's job to tell 
people to be calm and advise them what to do? We are not financial advisers… We judge it is right for us to report 
the reassurance being offered by the Bank of England and the FSA and our correspondents have offered the 
judgement that those reassurances are legitimate.  But it's not the BBC's job to tell the audience what to do with its 
money.”  (BBC Editors‟ blogspace, 14.9.07: http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/theeditors/2007/09/ 
preventing_panic.html) 
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the regulatory system in general.  However, Northern Rock was not seen as “Too Big To 
Fail” and entailing systemic risk, unlike the SocGen case, next below). 
 
2008 – Société Générale (SocGen) bank: risk control system hacker / rogue trader:  Unlike 
Barings or Northern Rock, SocGen is one of its host country (France‟s) largest commercial 
institutions.  As a national retail bank and significant in global markets, it is in a category of 
super-banks known as “TBTF” (Too Big To [be allowed to] Fail).  SocGen employee Jérôme 
Kiervel, a novice trader allegedly acting alone, for a year ran a “concealed enterprise”.  
Having previously worked as a clerk in the bank‟s back office, Kiervel used his knowledge of 
reporting systems to regularly disable the bank‟s risk-control software, enabling him to run 
up €30billion of exposure to open futures contracts.  The fraud was discovered when Kiervel  
neglected to override one of the exposure alarms.  Coincidentally, the next trading day 
(January 21st) saw the largest stock market fall in 25 years.  
   Although SocGen had alerted its regulators, the bank was allowed to conceal news of the 
fraud from the markets for three days, to minimise the onward costs of “contagion” whilst it 
attempted in private to unwind Kiervel‟s exposure.  By the time SocGen revealed its 
“terrifying accident” to the markets three days later, it had reduced the directly related losses 
to €5billion (£3.7billion), on top of its €2billion losses incurred during the sub-prime collapse 
in the preceding weeks.  Despite the chairman‟s protests, few market watchers believed that 
Kiervel could have been acting alone; lawyers acting for SocGen shareholders said that if he 
had done all the damage entirely by himself, Kiervel “deserved a medal for ingenuity”. 
 
2008 – Bear Stearns:  This venerable US-based investment bank and securities trading 
brokerage was founded in the 1920s. During the US mortgage boom it issued large quantities 
of asset-backed securities, and over  2006 and 2007 it increased its exposure, especially to the 
US mortgage-backed securities central to the so-called „subprime mortgage crisis‟.  Drastic 
falls in the prices of previously highly-rated assets led to the failure of two large hedge fund 
subsidiaries in summer 2007, followed by widely-predicted collapse. An emergency loan 
from the Federal Reserve Bank in March 2008, could not save the company, and Bear was 
sold to JP Morgan Chase for $10 per share. JP Morgan ceased using the Bear Stearns name in 
2010. 
 
2008 – Lehman Brothers: UK-based accounting fraud: The fourth-largest investment bank 
in the USA, founded in 1850, Lehman had global business in financial services including 
private equity and fixed income sales and trading. The credit ratings downgrade of assets in 
which it held very large positions, and the consequent collapse of client confidence, triggered 
a filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in September 2008.  The Bankruptcy Examiner 
prominently reported its use of a window-dressing accounting practice known as “Repo 105”, 
technically permitted in the UK but not in the US, through a UK subsidiary. This raised 
important questions on the management of global bankruptcies and the transfer of assets, and 
the possibility of an orderly bankruptcy for a global firm. 
 
2008 – AIG: American International Group had entered into Credit Default Swaps insuring 
enormous volumes of highly-rated asset-backed securities, including subprime mortgage 
backed securities.  The downgrade of these assets and of its own rating forced the company to 
offer guarantees to creditors and counterparties. The Federal Reserve provided a secured loan 
of up to $US85 billion to prevent bankruptcy in September 2008, and took a 7.79% equity 
stake. Controversy arose from further loans and post-bailout expenditures, especially on 
employee bonuses, and from the large sums paid through AIG to global financial institutions 
who had already received taxpayers‟ support, and those outside the USA. 
 
2008 – HBOS:  This bank was the product of a 2001 merger between Halifax  bank and the 
Bank of Scotland, forming a fifth bank comparable in size to the big four UK retail banks at 
that time.  In September 2008, HBOS suffered volatility and a collapse in its share price 
following the collapse of Lehman, a loss of confidence, and rumours that it has asked the 
Bank of England for emergency funding. HBOS became a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
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Lloyds banking group, HM Government allowing the merger to bypass competition law. 
There was much speculation about the role of short-selling in precipitating the merger, but in 
February 2009, Lloyds revealed losses of £10bn at HBOS.   In March 2009, the UK 
government increased its stake in Lloyds Banking Group from 43% to 65%. 
 
2008 – Bradford and Bingley had converted from a building society to a bank, and floated 
on the London stock market, in 2000. It then abandoned standards in lending, making more 
than 80% of its mortgages to borrowers self-certifying their income or buying to let.  During 
the financial crisis, its ability to obtain funding on the international markets disappeared. In 
the understandable absence of any interest in a takeover, Bradford and Bingley was 
nationalised by the UK government at the end of September 2008. Its retail operations and 
branch network were sold to Grupo Santander. 
 
2008 – Royal Bank of Scotland:  In April 2008, RBS announced a rights issue intended to 
raise £12bn to offset £5.9bn losses from credit markets and to increase reserves following the 
purchase of ABN AMRO. In October 2008, in the absence of other subscribers to a further 
rights issue, HM Government took a stake of more than 57% of the share capital as part of 
operations to avert collapse of the financial sector. The chief executive, Sir Fred Goodwin, 
resigned. In January 2009 the government converted its preference shares to ordinary shares, 
resulting in an increase of its equity stake to 70%. On the same day, RBS announced full-year 
trading losses of between £7bn and £8bn, and writedowns on goodwill, mainly the disastrous 
takeover of Dutch bank ABN AMRO, of about £20bn. 
 
2008 – Irish banks and the property crash:  The collapse of a nationwide property bubble, 
low lending standards, and fraudulent circular transactions triggered enormous losses to 
Ireland‟s major banks on commercial and residential real estate loans. In September 2008, the 
government of Ireland, which was not in deficit before the crisis, guaranteed all liabilities of 
its biggest banks, exceeding 200% of Ireland‟s GDP.  In December 2010 Ireland took an 
€85bn IMF-sponsored rescue package intended to restore confidence and stability. The 
conversion of private liabilities to public necessitated a severe government austerity 
programme. In 2008-9 Ireland‟s economy contracted by 11%, and unemployment rose to 
more than 13% of the labour force.  
 
2008 – Icelandic banks in the UK:  Iceland‟s three major commercial banks, Glitnir, 
Kaupthing, and Landsbanki, expanded massively then fell into debt default and receivership.  
Large-scale fraud and false accounting were found, with connected-party loans and own-
share transactions as well as investment losses.  The UK had been a prominent base for the 
banks‟ expansions (for example, Landsbanki created a UK brand, IceSave).  Creditors and 
depositors of subsidiaries outside Iceland sought or received substantial assistance from  
national governments, and a $4.6 billion IMF-led loan was extended to the government of 
Iceland.  In the UK, the government invoked anti-terrorism legislation to freeze assets, and 
guaranteed the deposits of UK retail investors. A proposal to for the Icelandic government to 
reimburse this money was rejected in a referendum on 11th April 2011.  The Icelandic 
economy reacted sharply, with national currency devaluing and fierce rises in interest rates, 
inflation and unemployment.  
 
2008 – Nationalisation of UK banks: A £500bn rescue package for the UK banking system 
was announced in the first week of October 2008, consisting of short term loans and 
guarantees of debt.  This failed to restore confidence or restart lending between banks, but 
had the effect of making all of Britain‟s high street banks (except for HSBC) partly or wholly 
state controlled. 
 
2008 – Madoff: massive fraud by „wealth management‟ institution:  Investment manager 
Bernard Madoff was arrested, and subsequently jailed for life, after confessing to his sons 
that his wealth management business, in operation since the 1970s, was based on a fraudulent 
(“Ponzi”) scheme. Its marketing relied on “affinity fraud”, using social contacts to attract 
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money from charities, private investors, and the rich and famous. Madoff also ran a large 
broker-dealer business and had been the Chairman of a major US stock market, NASDAQ.  
This case was remarkable for submissions of evidence to the US securities regulator (SEC) in 
May 1999, and again in 2005, by Harry Markopolos, a derivatives expert and trader.  
Markopolos argued forcefully that the most rational explanation for Madoff‟s returns was that 
he was running a Ponzi scheme.  The fraud was officially valued at US$64.8bn; investors had 
paid in (and lost) US$36bn.  Investors sued the trustees and Madoff‟s main adviser banks 
including JP Morgan Chase and HSBC for return of fees and for complicity. 
 
2010 – Investment banks enabled Greece to over-borrow: The Greek economy grew 
rapidly in the early 2000s, fuelled by cheap borrowing in Euros, much of it organized by 
investment banks.  In 2010 it became apparent that the Greek government had engaged in 
transactions designed to hide the true level of borrowing.  Tax evasion was already a severe 
and widespread problem, and the severe austerity measures required by IMF bailouts caused 
civil unrest.  Subsequently, the eurozone countries and the International Monetary Fund have 
agreed a further series of rescue loans, conditional on a new Greek government‟s 
implementation of harsh austerity measures. 
 
2011 – Report of the UK‟s Independent Commission on Banking:  Appointed by the UK 
Parliament, this body published (in April 2011) a report recommending ring-fencing of retail 
banking operations, and a requirement of 10% equity capital applying both to a retail banking 
subsidiary and to the group as a whole. It stopped short of recommending actual breakup of 
universal banks, holding that the costs of this would outweigh the benefits.  A week later, the 
Public Accounts committee report on the progress of taxpayer support for the UK banking 
system: Although banks had repaid nearly half of the £1trillion of public money used for their 
rescues, they reportedly continued to expect public support; also, the mechanisms for winding 
up a failed bank could not handle failure of a major institution, which would still transfer 





All case notes summarised from commercial market analyst reports (Economist Intelligence Unit, 
Technimetrics), contemporary news media accounts (Financial Times, [London] Times, BBC News), 
Exeter University financial markets history web resource (http://www.projects.ex.ac.uk/RDavies/) and 
author’s own recollections.  Any errors of fact or inference are the author’s own.  
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Role function / title Organization description Pilot Main 1 Main 2 
C1 
CRO, Head of Audit; Principal of a trade 
association 
Major retail financial brand; 
Major industry NGO 
X X  
C2 CRO, Managing Director 
Global investment bank, 
EMEA HQ, London 
X X  
SM1 Director, risk product development Global bank, London HQ X X  
SM2 
Director, government relations; Head of a 
trade association  working group 
Major retail financial brand X X  
TA1 Director, Risk Major industry NGO X X X 
ADV1 Director, regulatory relations Professional advisory firm X X  
ADV2 Director, regulatory affairs Professional advisory firm X X  
ADV3 
Director, regulatory relations; head of a 
trade association working group 
Professional advisory firm; 
Major industry NGO 
X X  
ADV4 SVP, regulatory relations Professional advisory firm X X  
ADV5 Managing Director, risk advisory Analytics X X  
C3 CRO, Director 
Global investment bank, 
EMEA HQ, London 
X X  
ADV6 Senior Manager, Risk Professional advisory firm X X  
SM3 
Chairman, Risk Committee; Head of a 
trade association working group 
UK high street bank; Major 
industry NGO 
X X  
C4 
CRO, Director regulatory relations; Head 
of a trade association working group 
Major retail financial brand; 
Major industry NGO 
X X X 
C5 CRO, Head of Risk UK high street bank X X X 
C6 CRO, Head of Risk 
Global bank, UK (wholesale 
market) HQ 
 X  
TA2 AD, regulatory relationships Major industry NGO  X  
C7 CRO International bank, UK HQ  X  
C8 CRO, Managing Director International bank, UK HQ  X  
C9 CRO, Managing Director 
Global bank, EMEA HQ, 
London 
 X  
C10 CRO International bank, UK HQ  X  
C11 CRO, Retail Major UK mortgage bank  X X 
C12 CRO, Head of Group Credit and Risk Global bank, London HQ  X  
C13 CRO 
Global bank, UK (wholesale 
market) HQ 
 X  
C14 CRO Global bank, EU HQ  X  
C15 CRO, Manager Group Credit and Risk Major UK mortgage bank  X  
C16 CRO, Head of Audit UK private bank  X  
C17 CRO International bank, EU HQ  X  
C18 CRO International bank, UK HQ  X X 
C19 CRO, Wholesale Major UK mortgage bank  X  
C20 CRO UK private bank  X  
C21 CRO, Director Risk International bank, EU HQ  X  
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C22 CRO International bank, EU HQ  X  
C23 CRO International bank, UK HQ  X X 
C24 CRO, Head of Risk Major UK high street bank  X X 
C25 CRO, Director Market Risk 
Wholesale banking division of 
high street brand 
 X  
C26 CRO International bank, UK HQ  X  
C27 CRO International bank, UK HQ  X X 
C28 CRO, Head of Global Operational Risk International bank, UK HQ  X  
C29 CRO, Head of Regulatory Risk UK high street bank  X  
C30 CRO, Director of Risk UK high street bank  X  
REG1 Head of Risk regulation Regulator (former banker)  X  
C31 CRO International bank, UK HQ  X  
C32 CRO, Director, Group Risk UK mortgage bank  X  
C33 CRO International bank, UK HQ  X  
C34 CRO, Director of Group Operational Risk UK high street bank  X  
C35 CRO International bank, UK HQ  X  
  Total 15 47 8 
  Grand total interviews   70 
 
Assumptions for table 
 
 CRO status verified by one or more of the following means:  respondent‟s own confirmation; BBA 
member listing / attendance at CRO forums; other CRO (colleague) verification. 
 
 Brief guide to distinguishing bank and business types: 
o Global bank -  active in all major centres of business worldwide 
o International bank -  active in more than one country 
o High street bank -  deposit-taking and servicing for individual customers and local 
businesses 
o Private bank -  deposit-taking for individual wealthy customers   
o Retail banking -  providing “non-expert” financial services, subject to full consumer 
regulation; mainly, taking individuals‟ deposits and lending cash to individual and small-
business borrowers 
o Wholesale banking -  providing professional market services which exclude consumer 
access; includes raising funds through the money markets 
o Investment banking -  buying and selling stakes in business ventures (as opposed to 
simply lending cash to borrowers) 
 
 Interviewee coding:   
o Cxx = CRO;  
o SMxx= Board-level senior manager with responsibility for business risk; 
o ADVxx=Non-banker professional adviser with risk reporting brief (lawyer, auditor, 
analyst, rating agent);  
o TAxx=Director/principal convenor of an industry trade association 
o REGxx=Regulatory agent (and former risk officer). 
 
